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In Dedication

Every year, the *East Asian Studies Journal* is dedicated to a Wittenberg University faculty or staff member who is actively involved in the East Asian Studies Program, promotes academic achievement and encourages students to stretch beyond their limits in their chosen fields of study. The student staff would like to dedicate this year's issue to Dr. Ralph Lenz, our Geography teacher.

Dr. Ralph Lenz has a PhD in Geography from Rutgers University. He joined the Wittenberg faculty in 1976 after one year at the University of South Western Louisiana. Dr. Lenz initial publications in Geographical Analysis show his early focus on quantitative and theoretical research in analyzing map patterns. After taking Fulbright-Hays group trips to multiple places including India, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, Dr. Lenz became increasingly focused on regional research with South East Asia as his area of focus. Dr. Lenz has made 27 visits to Southeast Asia and has published multiple pieces on Indonesia and Vietnam. After receiving a Freeman grant which sponsored visits to Eastern China and the Silk Road, in addition to some other travel time, Dr. Lenz has visited 12 provinces in China. Using his research in China, Dr. Lenz began teaching about Chinese Geography and Chinese minority groups in the Wittenberg East Asian Studies department.

We at the *East Asian Studies Journal* would like to thank Dr. Lenz for his great contribution to our program and passion for sharing East Asian Studies.

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Outbursts of Violence: Reaction to Oppression or Acts of Terrorism? An Analytical Study of Han Chinese and Uighur Muslims Relations

Elizabeth LeFavour

Elizabeth LeFavour is a recent graduate of the University of San Diego class of 2016 with a BA in International Relations and a minor in Asian Studies. Elizabeth received the Ernest N. Morin Award in International Relations awarded and the Outstanding Student Award for Asian Studies from Dr. Yi Sun, Director of the Asian Studies Program at the University of San Diego, for her research pertaining to Uighur Muslims in China. She has interned with Congressman Darrell E. Issa and the World Affairs Council of Jacksonville, Florida as well as with the Justice in Mexico Project documenting and writing briefs on organized crime related homicides in Mexico. Elizabeth will begin her graduate studies in the Fall of 2016 at George Washington University. She will pursue her Masters of Arts in Security Policy Studies with an emphasis on Defense Policy. Her research interests include Chinese and Korean security issues, terrorism, and defense policy in Asia.

On October 28, 2013, a group of five Chinese Uighur drove a jeep into Tiananmen Square in Beijing, set the gas tank on fire, killed two civilians and injured another forty bystanders.¹ The American media was blocked in the Chinese circuit, and the Han Chinese government immediately held the Uighurs of Northwest China responsible for the attack. There was evidence that the attackers had jihadist flags and probably had ties to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement.² Coincidentally, my parents and brother arrived in Beijing on the same day to begin a ten-day Lutheran missionary trip through China. It was certainly nerve-wracking to hear of a "terrorist" attack in China when

Jiang, Steven, and Katie Hunt. "Five Arrested in Tiananmen Square Incident, Deemed a Terrorist Attack." CNN 30 Oct. 2013: n. Print.

² Ibid.

my family was landing in the country.

I now know violent incidents are frequent occurrences and the Han Chinese government would label the Uighurs as violent terrorists to justify oppression against the ethnic group. The tension between the Uighur minority and the Han majority has instigated much of the violence in China. The Uighur, a Turkicspeaking group of ten million Muslims, reside mainly in the Xinjiang province of northwest China. The central question for both the Chinese government and state actors worldwide is whether the marginalization of the Uighurs by the Han Chinese inspires them to join forces with modern jihadists of the Islamic State. Recently, there have been many examples of Uighur violence in China. Just one year after the incident in Tiananmen Square, on March 2, 2014, eight Uighurs, allegedly armed with knives, attacked civilians in a train station in southern China. This event killed approximately thirty- three and wounded another 143.3 At the site of the "Kunming Attack," authorities claimed they found a jihadist East Turkistan Flag.⁴ On May 31, 2014, a few Uighurs supposedly crashed two cars into an Urumqi market and killed thirty-one people. 5 It can be easy to agree with the Han government and label these events as "acts of terrorism." One could then draw the conclusion that Uighurs are connected to the Islamic State and should be viewed through a parallel lens. A comprehensive understanding, however, sheds light on the flaws of such interpretations. Throughout the history of China, Muslims have been on the receiving end of stereotypes and mistreatment. Consequently, the Uighurs have grown frustrated, and many resent the Han government for what they perceive as unfair policies and practices. This paper is intended to address the questions as to whether these instances of Uighur violence are acts of terrorism or the result of ethnic oppression. To answer these questions, this paper examines China's domestic Han-Uighur relations as well as the external influences of the War on Terrorism.

In responding to the questions of whether the instances of Uighur violence are outcomes of ethnic subjugation or terrorist activity, the key is to understand what the violence represents for the Uighur. Naturally, Uighur violence today

³ Associated Press. "China Blames Uighur Separatists for Knife Attack at Train Station That Leaves 33 People Dead." Fox News 02 Mar. 2014: n. pag. Print.

^{4 &}quot;Urumqi Attack Kills 31 in China's Xinjiang Region." *BBC News*. N.p., 23 May 2014.Web. 29 June 2015.

⁵ Ibid.

stems from domestic factors including oppression from the Han, as well as from international factors including the global jihadist movement, globalization, and the development of the Islamic State. Since 1949, the Uighurs in China have been facing increased restriction from the Han government, including limitations on Islamic religious practices, control of mosques in local villages, and restrictions to enter the job force in growing industries. In the 1980s, the violence increased as the Muslims protested the subjugation; one of the most significant events was the Rushdie Affair in 1989, when 3,000 Muslims marched to Beijing, triggering similar responses throughout China. This violence shaped the events today that China now labels "acts of terrorism."

Internationally, the events surrounding 9/11 changed the experience for Muslims in China. The countries in the international system continue to put forth policies to prevent terrorist attacks. Security continues to increase and the Uighurs have adapted themselves to the forces of globalization. The media, economics, and human rights groups play a role in the changing experiences of the Uighurs. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent events, many perpetrated by Islamist extremists, have tarnished the reputation of the Uighur. To understand whether the Uighur are acting against oppression or whether their outbursts are examples of terrorism, the history and global context must be comprehensively understood and evaluated.

Historical Experiences of the Uighurs in China

Islam in China is historically as significant as Buddhism or Confucianism in the context of Uighur history in China. After the death of Muhammad, Muslims conquered land in the Middle East and developed a sophisticated army. A segment of the army came to the Chinese border in the middle of the 8th century and to establish contact with the Chinese Emperor. Traders came from the Middle East and helped to develop the Silk Road. Many of these Muslims settled in the Western provinces of modern day China near Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In the 14th Century, during the Ming dynasty, the Muslims integrated into Chinese society; in some instances even joining the Chinese army.

During the 17th Century, during the Qing dynasty, violence increased

- 6 "Islam in China." China Highlights.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.
- Poston, Dudley, Wadha Saeed Khamis Alnuaimi, and Li Zhang. "The Social Demography of China's Muslims." Modern China Studies 18.1 (2011): 14-71. Ebsco.com.Web. 2 Apr. 2015.

significantly between the Qing Dynasty and Muslims. Sinicization was largely directed at the Muslim minorities in China and the Confucians tried to replace the native Muslim tribal systems with Chinese administration. The government sent Han immigrants to the region with the order to assimilate the Muslims into "mainstream Han culture." Generally speaking, the Muslims faced marginalization, discrimination, and subjugation by the government rather than assimilation. The oppression from the central government, has contributed to the Uighur violence that has become prevalent today.

After the Qing dynasty, the experiences for most Uighurs in China changed significantly. Once the dynasty officially ended in 1912, the Uighurs enjoyed a level of autonomy in northwest China. In 1933, Turkic Rebels declared the land to be named the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan.8 This autonomy was short-lived, and in 1949 with the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Communist party took control of the land and declared it a province of China again. The PRC opposed the Uighurs, a minority collectivized around a religion, for fear of potential rebellion. The communists argued that Xinjiang province had been a part of China since 200 B.C.E.9 Though the PRC promised a degree of cultural autonomy through Article 77 in the new constitution, the policy restriction essentially nullified the freedoms that the Uighurs were given. 10 Certainly some of the violent tendencies of the Uighur, emerged prior to 1949, however, the shift in government rule altered Beijing's strategy toward the Uighur significantly. From 1951-53, the PRC expropriated religious lands. In 1954, China adopted the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to foster the assembly of agricultural hubs in western China. The XPCC used security forces and police to control the region and execute Beijing's goal to move "westward." In many ways, this plan failed to provide the same infrastructure and development that was evident

Wighurs and China's Xinjiang Region." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, 29 Mar. 2012. Web. 30 June 2015.

⁹ Ibid.

[&]quot;Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization." UNPO: Cultural Policy in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (East Turkistan). N.p., n.d. Web. 30 June 2015. Article 77 of the Constitution allows the deputies to the National People's Congress to be under the supervision of units, which elected them.

^{11 &}quot;Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, 29 May 2012. Web. 30 June 2015.

in Special Economic Zones like Shenzhen. The centers of culture in China experienced greater success and development.

Additionally, due to Beijing's development plan, the percentage of Uighurs living in Xinjiang dropped from 76 percent in 1949 to 47 percent in 1986. ¹² China justified this shift in demographics as a necessary economic policy that the Uighurs were simply not equipped to handle. ¹³ Beijing argued that the reforms instituted in education, coupled with the Han military presence would strengthen the region. In reality, the Uighurs were treated as second-class citizens that Beijing hoped to control in the region. The central government planned to strengthen the Xinjiang economy, but there was also a motivation to ethnically cleanse the region of Muslims and eliminate sentiments of separatism. The west remained a frontier and the attempts to develop the land actually had an adverse effect and created tension between the Han immigrants and the Uighur populations.

Notably, the Uighurs attitude towards the traditional Confucian concept of filial piety is another factor in the historical analysis of the Uighur in the PRC era. According to Raphael Israeli, a scholar with specific research interests in central Asia, the principle of "Xiao (孝)" or filial piety is one of the central tenets of Chinese Confucianism.¹⁴ The respect for ancestors, be it the relationship of the parent to son, tutor to student, or emperor to society is central to the success of humanity. ¹⁵ Since the Uighur do not follow the practice of filial piety, the Han Chinese have found further reason to justify the Uighurs as social outcasts.

The condemnation of the Uighur culture did not end with the criticism of their filial piety, but rather many factors contributed to the Uighur suppression during the PRC. The Han took most opportunities to patronize and demonize the Uighur. Early 1950s marked the beginning of Islamaphobia in China. The organization of their societies was a key catalyst for the tension; Muslims in China focused on the local congregation, but understood their role in the larger Islamic community. Individual Uighurs focused on their local organization, but felt a spiritual connection to Mecca and Allah making

^{12 &}quot;Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization." *UNPO: Cultural Policy in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (East Turkistan)*. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 June 2015.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Israeli, Raphael. *Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002. Print.p.10.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.11.

the conformity to Confucianism in China more difficult. Conversely, the Han were conditioned by Confucianism and found it easier to conform to the Confucian government. Differences in social organizations, cultural traditions and religious practices were the breeding grounds for violence. As early as the 1950s the Han Chinese began to fear Muslims for their religious practices and rituals. This fear prompted reforms from the Han Chinese that served to increase the violence and perpetuate the Uighur hostility.

In the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution completely transformed the Uighur experience in China. During the Cultural Revolution (1966 until 1979), Beijing fought diligently to control the Uighurs. Mosques were shut down and littered with pigs to disparage the Muslim tradition. Uighur language was banned from schools, and writers were arrested for attempts to advance separatism. Those Uighurs wearing beards or head scarves were arrested on the streets.¹⁷ These restrictions laid the groundwork for the violence that is prevalent today. Mao Zedong's goal was to eliminate the vestige of a traditional Chinese society and replace it with communist rule extended to all of China. His efforts to bring a new found stability into China through heavy-handed political mechanisms actually initiated violence in the Xinjiang province.

It is worth noting that Uighur are not the only Muslim group in China. The Uighur are the largest Muslim group with ten million people concentrated in the Xinjiang province of China's northwest. The Hui are the second largest Muslim group with 9.5 million people who are spread in all of the major cities. He Hui are considered to be the most assimilated because of their efforts to speak Mandarin and their abandonment of Islamic religious practices like the five daily prayers and the fasting during Ramadan. Part of the assimilation could be geography since there are many Hui located in Dongbei region as well as Beijing, while the Uighurs are centered in Xinjiang closer to the Middle East than East Asia. Thus, the Hui are considered the "good Muslims" in the eyes of Han Chinese, while Uighurs are the "bad Muslims." There are eight additional groups of Muslim minorities including: the Kazak, Dongxiang,

¹⁶ Israeli, Raphael. *Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002. Print. p. 18.

¹⁷ Kurlantzick, Joshua. "The Unsettled West." *Foreign Affairs* July 2004: n. pag. Print.

¹⁸ Poston, Dudley, Wadha Saeed Khamis Alnuaimi, and Li Zhang. "The Social Demography of China's Muslims." Modern China Studies 18.1 (2011): 14-71. Ebsco.com.Web. 2 Apr. 2015.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.20.

²⁰ Ibid, p.28.

Kirgiz, Salar, Tajik, Bonan, Ozbek, and Tatar.²¹ Its behavior of each Muslim group is directly dependent upon their experience as a minority in China.

Even the Hui were on the receiving end of violence from the Han government. In 1967, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) closed mosques and burned Islamic books in Shadian, a Hui village. Many of the Hui came to Beijing and protested the discrimination and restriction of their religious practice. This protest escalated and at one point involved nearly 10,000 PLA troops to suppress the "violence." This event killed 1,000 Hui and destroyed close to 4,000 homes.²² The way of PLA suppression was clearly excessive, however, there were no clear ramifications for the Army. This serves as an example of the mistreatment that Muslims (not only Uighurs) experienced during the 1960s. Arguably, the Hui protests triggered the PLA action, however, there are even worse incidents exemplified by the Uighurs. In 1968, the East Turkistan People's Revolution Party, established by the Soviet Union, smashed the headquarters of the CCP in Yining after the central government attempted to stop Muslims fleeing to the Soviet Union²³. The heavy-handed control from Beijing resulted in greater unrest from the Uighurs and led to further violence throughout the early 1970s.

In 1978, the political climate in China changed as the central government modernized under Deng Xiaoping. The PRC decided to shift focus back to the 1954 Constitution in the spirit of progress. In theory, this change granted ethnic minorities the right to preserve their customs within the protection of Chinese law.²⁴ Rafael Israeli discusses the fact that Chinese Muslims stand out from other ethnic minorities for several reasons. First, Muslims are not concentrated into one province and therefore cannot be dealt with as one "autonomous region." Second, Chinese Muslims think of Allah and Islam in higher regard than central Chinese authority. Third, Chinese Islam is not only a religion, but also a way of life; Muslims organize their day through their prayers, and follow detailed prescriptions from the Qur'an about how to live a holy, meaningful life of service.²⁵ These differences make it very

²¹ Ibid, pp.30-34

²² Israeli, Raphael. *Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002. Print. p.263.

²³ Wang, David. *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident of 1944-1949 in Xinjiang*. Diss. University of Tasmania, Australia, 1993. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

²⁴ Ibid, p.241.

²⁵ Ibid, p.242.

difficult for the Han Chinese to easily "deal" with the Uighur and Muslims as an entire minority. As time progressed, the opinion of the Han towards Uighurs became increasingly hostile and by the 1980s the government began to label Uighurs as "terrorists."

In the late 1970s, the government under Deng Xiaoping, seemed to loosen its grip on Muslims in China in the spirit of modernization. The restriction to attend Hajj was lifted by the PRC in 1979 and today a total of 50,000 Muslims from China have made the spiritual journey to Saudi Arabia. ²⁶ The Uighurs welcomed this conciliatory gesture by Beijing government in the short term, but in the long term it backfired. Historical ties to Islam inspired many Uighurs to migrate or partake on the pilgrimage to Mecca in order to renew their spiritual connection to Allah. As a result, the Uighurs became less loyal and more hostile to the central government. As time progressed, many of the economic reforms imposed by the Han government shortchanged minority groups in China. While the reforms were generally well received, the pricing reform, for example, that allowed for some fixed prices and other prices to float, benefited the rich and hurt the poor. The money supply also increased too dramatically leaving many factories out of business. In 1989, approximately 3,000 Muslims marched on Beijing, commonly referred to as the Rushdie Affair, which subsequently inspired similar marches in other regions. In Lanzhou, known as the Mecca of China's Islamic community, as many as 20,000 Muslims marched to protest the religious restrictions, lack of job opportunities, and overall quality of life within the Han government in power.²⁷ Furthermore, China could no longer isolate its Muslims from the Islamic world evident by the thousands of Chinese Muslims who attended the annual Hajj in Mecca.²⁸ As the world changed and cultures began to more easily "clash," the Muslims in China yearned for more than the repression they experienced within their borders.

The Uighur Experience After 9-11

The Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon completely changed the daily life for the Uighurs in China. Most Muslims witnessed drastic transformations, and depending on the individual, the experience that followed the terrorist attacks was quite difficult.

Through globalization, the Uighurs found themselves living in a

^{26 &}quot;Islam in China." China Highlights.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.

²⁷ Israeli, Raphael. *Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics.* Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002. Print. p. 267.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 272.

global society that feared Islamic Terrorism. In the United States, the Bush administration stressed the policy that countries either had to align with the U.S and combat terrorism or they would be considered an enemy. As China increases its international profile, it likely felt the need to publicly support the Unites States' War on Terror. On November 29, 2001, China released a document through the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, which stated that the "East Turkistan" terrorists had carried out several attacks. Arguably, China had been dealing with the Uighur issue prior to 9–11, but the shift in focus on Islamic extremism likely prompted Beijing to formally classify ETIM as a terrorist organization and back the fight on terrorism. These attacks began in 1990 within China's borders and in 1997 outside of China primarily in Turkey and Uzebekistan. The release provided information, which cited direct ties to Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. The report stated that the Eastern

Islamic Movement (ETIM) was led by Bin Laden, had received training and weapons from the Taliban, and "fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent activities." In the wake of 9/11, China's report on terrorism within their borders alarmed U.S. officials. The U.S. quickly labeled ETIM as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group" in 2002, and detained at least twenty-two Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay throughout the war. Some of these Uighurs were apprehended by coalition forces in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and sent to Guantanamo Bay. The United States government was very willing to apprehend Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay and then allow the Chinese government access to these individuals. A U.S. Department of Justice briefing from the FBI reports that several Uighur detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation while interrogated at Guantanamo Bay. It is clear that the United States also

- 29 Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. "Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by "Eastern Turkistan" Organizations and Their Links with Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban." Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by "Eastern Turkistan" Organizations and Their Links with Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. N.p., 29 Nov. 2001. Web. 30 June 2015.
- 30 Drennan, Justine. "Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?" Foreign Policy Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse Comments. Foreign Policy, 09 Feb. 2015. Web. 30 June 2015.
- 31 Tharoor, Ishaan. "A Brief History of the Uighurs." *TIME* 9 July 2009: n. pag. Web. 26 Oct. 2015.
- 32 United States of America. Department of Justice. Office of Inspector General. A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq. N.p.: n.p., 2008. Print.

felt that the Uighurs should be treated as terrorists alongside Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

Prior to 9/11, Uighur violence was not a "hot topic" issue studied among scholars. However, the increased focus on the Uighurs due to the possible connection to terrorism has resulted in an increased interest in the Uighurs. Global context plays a large role in answering the question of whether or not the outbursts by the Uighurs are acts of terrorism. Through the media, economics, and human rights groups, countries around the world have begun to pay closer attention to the activities of the Uighurs and the Chinese response.

It is also important to note the difficulty for Muslims to live everyday life China as a result of 9/11. On July 5, 2009, in Urumqi, violence broke out between Uighurs and Han, which left 140 dead and 830 arrested. One hospital did record 274 patients, only 54 of which were Muslims. The hospital stated there were significantly more Han casualties than Uighurs, although both sides suffered losses. 33 The primary cause for the violence was the Shaoguan incident, which occurred a month before, in which Han toy factory workers blamed two Uighur men for the sexual assault of a Han woman. While killing is not justifiable, many question the validity of Uighur protests and violence against the Han. Analyzing the situation only through the lens of the Han would not be fair. Arguably, the event was provoked in part by the Han and blaming the Uighurs is not an accurate depiction of the regional security in Urumqi. The immediate interviews with local Han reported that they felt more secure against Uighurs with the increased police presence. Various sources that refrain from identifying as Uighur, Han, or another ethnicity provide descriptions that Uighur hospital workers refused care to Han and beat and killed Han in the streets.³⁴ From the alternate perspective, the Uighurs began by peacefully protesting the lack of government action in regards to the factory incident the month before. It was not until the Chinese police forces brutally attempted to restrain the Uighurs that the violence turned deadly.³⁵ The original intent of the Uighurs was peaceful communication with the central government and

³³ Branigan, Tania. "Ethnic Violence in China Leaves 140 Dead." *The Guardian.com.* N.p., 6 July 2009. Web. 30 June 2015.

³⁴ Branigan, Tania. "Ethnic Violence in China Leaves 140 Dead." The Guardian.com. N.p., 6 July 2009.Web. 30 June 2015.

^{35 &}quot;Worldwide Uyghur Protests on Second Anniversary of 5 July 2009." Uyghurcongress.org. World Uyghur Congress, 8 July 2011. Web. 26 Oct. 2015.

expression of opinion rather than traumatic, impactful violence.

After the 2009 incident in Urumqi, the central government began to implement restrictions on the Uighurs pertaining to employment, religious practice, and social identity. The primary cause of these restrictions is the population growth of Uighurs in the Xinjiang province and the need for the central government to provide adequate resources for survival. Wealth is consolidated in the hands of the Han in China, so the Han saw reforms for the Uighur as policy improvements.³⁶ The primary issue, however, is that both private and public organizations have discriminatory hiring processes and believe that because of their wealth and social standing in China, they have the right to place restrictions on the Uighur.³⁷ Many of these restrictions were then supported by the central government. For example, in 2014, two significant restrictions were placed on Uighurs by the Han government. The first restriction occurred in July of 2014, when China banned fasting during Ramadan in Xinjiang. It is likely with the increasing numbers of Uighurs traveling to Mecca for Hajj and as China's international profile elevates, it feels more justifiable to emulate the American and Western European in their approach to counter Islamist extremists. In China's case, the violence perpetrated by the Uighurs served as a pretext for further crackdown. It is more convenient to say any acts of violence are acts of terrorism. For example, in the Ruoqiang county of Xinjiang, teachers were denied the freedom to fast for Ramadan, and posters were hung in the school advocating that students also refrain from the practice.³⁸ Most recently, in January of 2015, also in Urumqi, burqas were prohibited and a law passed that restricted residents from wearing the traditional Muslim head covering in public places.³⁹ In Karamay, the burqa, large beards, and dresses with the star and crescent symbol were also prohibited. ⁴⁰ The Han's purpose for such restrictions is fairly simplistic: to create one uniform Chinese culture rid of all ties to traditional Muslim practices. While it is important to note that many minorities in Southeast China, such as Yunnan and Guangxi,

³⁶ Bhattacharji, Preeti. "Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 29 May 2012. Web. 26 Oct. 2015.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Associated Press. "China Bans Ramadan Fasting in Muslim Northwest | Al Jazeera America." *China Bans Ramadan Fasting in Muslim Northwest* | *Al Jazeera America*. N.p., 3 July 2014. Web. 30 June 2015.

³⁹ Jiang, Steven. "China Bans Wearing Burqa in Biggest Muslim City." CNN.com. N.p., 14 Jan. 2015. Web. 8 Apr. 2015.

⁴⁰ Jiang, Steven. "China Bans Wearing Burqa in Biggest Muslim City." CNN.com. N.p., 14 Jan. 2015. Web. 8 Apr. 2015.

do enjoy some level of cultural autonomy, the Xinxiang province has been especially repressed for their religious differences.

Beijing's goal to restrict Muslims in China is more complex than just banning burqas or fasting. Due to the increased violent tendencies of the Uighurs, China has even gone as far to label some Uighur extremist groups as terrorists. For example, on April 28, 2013, a press release on CCTV blamed a violent clash that killed fifteen on "terrorists" from the "Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region." The media in China more often than not portrays the Uighur Muslims as terrorists. Though the central government does not view all Uighurs as terrorists, the media portrayal is not balanced and representative of the Uighurs as an entire ethnic group.

The Media: Portrayal of the Uighurs through Western lens

Internationalization of the Global War on Terrorism played a role in the media and helped shape the western perspective on Muslims in Central Asia and China. In the media, the U.S. and Great Britain are the primary news sources publishing articles on Uighurs outside of China. The media has a tendency to polarize political situations; often, have either labeled the Uighurs as "terrorists" or as freedom fighters rebelling against the oppressive, communist rule. For example, recently, TIME magazine, an article was published titled, "Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on Separatist Muslim Uighurs." The article uses rhetoric such as "bloodshed," "assailants," and "wielding attackers" to describe the Uighurs. ⁴² The U.S. as the main force fighting the Global War on Terrorism, faces an especially difficult position. Thus, does the U.S. have to choose between supporting the Uighurs as freedom fighters versus supporting China as an ally? This question probes at the very nature of the U.S. position internationally. The U.S. certainly has a vested interest in the affairs of Central Asia. Following 9/11, the U.S. media tracked the possibility of terrorism emerging in all corners of the world. In a recent Foreign Policy article titled, "Is China making its own Terrorism Problem Worse?" a State Department official says that the U.S. designated

^{41 &}quot;Authorities Identify 15 Victims in Xinjiang Terrorist Clash." *CCTV* [Beijing] 29 Apr. 2013: n. pag. Print.

⁴² Beech, Hannah. "Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on Separatist Muslim Uighurs." *Time*. Time, n.d. Web. 07 Nov. 2015.

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization because of the evidence that China posted at the time about terrorist attacks on China's homeland and the connection to the Xinjiang province. ⁴³ Consequently, the U.S. government took the Chinese opinion at face value. Though we cannot be certain of the true opinions of U.S. government officials, in reality, the U.S. willingly agreed with China and supported ETIM being labeled as a terrorist organization. Perhaps this was to maintain peace; however; the U.S. has changed its opinion in the media and has offered increased sympathy for the Uighurs. For example, in the *Christian Monitor*, an article titled, "China's Uighurs: Who are they, and why are they unhappy?" questions exactly who the Uighur are as an ethnic group, outlines their grievances, and offers solutions for the central government. One suggestion is made that Beijing focus on the economic development in Xinjiang rather than strictly working to "combat terrorism." This is a common theme throughout U.S. policy and the State Department has since removed ETIM from the list of terrorist organizations. ⁴⁴

Recently, the western media is the portrayal of the Uighurs' lifestyle on a day-to-day basis. Justine Drennan makes the claim that scholars, human rights groups, and Uighur advocates are arguing that China is exacerbating the threat of the Uighurs to validate the actions taken in Xinjiang. ⁴⁵ Furthermore, in *The Atlantic* piece, "The Uighurs, China's Embattled Muslim Minority," James Palmer discusses the Uighurs' struggle to find their identity in the post 9-11 world. The article sheds light on renowned Shanghai photographer, Eleanor Moseman, who provides images of the Uighurs in their everyday life to express that they are still actively searching for their identity within the PRC and the Muslim community. ⁴⁶ This representation considerate of the Uighur situation in Xinjiang, aims to share more about the Uighurs as worthy of rights and freedom to enjoy everyday life. According to *PBS*, Ms. Moseman has embarked on biking expeditions to the Xinjiang province and spent over

⁴³ Drennan, Justine. "Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?" Foreign Policy Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse Comments. Foreign Policy, 09 Feb. 2015. Web. 30 June 2015.

⁴⁴ Ford, Peter. "China's Uighurs: Who Are They, and Why Are They Unhappy?" *CS Monitor*. N.p., 9 Nov. 2013. Web. 7 Nov. 2015.

⁴⁵ Drennan, Justine. "Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?" Foreign Policy Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse Comments. Foreign Policy, 09 Feb. 2015. Web. 30 June 2015.

⁴⁶ Palmer, James. "The Uighurs, China's Embattled Muslim Minority, Are Still Seeking an Identity." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 27 Sept. 2013. Web. 30 June 2015.

a year living with Uighur families to provide the most accurate depiction of how the Uighurs live. Her photography shows the tender love Uighur women have for their babies, generations living under one roof, and Uighur men and boys praying publicly before school daily.⁴⁷ Recently, the Global Times reported that 300 Chinese extremists have been fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In January of 2015, another 300 Chinese left for Malaysia to join the organization.⁴⁸ Though this figure cannot be validated, the reality is that when the media uses a fear-inducing, hyperbolic tone for their reports there are detrimental effects for the Uighur. First, it paints the Uighurs in a light that classifies them as equal to ISIS. As media outlets repeat these numbers, it creates a fear against Uighurs. This fear then creates anger and hostility for young Uighurs who may join ISIS in pursuit of a cause that is meaningful to them. Though 300 may seem like a high number when publicized in the media, it is important to remember that there are 10 million Uighurs in China. This means that only .003% of the population is possibly linked to the Islamic State terrorist organization. Perspective is important in understanding the gravity of the media reports.

Economics: Oil Industry and Uighur Discontent

Another aspect of the global context for Uighurs is the increasing interest in the Xinjiang province due to the region's oil sources. This contributes to Han enthusiasm to build infrastructure and to encourage Han immigrants to settle in the region. As of 2014, oil from the Xinjiang province accounted for one-fifth of total oil in China. Thus, in China's new five-year plan, Xinjiang is be considered one of the main energy bases with the aim to build a "New Silk Road" stretching from Xinjiang to Central Asia and Europe. 49 China is investing billions in regional infrastructure to create electricity lines and oil plants. Oil, natural gas, and coal are all found in abundance in the Xinjiang province. Companies such as PetroChina are capitalizing on the opportunity to profit by exporting these high demand resources internationally. Investors are

⁴⁷ Ponsot, Elisabeth. "Who Are the Uighurs?" *PBS.org*. PBS, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 7 Nov. 2015.

⁴⁸ Yongzheng, Qiu. "Turkey's Ambiguous Policies Help Terrorists Join IS Jihadist Group: Analyst." Global Times. N.p., 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 30 June 2015.

⁴⁹ Wong, Edward. "China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and Also Strife." The New York Times. The New York Times, 20 Dec. 2014. Web. 30 June 2015.

key to the success of this new enterprise, and China is looking internationally for employees consequently eliminating the Uighur workforce. For example, the New York Times reported in October of 2013, that half of the positions in the oil industry were labeled as non-Muslim only. Thus, the Uighur were frozen out of the gas and oil industries. The situation heightened as local authorities local authorities introduced restrictions on the beards and burgas of Uighurs. It is important to understand that through economics, Beijing could very well be radicalizing the young, unemployed Uighurs. The radicalized Uighurs then speak out in the form of organized protests and rallies fighting for their ability to have a steady income and participate in their local economy. The hiring discrimination is due in part because of ethnic tension between the Han run companies and the Uighur "slums." As the "insurgencies" from Uighurs increase in frequency, the Han are less willing to hire them to work in the oil companies and more likely to impose restrictions on their Islamic faith.⁵⁰ Though the same argument could be made for disadvantaged Muslims elsewhere, the Uighurs are a unique story because typically the indigenous is actually forced to work in the critical industries for low pay. In the case of the Uighur, they are not even being given the chance to have employment.

Advocacy Groups: Uighur Activism in a Globalized World

Advocacy groups have emerged recently to promote better standards of living and employment opportunities for the Uighurs. The largest Uighur advocacy group is the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) based in Munich, Germany. From April 13–16, 2014, the WUC along with the Underrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) held a conference. This conference aimed to "lift the veil" on the secrecy of the "killing" of Uighur in northwest China, to raise awareness, and create the foundation for a dialogue about the issue. ⁵¹ This kind of international conversation about the Uighur is a recent phenomenon. International Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and representatives from more than fifteen countries were in attendance at the conference. This collaboration has laid the groundwork for the possibility of both terrorism stemming from the region and a significant case of human

⁵⁰ China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and Also Strife

^{51 &}quot;Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization." *UNPO: Cultural Policy in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (East Turkistan)*. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 June 2015.

rights violations from the Han government. Thus, the question of whether the Uighur are terrorists or oppressed minorities is extremely difficult to answer.

In Familiar Strangers, Jonathan Lipman argues that the world must know the historical context of the Uighur violence. He points out that in America we needed to tell the story of the African American or the woman because they were just as much a part of the history as were the white people or the men. ⁵² Therefore, in connection to the situation in China, hasty generalizations lead to oversimplifications about the Uighur Muslims. Lipman is arguing that history cannot be a dichotomy in which a person must be "more Chinese or more Muslim," but rather, that they could be both at once. ⁵³ Therefore, Beijing labeling the Uighurs as distinctly different than the Han majority undermines their efforts at peace. The Uighurs feel more isolated and "separate" from the central government and do not respect the Han as a legitimate form of government.

Outbursts of Violence: Reaction to Oppression or Acts of Terrorism?

This paper focused on what the outbursts of violence represent for Uighurs in China. History and the global context must be evaluated and understood at the most nuanced level.

Historically, after the PRC was founded, Uighurs faced a new experience in China. Even though all religions experienced a change, the Uighurs suffered considerably worse. Though promised autonomy at first, the Xinjiang province was taken in 1949 and the new government controlled increased amounts of the territory through the expropriation of religious lands. During the 1960's Cultural Revolution, the Han took control of mosques, increased restrictions on religious practices and began to increase the presence of the PLA to control the "rebellious" Uighur. In a matter of a few decades, the Uighur lost their livelihood and their freedom. In the 1980s, the Uighur were tired of remaining silent to the mistreatment. In 1989, during the Rushdie Affair, 3,000 Muslims marched on Beijing. This inspired similar marches in northwest China. The Rushdie Affair marked the beginning of the modern day violence that remains in the news cycles today. As globalization became a reality, Muslims in China became markedly interested in their connection to the Islamic World. The

⁵² Lipman, Jonathan Neaman. Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China. Seattle: U of Washington, 1997. Print. p. 212.

⁵³ Ibid, p.227.

number of participants that attended the Hajj in Mecca grew exponentially.

In terms of the global context, 9/11 changed the dialogue in regard to "terrorism." Though the public does not know the exact reasons for China's actions in 2001 following the attacks on the U.S., China released the document labeling the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization. The U.S. supported China's distinction of Uighurs as terrorists. As time progressed, the voices of Human Rights organizations and the U.S. media became more sympathetic and described Uighurs as persecuted ethnic minorities in need of international reprieve. As a result, the truth is hard to discern in amongst the varying labels for Uighurs. In my opinion, terrorism certainly exists in northwest China. It cannot be denied that some Uighurs are involved with ETIM and ISIS and have the goal to embark on international jihad to establish the Islamic State. With that being said, domestic factors are exacerbating the issue in China. Not all Uighurs are terrorists, and in fact, most are not. Generally speaking, the Uighurs are an oppressed ethnic minority having to acclimate themselves to a world that fears Islam and terrorism.

The question of the Uighurs is difficult to discern with a balanced approach. In good conscience, one cannot say they are more "oppressed ethnic minority" or more "Islamic terrorist." Rather, the best answer is that within their culture and ethnic group there are some Uighurs that are terrorists that have joined forces with ISIS. Conversely, the majority of Uighurs simply wants to live their lives. Therefore, the Han are not justified to treat the Uighurs as second-class citizens and restrict their religious freedoms. Domestic factors play the largest role in the violence and, in fact, have instigated violence in China. Uighur ferocity is primarily rooted in the economic deprivation, restriction, and persecution by the Han government. A very small percentage of the Uighurs have identified with the goals of the. I argue that by peeling into the roots of the Uighur experience and understanding the context of Muslims in China helps to understand the acts of violence. Though terrorist in nature, the outbursts should be considered expressions of resentment for years of subjugation by the Han Chinese. The situation is complex and history plays an important role in being able to grasp the political situation for the Uighur going forward.

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The Swords of Japan: A Window of Modernization

Michael Herman

Michael Herman graduated from the University of San Diego in San Diego, CA in the class of 2015 with a major in History and a minor in Naval Science. His studies involve military history and the evolution of warfare. After graduating, Michael commissioned as an Officer in the United States Navy and chose to be stationed in Yokosuka, Japan so he could learn Japanese and continue his studies in Japanese history and culture.

The year 1868 marked nationwide turmoil and unrest in Japan as civil war gripped the country by its core and forced it to change its ancient ways. With the young Emperor Meiji in place, a radical change of Japanese culture ensued as the country moved wholesale into Western learning in the cultural, social and economic arenas. With the feudal system and samurai class virtually dismantled, Japan moved away from many of its old traditions and brought in everything that was new and modern. During this time, the military was not unaffected. The Imperial Army and Navy adopted Western military advisors and technology completely redefining the image of the Japanese warrior. While the Japanese warrior used to be defined by a high level of swordsmanship, spirituality, and discipline, ever since the introduction of the firearm in the 15th century warriors slowly became defined by how well they could march and shoot a rifle.¹

The samurai class, which had not given up their power and status quietly, was largely dismissed by the government so that newer systems of politics and economics could have the chance to gain some momentum. But those who have studied World War II Japan or even seen movies depicting that time period may have noticed that WWII-era Japanese soldiers believed they were acting like samurai in certain rituals and even carried government-issue

Thomas Cleary, Soul of the Samurai: Modern Translations of Three Classic Works of Zen & Bushido (North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2014), 5.

samurai swords. It is curious how this came to be since only decades earlier the Meiji government had made it illegal to carry samurai swords under the Haitorei edit (1876) in an attempt to modernize. This modernization which persisted well into the 20th century, was very intrusive to Japanese society ultimately led to a rise of the Japanese nationalist fervor in the mid-1890's.2 This rise in nationalism saw a return to and gross distortion of Japanese traditional values through concepts like "bushido," commonly known as "the way of the warrior." Many scholars argue that the radical break away from Japanese culture, and subsequent interest in feudal Japan and the Samurai, was a response to the rapid urbanization and industrialization of their society. I will test this by examining the change in the primary weapon of the traditional Japanese warrior, the sword, from the Edo period to World War II and what this change can tell us about the development of the Japanese warrior and the nation he fought for during the late Meiji period through the Imperial era. This will show that swords give us a window with incredible insight to the changes Japan was undergoing in this period.

Feudal Era Samurai

From the 12th to the mid 19th century, Japan was fundamentally a feudal society. Just as in medieval Europe, there were the merchants, the artisans and a large class of serfs and peasants, all of whom were essentially servants to the small upper class of warriors known as the samurai. This upper class aristocracy, just like the knights of early feudal Europe, largely consisted of mounted, armored warriors. The word "samurai" itself came from the Chinese verb 与 literally meaning "those who serve" because Samurai were warrior-servants of a feudal lord or *daimyo*. ⁴ From the 14th century to the 17th century, warfare became endemic throughout Japan as loyalty to the emperor dwindled and power changed from one military family to another. Consequently, much as in the case of feudal Europe, such extensive periods of warfare brought great admiration for military virtues of honor, bravery, discipline and acceptance of death. As Harvard professor of East–Asian studies Edwin Reichauer states, "Lacking any religious injunctions against suicide, in defeat they commonly

² Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 81, 85.

³ Karl F. Friday, "Bushidō or Bull? A Medieval Historian's Perspective on the Imperial Army and the Japanese Warrior Tradition," *The History Teacher* 27, no. 3 (May 1, 1994): 340.

⁴ Reischauer, *The Japanese Today*, 52-53.

took their own lives rather than accept humiliation... by means of cutting one's own abdomen... to demonstrate will-power and maintain honor." This gruesome and extremely painful act was called *harakiri*, literally "belly-slitting" but better known as *seppuku* and has survived to modern times as an honorable way to escape an intolerable situation. ⁵

In addition to warfare, Japanese warriors prided themselves on their skill in the arts of poetry and calligraphy.⁶ It even became provincial law that samurai devote time to literature as it became more relevant in dealing with political matters in the early 17th century as peace began under the administration of a Tokugawa Shogunate in 1600, "The study of literature and the practice of the military arts, including archery and horsemanship, must be cultivated diligently." This peace, which lasted nearly 250 years, created problems for the ruling warrior class who sought to be relevant in a time without war. One 17th century samurai who heavily pondered this issue was Yamaga Soko (1622-1685). Yamaga attempted to define the warrior from an ethical standpoint saying that the warrior was not only an example of Confucian purity to the lesser classes of society, but also an enforcer of it. In this setting, the samurai would become some sort of Warrior–Sage, and realizing their dilemma, samurai soon began to act in such a role more and more. But in a society without war the Japanese warrior's role became more idealized than realized.⁸

Attitudes of the Samurai class such as the idea as a Warrior-Sage or example to the rest of society accelerated the rise of some extremism among many samurai masters. While many samurai of this time period accepted their fate of domestication, others reveled in protest in attempt to retain their unique status as samurai. Today, the most famous of any of these attitudes is that of Tsunetomo Yamamoto, who in the late 17th century served as a samurai lord in the court of the third *daimyo* of the Saga Prefecture, Nabeshima Mitsushige. After his master's death Tsunetomo went to live a life of seclusion as a Buddhist priest and proceeded to dictate the meaning of his service to scribe Tashiro Tsuramoto. After seven years' worth of conversations, Tsuramoto arranged

- 5 Ibid., 56-58.
- 6 Shiba Yohsimasa, "The Chikubasho" in *Ideals of the Samurai*, trans. Wilson (Burbank, CA: Ohara Publications, 1982), 27.
- 7 "Rule for the Military Houses" (Buke Sho-Hatto) in Ideals of the Samurai, trans. Wilson (Burbank, CA: Ohara Publications, 1982), 29.
- 8 Wilson, introduction to *Ideals of the Samurai*, 29.
- 9 Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 279.

these utterances into a book named *Hagakure*, literally meaning "hidden by the leaves." In more recent times the title is usually followed by "The Book of the Samurai" and is often considered to be a very valuable source for peering into the thought process of the Samurai class. As the book's translator William Scott Wilson tells us,

[Tsunetomo] was the absolute samurai... His extremism and singularity were not held in check by any anticipation of judgment from the outside... His mentors and perhaps geographical position gave encouragement to his own radicalness, and the single idea that focused his thought was not prone to compromise or dissuasion.¹¹

But while much Western scholarship classifies this book as an extremist version of the samurai ethic that does not accurately represent the majority of historical samurai, other scholars believe *Hagakure* to be "a work that reflects the 'ethnomentality' of the Tokugawa samurai in all its diversity." ¹²

The radical attitudes of Tsunetomo were shared by many and had been among the warrior class for centuries. All of these factors Wilson highlights contribute to Tsunetomo's focus on the importance of one's master and the willingness of the samurai to die, front-lining this philosophy with his opening line "The Way of the Samurai is found in death." The recklessness which Tsunetomo conveys throughout these conversations is somewhat rejected among various scholars who state that while it is not hard to find examples of samurai who in some situations, chose to turn and die in a frontal charge rather than be killed while running away, the historical military record of medieval Japan shows more often the efforts of samurai to use deception and subterfuge to catch his enemies off guard or helpless, than the sort of zealous self-sacrifice that Tsunemoto spoke of. Whether this be the case or not, there is no doubt that there is an honorific acceptance of death within the samurai unlike that of any other warrior giving rise to the Japanese cult of honor. If

- 11 Wilson, introduction to *Hagakure*, 16.
- 12 Ikegama, The Taming of the Samurai, 279.
- 13 Tsunetomo Yamamoto, *Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai*, trans. William Scott Wilson (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979), 17.
- 14 Friday, "Bushidō or Bull," 341.

William Scott Wilson, introduction to *Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai*, by Tsunetomo Yamamoto, trans. William Scott Wilson (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979), 9.

one reviews other literature of the period, "it is evident that the number of references to honor, usually expressed with the word *na* or 'name,' suddenly increases with the emergence of the samurai."¹⁵ Another book translated by Wilson, *The Ideals of the Samurai: Writings of Japanese Warriors*, presents writings of samurai masters dating back to the 13th century and many of these men, like Tsunemoto, praise death on the battlefield. These values and other ideals practiced and praised by the samurai soon became coined as *bushido*, literally meaning "Way of the Warrior."¹⁶

Soul of the Samurai

Throughout their illustrious history, the warriors of Japan have carried many different weapons in battle but the iron tools and weapons brought over from mainland Asia during the Yayoi period (300 BC–300 AD) soon began to produce skillful iron working by native Japanese craftsmen. These ironsmiths worked for centuries in order to perfect the art of their craft—determining which techniques, materials and forging methods would produce swords that would cut well and would not bend or break. Changes in battle methods would inevitably effect the nature of the weapon as the sword went from the long and straight *chokut* in the 8th to 10th centuries, to the long and curved *tachi* in the 10th and 11th centuries, until eventually the Japanese sword as we know it today, the *katana*, with a shorter curved blade, was perfected sometime around the 12th century.¹⁷

The making of a traditional Japanese sword is an extremely involved procedure that can take several months from start to finish. The process begins with the smelting of a type of iron ore known as *satetsu* found in the form of very fine sand. The *satetsu* is placed in large charcoal-fueled clay furnace called a *tartara* until it melts and hardens into a large steel block at the base of the furnace. This block is then removed, broken into fist-sized pieces and examined for carbon content. The steel that has a carbon content ranging from about 0.6 to 1.5 percent is called *tamahagane* and is deemed suitable for sword making. The rest must undergo additional smelting to adjust the carbon content. ¹⁸

Swordsmiths then hand select the pieces of tamahagane they wish to use

¹⁵ Sakurai Shotaro, *Meiyo to chijoku* (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1971), 4, quoted in Ikegami, *The Taming of the Samurai*, 49.

¹⁶ Inazo Nitobe, Bushido: The Soul of Japan (New York, NY: Kodansha USA, 1899), 10.

¹⁷ Kokan Nagayama, The Connoisseurs Book of Japanese Swords (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha International, 1998), 2.

¹⁸ Leon Kapp, Hiroko Kapp, Yoshindo Yoshihara, and Tom Kishida, Modern Japanese Swords and Swordsmiths: From 1868 to the Present (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha International Ltd., 2002), 9.

and stack them in a compact square on a steel plate welded onto the end of a long steel handle. This is then inserted into the forge until it is heated to a specific temperature at which point it is withdrawn, folded, hammered, and reheated some twelve or thirteen times depending on the swordsmith. This process is what gives a Japanese sword its strength and durability with its softer center and hard outer edge with some several thousand layers of steel made visible by the wave-like pattern on the blade known as the *jihada*.¹⁹ If a sword is not made in this fashion or using the Japanese steel *tamahagane*, it cannot be considered a "traditional" Japanese blade.²⁰

The sword, moreover, has symbolic significance to early modern Japanese as many called it the "soul of the samurai" and believed that it contained certain spiritual qualities due to its appearance in myths and religious texts. Some of Japan's oldest histories contain hints that the sword was regarded as an object of worship in addition to an effective weapon. This most likely originated from the Japanese myth of the three sacred Imperial regalia in which the gods directly handed three objects, one of which was a sword, to the brother of the sun goddess from whom the imperial family claimed direct descendance.²¹ This myth is significant because the sword was lost during the Battle of Dannoura in 1185 between Imperial and Shogun forces when eight-year-old Emperor Antoku jumps into the ocean with it. Thus, the loss of the sword, which represented imperial power, symbolically tethers the lost sword to the new martial entity of the shoguns.²² Dutch scholar Vyjayanthi R. Selinger argues that this tethering is specifically symbolic to the first shogun Minamoto no Yoritomo because in the battle in which the sword is lost and his forces conquer the Emperor's, he brings stability to the region and becomes the new symbol of power, and is thus the new sword. "Yoritomo, who restores peace to the realm, is represented as the metaphoric double of the imperial sword... [and] Yoritomo assures the continuity of imperial power by becoming its proxy."23 This means that the leaders of Japan whether emperor or shogun, were symbolized by a sword making the weapon something of a sacred object

¹⁹ Kapp, Kapp, Yoshihara, and Kishida, Modern Japanese Swords and Swordsmiths, 9-10, 49.

²⁰ Ibid., 43.

²¹ Nagayama, *The Connoisseurs Book of Japanese Swords*, 2. Gregory Irvine, *Japanese Sword: Soul Of The Samurai* (Trumbell, CT: Weatherhill Press, 2000), 8.

²² Vyjayanthi R. Selinger, Authorizing the Shogunate: Ritual and Material Symbolism in the Literary Construction of Warrior Order (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2013), 107.

²³ Ibid., 107-108.

throughout the country.

Although at first all classes of people carried weapons of different sorts, the times of great social upheaval before the unification of Japan in 1600, most notably the Warring States period from the mid-15th to 17th century, caused a rise of the warrior class. The sword gradually became exclusive to a small percentage of the population and eventually, the samurai as a class were formed when general to the shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi, confiscated all arms of the peasantry in 1590 drawing sharp lines between social classes.²⁴

Japanese scholar Francis Brinkley who lived in Japan for some 40 years during the Meiji Era expertly highlights the importance of the sword to the Japanese people during the time in his account *Japan: Its History literature and Arts*:

The sword has exercised a potent influence on the life of the Japanese nation. The distinction of wearing it, the rights conferred, the deeds wrought with it, the fame attaching to special skill in its use, the superstitions connected with it, the incredible value set upon a fine blade, the honors bestowed on an expert swordsmith... all these things conspired to give to the katana an importance beyond the limits of ordinary conception.²⁵

All of these notions and more make the sword a vitally important artifact when studying feudal, Tokugawa, and early modern era Japan.

The Meiji Era and its Swords

In summer of 1853, large black ships sailed through the isolationist waters of Japan and into Yokohama harbor. Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States had come with his black fleet to force Japan to open its doors to international trade. The sudden and massive influx of foreign trade effectively destroyed domestic markets and the monetary system. The one person that could do something, the *shogun*, was powerless against the superior forces and firepower displayed by the United States despite his best efforts at gaining national support. Eventually, his lack of action and breeches in protocol while consulting the *daimyo* for support led to a flood of criticism. Popular sentiment for the opening of the country was vastly negative and many felt that in order

²⁴ Reischauer, The Japanese Today, 65.

²⁵ Francis Brinkley, Japan: Its History Arts and Literature, Vol. II (Tokyo, Japan: J.B. Millet Co., 1901), 142.

to meet the foreign powers, the nation would have to come together around a greater symbol of national unity, the emperor. Unable to resist the weapons and manpower of the ominous foreign presence and the increasing disintegration of the authority and loyalty to the *shogunate*, eventually led factions of Japanese leadership to seize control of the imperial court and declare the resumption of direct imperial rule under Emperor Meiji on January 3, 1868.²⁶ The change brought about by the Meiji era effectively restored the power in the country from the *shogun* and the Samurai class to the emperor and the central government, from which the *shogun* had taken much of its power during the 12th century.²⁷ After only a little more than a decade of exposure to western culture and ways of industry and capitalism, the Japanese way of life had been knocked to its foundations.

Although replacing the old feudal domains with new prefectures was relatively easy because of the symbolic role of the daimyo now governors wiping out the old class divisions of the deep-seated feudal system would prove to be much more difficult. While many of the peasants were happy to see a change in this system, the Samurai were very reluctant to give up their special privileges and hereditary titles. The following years did not bode well for the samurai either as their role in society was steadily dismantled. In 1873, nationwide military conscription was put into place rendering the old class basis for military service completely obsolete. ²⁸ The final abolishment of the Samurai class began in 1876 by means of the Haitorei edict which forbid the samurai from carrying their swords, the weapons which symbolized their authority.²⁹ Opposition to this new law and additional strife between different factions of the government caused by a lingering antipathy for the new Meiji government instigated numerous samurai uprisings eventually culminating in the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. This rebellion, which was largely composed of samurai bitter about their new place in society, was led by commander of the Imperial Guard and samurai lord Saigo Takamori. Some 42,000 men flocked to Saigo's cause, but the effort was in vain as the imperial army possessed greater numbers and more advanced weaponry eventually subduing samurai rebellions for good.³⁰

The influx of Western style and ideals that was forcibly embedded into

²⁶ Reischauer, The Japanese Today, 79-80.

²⁷ Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai, 48.

²⁸ Reischauer, The Japanese Today, 81.

²⁹ Irvine, Japanese Sword, 108.

³⁰ Drea, Japan's Imperial Army, 40.

Japanese society soon became immediately noticeable in the Japanese Imperial Army through modern uniforms, tactics, firearms, and battlefield conduct. Much less noticed are the swords which commissioned and non-commissioned officers carried on the battlefield and what they symbolize. Although today, swords are worn to show tradition and only for ceremonial purposes, officers and non-commissioned officers have always worn swords as a status symbol. In pre-Meiji Japan, as I have discussed, only samurai had the right and privilege to wear swords. After the restoration, the wearing of swords was restricted to police and military only, many of whom were ex-samurai. But gradually, the beginnings of Japan's modern military institution began to show as new government officials began to answer the question of who was qualified to serve in the army. Eventually, a nation-wide conscript policy was formed and required a certain amount of troops from each domain based on rice production. Although some units were made up of only samurai, all were equipped with modern infantry weapons as well as artillery.³¹

At this point, men who had not been born of the samurai class soon began to earn the right within this modern military to carry a sword. Just as the European style made a lasting affect on the design of dress uniforms, it had an effect on the military officer's sword. The army's military advisors who, at the time, were French and German would have heavily influenced the first swords that were issued in the imperial army.³²

As one can see from Figure 2, this sword and scabbard which were produced from c. 1871 to 1877 with a few varying designs, are completely western in appearance and bear no resemblance to the sword in Figure 1 which is the widely recognized katana carried by the samurai for centuries.

Take particular notice to the different elements of the hilt, the scabbard, and the curvature of the blade in Figure 2. While Japanese swords had always had a *tsuba* for minor protection of the hands, it had never come close to the hand and knuckle guards of European swords which gradually became more elaborate as shields were phased out in European warfare.³³ Since these swords bear such close resemblance to western swords of the time, the only way that they may be identified is by Japanese arsenal markings. Although none of

³¹ Edward J. Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 23.

³² Richard Fuller and Ron Gregory, Military Swords of Japan 1868-1945 (New York, NY: Arms & Armour Press, 1993), 8.

³³ For details on European warfare see: Ewart Oakeshott, European Weapons and Armour: From the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution (Boydell Press, 2012).

these swords have actually been found due to the level of destruction in Japan during World War II, there are photos in which officers appear to be yielding the army officers pattern of c. 1871.³⁴ Although the actual production dates of this sword are unknown, it is speculated that production stopped sometime around 1877—the year of the Satsuma rebellion.

The significance of this rebellion cannot be overlooked as it shows both a major end to traditional Japanese culture and a beginning in the timeline of Japanese nationalism. The defeat of Saigo's forces marked an effective end to the samurai class in that there was no longer any dispute in the central government of how to "deal with the samurai." Traditional samurai privileges and regional challenges to the central government were swept away and as a class, they ceased to exist. However, their ideals did not die with them. As military historian Edward J. Drea explains, "Conscripts' battlefield performance deeply troubled the Meiji leaders, who saw that, man for man, the conscripts were




Figure 1



Figure 2

34 Fuller and Gregory, Military Swords of Japan, 15.




Figure 3

no match for Saigo's samurai." This led army leaders to conclude that while government troops may have better weapons and training, samurai fighters had superior morale and will to fight. The ferocity with which Saigo's samurai fought convinced senior army officers that these warriors possessed special intangible qualities that had to be inculcated into the ranks of the Imperial army. Authorities soon launched an intensive indoctrination program to instill the men of the Imperial army with the spiritual attributes samurai warriors held with such high regard. ³⁵ This instilment of intangible qualities lead to a reliance on the spiritual aspect of battle and over time, this came to mean a willingness to fight to the death regardless of the tactical situation. Once this concept gained acceptance, death in combat became the standard by which one measured their fighting spirit. It is in this instance we see the ideals of the samurai transferred to the common fighting man.

At around the same time as this spiritual indoctrination, we see the emergence of the sword in Figure 3.

This sword, known as the 'Kyu-gunto' or proto-military sword, contains elements from the western style sword in Figure 2 as well as the return of some traditional Japanese sword components. As seen side by side in Figure 4A and B, the Kyu-gunto has obvious resemblance to the completely western Imperial Japanese sword with the retaining of the handguard and wire-bound grip. In addition both have the slightly angled pommel which was popular in French and German swords of the time.

Also notice the scabbard tips in the swords of Figures 2 and 3 and enlarged here in Figure 5. This is a distinctly Western sword scabbard trait known

as a 'drag' and is intended to protect the scabbard tip from additional wear. Although not pictured on the sword in Figure 4A, many Western swords





Figure 4A Figure 4B

of the time used clips welded to the handguard plate to hold the blade in its scabbard. Notice the small protruding piece sticking horizontally out from the handguard plate on Figure 4B. This is in fact one of the aforementioned clips to hold the Japanese-style blade into its Western-style scabbard. This portion of the sword I found most curious because it contains both the clip and a *habaki*—a metal collar slid around the base of the blade which was the traditional Japanese way to hold a sword in its scabbard as pictured in Figure 6.

Other traditional Japanese influences on the Kyu-gunto in the hilt are exhibited by the existence of a *mekugi-ana* (peg hole) and accompanying *mekugi* (bamboo peg) which were used to hold a Japanese blade within its mounts. While Western swords were generally made with the hilt as part of the sword, Japanese swords were always made and stored without mounts. This allowed any sword to be placed in virtually any mounts simply by removing the *mekugi* and sliding the blade out. These are represented by the small circle

on the hilt in Figure 4B and on the *nakago* (unmounted handle) in Figure 6.



The remaining Japanese influence in the Kyu-gunto is exhibited solely in the blade. Although many of the early examples of this sword are speculated to have mass-produced blades, most of the surviving specimens have hand-forged or ancestral blades of the traditional

Figure 5





Figure 6

samurai. While a trained eye will be able to see the difference in the sori or curvature between a Japanese blade and a Western one, the most obvious component that gives away a blade as Japanese is the kissaki or point. See in Figure 7 the difference between A, an example of a Western blade, and B and C, both Japanese blades from above.

Although the blade in Figure 7B (traditional katana from Figure 1) and 7C (Kyu-gunto from Figure 3) are of different style—one with a visible hamon (temper pattern), and the other with a bo-hi (straight groove), the tips have a specific trapezoidal shape to them as well as the distinctive yokote which is the line perpendicular to the cutting edge of the blade and defines the point area by making a clear delineation between the point and the body of the sword.³⁶

Although the actual date of the emergence of this sword is unknown, it is suspected that it came about sometime in the late 19th century and



36 Kapp, Kapp, Yoshihara, and Kishida, Modern Japanese Swords and Swordsmiths, 19.

Figure 7B

almost definitely after the Satsuma rebellion of 1877.³⁷ Having discussed the importance of swords in historical Japanese culture, the emergence of this sword is highly significant because it is physical evidence of the indoctrination of samurai virtue into the general populace. And it is this spread of samurai ideals to the public that eventually caused everyone who was Japanese to come together as a nation believing all were part samurai in the years leading up to World War II. In other words, this sword represents the conception of nationalism in Japan.

"Bushido" and its Contribution to Nationalism

Although the samurai had always had a distinct way of battle conduct, there wasn't even a concept that classified this conduct as such until the 17th century. Just as a fish doesn't know that it is in water, samurai conduct on the battlefield was known only to samurai due to the constant state of internal war during Japan's long-standing isolation from other countries. Only when the 250 years of peace during the Edo period began under Tokugawa Ieyasu, and the role of samurai became more as a bureaucrat than a warrior did the concept of a code come about. Those who wrote on the "way of the warrior" were motivated by a search for the role of a warrior class in a world without war, which gave rise to the aforementioned warrior-sage.³⁸ Yamamoto Tsunemoto, Daidoji Yfızan, Yamaga Soko, and the other early modern samurai writers, wrote about the idea of a code of conduct exclusively for the samurai. What all of these men had in common was their strong desire to define and defend the essence of what set the samurai apart from all other classes. They were prescribing rather than describing a code of conduct for the elite and were arguing that it was this code and the values of it which separated this elite class of warriors from the throng of commoners and peasants beneath them.³⁹

This intention however, did not last long as the dramatic change in the social structure along with the instilment of spiritual attributes in Imperial army regulars and the growing nationalist fervor, eventually led to the belief that the samurai martial ethic was shared by all Japanese. This idea was then widely popularized by author Inazo Nitobe in his 1904 publication *Bushido: The Souls of Japan*. This book which is still popular today among those who are interested in samurai culture, may be the most controversial piece of literature

³⁷ Fuller and Gregory, Military Swords of Japan, 17.

³⁸ Friday, "Bushido or Bull," 340.

³⁹ Ibid., 343.

surrounding the ideals of Japanese honor. Nitobe, who claims that the spirit of Bushido replaced religion in Japanese schools in the education of morals, wasn't even educated in traditional Japanese ways having been a Christian most of his life. 40 Despite controversy over the book's accuracy of what really constituted the ideals of *bushido*, the book widely popularized the term both in Japan and internationally. There were many other watershed disseminations of the term *bushido* in Japan through various articles and journals which related to history, politics, and even baseball—the most prominent being the journal *Bushid zasshi* in 1898. 41 Publications such as these were largely due to the recent success in the Sino-Japanese war and show the degree to which traditional Japanese customs were being revived to serve nationalism during this time period.

The Imperial Era and the Rise of Nationalism

Although the degree to which the Japanese people were nationalistic during the start of the Meiji period is often inflated, the foundation for the radical nationalism to come was already there. Ethnically homogeneous, linguistically united, socially standardized and undivided by religious resentments, the Japanese of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period had few obstacles to the development of a strong national awareness. 42 In addition to this, the importance of loyalty to one's master and domain, which were central beliefs to the samurai, ended up playing a crucial role in the early years of Meiji as samurai loyalty switched from individual daimyo to emperor. As a society formerly run by a military class, it seems obvious to say that foreign wars would help to enhance the sense of patriotism and national unity in a newly proclaimed nation. In a span of less than 50 years the Japanese fought four major wars: the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the Sino-Japanese war starting in 1937, and World War II from 1941-1945. The Sino and Russo-Japanese wars were especially vital to the development of a national pride as the first foreign wars that Japan fought as a country with a national army.⁴³

This national army which was made up of conscripts from all over the

- 40 Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, 6. For facts about Nitobe's life see the National Diet Library's official website at http://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/e/datas/311.html.
- 41 Oleg Benesch, "Bushido: The Creation of a Martial Ethic in Late Meiji Japan." (Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia, 2011), 137.
- 42 Albert M. Craig, "Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism," in *Political Development in Modern Japan*, ed. Robert Ward, 100.
- 43 Nobutaka Ike, "War and Modernization," in *Political Development in Modern Japan*, ed. Robert Ward, 189.

country and from the poorest of families, soon became an institution not only for waging war but also for education. Japanese scholar Nobutaka Ike points out that "the problem of nation-building must necessarily involve the transformation of many individuals from 'traditional' man into 'modern' man." The new conscript army did exactly this in the 19th century as many of the recruits came from remote mountain communities and had not attended any sort of schooling. The army provided not only the opportunity for these men to learn how to read and write, but also afforded them the opportunity to talk with recruits from other sections of the country thus broadening their political horizons. Doing this made recruits aware of the world outside of their native villages and soon gave them no desire to return. In addition to the army's modernization and urbanization of these young men, the army instilled training in patriotism and nationalism. One such initiative was the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors which gave basic guidelines for the moral training of all men in the army and navy stating "as the protection of the State and the maintenance of its power depend upon the strength of its arms, the growth or decline of this strength must effect the nation's destiny for good or evil."44

Such encouragement of nationalism only continued in the years leading up to war in a spiral of increasing state-controlled institutions. In 1890 the emperor issued the Imperial Rescript on Education calling for all Japanese to have a sense of public duty towards the nation and a spirit of collective patriotism. Not long after this did the state issue control over textbooks in response to pressure from opposing politicians. Around the same time, with Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, the already in-place state religion of Shintoism began to expand rapidly. Production of shrines all over Japan soon attracted those mourning those lost in the Sino and Russo Japanese wars thus heightening the mood of patriotism.

The succession of these events would steadily increase over the years until they finally found their peak during the second Sino-Japanese war when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. The Japanese attitude of dominance over other

⁴⁴ Nobutaka Ike, "War and Modernization," in *Political Development in Modern Japan*, ed. Robert Ward, 195-197.

^{45 &}quot;The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890)," in *Sources of Japanese Tradition: Volume 2, 1600 to 2000*, compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck and Arthur Tiedemann (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 779-783.

⁴⁶ Wm. Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck and Arthur Tiedemann jap sources of tradition, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 792.

Asian nations found its root in samurai culture, stemmed in China, and soon stretched across the entire south Pacific to the point that we see just before the start of World War II in 1941.

By the 1930's, nationalism was in full force in Japan as the Imperial army had largely taken over the education and schooling systems of the country through propaganda. The publication of cheap and widely distributed commercial handbooks was fully subsidized by the army. They explained different ways to venerate troops and that conscripts should be grateful the emperor wanted them for his army. With instances such as these, military virtues steadily seeped into popular culture. ⁴⁷ Physical evidence of this came about in 1933–1934 with the emergence of the 'shin-gunto' or neo-military sword.

As seen in Figure 8, the shin-gunto was full a return to the Japanese style. One can see that at first glance, it is virtually indistinguishable from a traditional katana.

These swords lacked the title of being "traditional" for just about every reason though. Firstly, they were not forged using the lengthy traditional methods to meet the numbers of those that rated swords in the Imperial army. Although some smiths continued traditional sword making up through 1945, out of the approximately 7 million men in the imperial army and navy an estimated 2,150,000 men were eligible to carry swords. As one can imagine this created a problem for the military of how to produce such a large number of swords forcing them to mass–produce them at an industrial level. Secondly, due to the volume of swords needed, they were not made using *tamahagane*. Instead




Figure 8

- 47 Drea, Japan's Imperial Army, 73.
- 48 Kapp, Kapp, Yoshihara, and Kishida, *Modern Japanese Swords and Swordsmiths*, 42 and 61.

they were made either using a combination of *tamahagane* and foreign steel in the case of the *Murata-to* or using imported steel rails or old railroad tracks and given the name *Showa-to* which were made towards the beginning of World War II.⁴⁹ Although there are many reasons why these swords are not real samurai swords based on how they were made or what they were made of, they are significant because of the way they look and how they came about.

After the Second World War, the new Japanese government passed a law making the production of swords illegal. In addition American occupation forces went from door to door collecting all swords new and old from the people in order to hinder any possibility of insurrection. ⁵⁰ The occupation forces knew they were confiscating more than just a weapon though, they knew it represented the fighting spirit of Japan and as long as the people had them stable reconstruction could not be started. In 1952, the government finally decided to allow the production of swords through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Master swordsmith Kurihara Hikosaburo then took it upon himself to travel all over Japan meeting with swordsmiths and asking them to continue their sword-making. Although Kurihara died only a short time later, he played a key role in the revival and continuation of traditional Japanese sword-making. ⁵¹

Since the production of samurai swords is still very closely monitored and the imagery of them is scarce throughout the Japanese National Defense Force, it will be interesting to see what role swords play as Japan considers remilitarization with the impending Chinese threat.

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Tears without Tear Gas: The Failure of the Umbrella Revolution and Hong Kong's Youth

Caleb Camrud

Caleb Camrud is a junior at Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota, currently pursuing a double-major in Political Science and Mathematics. He has presented original research on Hong Kong at Concordia's 2015 Faith, Reason, and World Affairs Symposium, and research on traditional Japanese theatre at Concordia's 2015 Celebration of Student Scholarship. Caleb recently interned at the United States Attorney's Office in Washington, DC in the Spring of 2016.

Abstract

Hong Kong's recent Umbrella Movement was caused by factors dating back to the British invasion and occupation of the port of Canton. Though on the outside, it looked as though these protests dealt with the upcoming elections of the Chief Executive, they were ultimately protesting the fundamental system of governance in place in Hong Kong. Had the protests merely been concerned with electoral reform, they would have had no legal standing upon which to make their claims, with both the Joint Declaration and Basic Law supporting the system proposed by the People's Republic of China. Though the protests gained some footing early on, they ultimately dispersed, and no electoral reform has yet taken place. The Umbrella Revolution, i.e. the spirit of disbanding and reshaping the current system of governance in Hong Kong, what the protesters were hoping to achieve, will ultimately fail, due to movement's overreliance on youth. Young people in Hong Kong simply do not have enough political efficacy, nor enough economic or militaristic means, to institute any major changes, and with the Basic Law's provisions ceasing in 2047, time is running out.

Our saga begins in a port city enwrapped in a state of turmoil, teeming with life and wealth, yet lacking in liberty and equality. The city was fought over, controlled, and traded between world powers, erasing it of any identity it might once have had, leading to an ideological struggle over its true nature, what it is and what it might become. In the legislature, lawmakers must choose between what they believe is right, what the citizens want, and the pressures of an overarching and somewhat oppressive state government, which holds nearly ultimate authority. The leader of this town, elected by the authority state, feels not only a sense of allegiance to those who gave him power but also a fear of what might happen should he disappoint them. Instead of listening to the members of his city, he ignores them to protect himself. Because of this, pacts that are beneficial to the sovereign are made between the leader of the city and private corporations, and a combination of unbridled capitalism and government instated monopolies drive up real estate prices, making the tycoons richer, and the disadvantaged middle-class poorer. The citizens, sensing disconnect in the legislature, a leader not willing to listen, and collusion between the state and private corporations, react in the only way they can: revolution. Students, teachers, and workers gather outside the central government building in the middle of the city, and on one fateful day breach a security barricade, sparking a social movement. In the days that follow, police use pepper spray and tear gas on civilians, but because of civic outcry, the size of the mobs becomes even larger. The resistance movement adopts a symbol to represent their hope – the yellow umbrella – to protect them from oppression in the way their actual umbrellas protect them from the gas being used by the police forces to suppress them. They fight, retreat, rally, and fight some more, for some months onwards. Eventually, however, the state and its collusion with private entities prove too strong, and the rebellion is quelled. But the spirit that awoke the movement lives on, especially in the youth of the city, those who witnessed, participated, and were molded by the events which transpired. Although the root of these conflicts was born in 1984, this is not an Orwellian piece of fiction. This is a story of Hong Kong.

The following tale of Hong Kong explains why the Umbrella Movement occurred, from the pressure felt by the youth of Hong Kong over the collapse of their political efficacy, to the more recent attempts by the People's Republic of China of gaining greater sovereignty over the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to modern Hong Kong's governmental roots set forth by the *Joint Declaration* and *Basic Law*. It not only claims that the citing

of supposed provisions for free and fair elections in the *Basic Law* were grossly misinterpreted, and that the PRC was never planning on allowing Hong Kong to function as a true democracy, but that he PRC is, however, allowing for a more democratic Hong Kong than the United Kingdom ever allowed, thus being chastised by the West for giving Hong Kong more autonomy than a Western state ever did. Finally, it discusses that though the Umbrella *Movement* was still a social movement, it was a movement asking for revolution, and explains how Hong Kong's Umbrella *Revolution* is destined to fail.

I

September 26, 2014 – Exactly thirty years after the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China released the historic *Joint Declaration*, hundreds of students rushed over the security barricades of the central government building in Hong Kong with anger, tenacity, and fear in their eyes. Many were still youths, students from local secondary schools exercising their disappointment of modern Hong Kong in the only way they believed they could: protest. Thus began a series of events now known as "The Umbrella Movement." Four days earlier, however, hundreds had begun gathering around that building, unhappy with the current political system in place in Hong Kong, furious at the way the Beijing government of the PRC seemed to be closing in and suppressing their social and political freedoms. Though the protests were meant to be relatively peaceful demonstrations, the large collections of people disrupted traffic and business throughout Hong Kong. Soon Hong Kong police forces were called in to disperse the crowds, and when protesters refused to leave, the police resorted to the use of pepper spray and tear gas, causing an uproar among witnesses.¹ To protect themselves from the tear gas, protesters began carrying umbrellas to use as shields, thus the movement was dubbed "The Umbrella Movement." In the following months, the protests fluctuated in numbers, and changed locations many times. However, the large number of youths who stood as the backbone of the movement remained constant. The young men and women of Hong Kong kept the Umbrella Movement alive until December 15, 2014. At this time the crowds dispersed for good, but those involved continued to be discontent with their lack of political efficacy

[&]quot;Police fire tear gas and baton charge thousands of Occupy Central protesters," South China Morning Post (International Edition), last modified September 29, 2014, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1603350/ police-fire-tear-gas-and-baton-charge-thousands-occupy-central.

in Hong Kong's political system.

The current political system of Hong Kong is composed primarily of the Chief Executive, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council, along with the Administration, the Judiciary, and the District Councils. However, apart from the District Councils who have no legislative power, only 35 of the 70 members of the Legislative Council are selected through free elections. ² In addition to this, the Chief Executive, who arguably has more power than the entire Legislative Council, is elected by a 1,200 member committee composed primarily of pro-Beijing aristocrats and corporate leaders.³ Because of this, the youth of Hong Kong in particular feel that they have no way of influencing the affairs of the government. In a *Time* article entitled "Hong Kong's Youth Are Venting Economic as Well as Political Frustration" David Zweig, professor of politics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, says "The young people of Hong Kong are very worried that the Hong Kong their parents knew is not going to be the Hong Kong to which they grow up."4 To many of the older generation, Hong Kong went through rapid economic growth, and transformed from being a Western colony to a more culturally independent and economic capital. But for the youth, economic stagnation can only be blamed on those in control. Because of this, they feel that the current economic woes of the city, rising property values, middling wages, and an acceptance of nepotism are not being accurately combated by the government. "Hong Kong is in a bind," writes Carsten Holz, a professor of economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, "the economy is dominated by a few tycoons closely affiliated with the aristocratic families of the mainland regime and with the mainland regime's Hong Kong puppet regime."⁵ In other words, corporatism, through ties with the PRC, has a strangle-hold on what the HKSAR government can and cannot do. Therefore, the youth find no way to influence political matters, except through social movement. Previous to the Umbrella Movement, they manifested their yearly griefs through the

^{2 &}quot;Government Structure," GovHK, last modified March 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/govdirectory/govstructure.htm.

^{3 &}quot;Hong Kong Lawmakers Reject Electoral-Reform Proposal Backed by Beijing," TIME, last modified June 18, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://time. com/3923968/hong-kong-election-reform-bill/.

^{4 &}quot;Hong Kong's Youth Are Venting Economic as Well as Political Frustration," TIME, last modified October 7, 2014, accessed August 11, 2015, http://time.com/3477757/hong-kongs-youth-are-venting-economic-as-well-as-political-frustration/.

⁵ Ibid.

July 1 marches.

Citizens' malcontent with portions of the *Basic Law*, a malcontent which reoccurred in the Umbrella Movement, began inciting wide-spread social movements in 2003. Though the "July 1 Marches" officially commenced in 1997, with The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China at its forefront, the marches gained significant support on July 1, 2003. During this time, the marches grew to anywhere from 100,000 to 500,000 marchers in reaction to an anti-subversion law proposed to the Hong Kong legislature on September 24, 2002. This law regarded Article 23 of the *Basic Law* which reads:

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.⁷

The proposed law would have allowed for anyone found guilty of acts of treason, sedition, secession, or subversion against the People's Republic of China to be imprisoned for life. The law was believed to be set to pass through Hong Kong's Legislative Council. However, in the aftermath of the July 1 marches, two Executive Committee members resigned, and the bill lost much support within the chief executive's cabinet and was eventually withdrawn. This was an extreme victory for pro-democracy citizens of Hong Kong, and culminated in larger support for annual July 1 marches in the future. With themes such as "Striving For Universal Suffrage in '07 and '08 ..." and "Oppose government collusion, striving for universal suffrage," these yearly reminders of the great support for democracy in Hong Kong only strengthened the idea for future

^{6 &}quot;Huge protest fills HK streets," CNN, last modified July 2, 2003, accessed August 12, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/.

^{7 &}quot;Basic Law Full Text," GovHK, last modified July 13, 2012, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter 2.html.

^{8 &}quot;Huge protest fills HK streets," CNN.

^{9 &}quot;Hong Kong leader abandons fight to pass anti-subversion laws," The Telegraph, last modified July 8, 2003, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/asia/hongkong/1435551/Hong-Kong-leader-abandons-fight-to-pass-antisubversion-laws.html.

social movements in the minds of young, aspiring protesters. Growing up around such strong ideals could only influence the youth of Hong Kong in one-direction: toward democracy.

The most recent attack of note by the People's Republic of China on Hong Kong's sovereignty was a 23,000 word document released by the China State Council Information Office in which the PRC declared "comprehensive jurisdiction" over Hong Kong. The paper essentially declared that the PRC holds ultimate sovereignty over the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, which, according to the *Joint Declaration*, was supposed to be guaranteed a "high degree of autonomy" until 2047. This announcement made on June 11, 2014 was immediately met with backlash from Occupy Central with Love and Peace, an organization known for promoting democratic reforms throughout Hong Kong. In the following days, Occupy Central, along with other pro-democracy advocates, organized a civil referendum for the people of Hong Kong to demand democratic reforms of the political system of Hong Kong, and for the direct nomination and election of the Chief Executive by the citizens of Hong Kong. Though the referendum gained 787,767 votes, with 42% agreeing that the Chief Executive should be nominated by the people of Hong Kong, it ultimately failed due to its unofficial status.¹⁰ The People's Republic of China reacted to this with an article in the state-run newspaper calling it an "illegal farce." Then, on August 31, 2014, the PRC proposed an electoral system in which those nominated and appearing on the ballot for the position of Chief Executive would be selected by a 1,200 member nominating committee, although election itself would still technically take place through "universal suffrage." That nominating committee would be selected and appointed by the People's Republic of China, and will be instructed to only nominate individuals who "love the country, and love Hong Kong" to appear on the ballot.¹² Naturally, this enraged pro-democracy groups throughout Hong Kong, who believed this meant only "pro-Beijing" candidates would have any chance at becoming the Chief Executive. The public's reaction to this 1,200 member nominating committee ultimately led to the crowd of

[&]quot;Hong Kong's Occupy Central democracy 'referendum' – What you should know," CNN, last modified June 30, 2014, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.cnn. com/2014/06/24/world/asia/hong-kong-politics-explainer/index.html.

¹¹ Ibid.

^{12 &}quot;China restricts voting reforms for Hong Kong," The New York Times, last modified August 31, 2014, accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html? r=0.

demonstrators outside the central government building, and therefore sparked the Umbrella Movement.

While the People's Congress in Beijing officially proposed this new electoral system, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong was still required to pass the bill for it to go into effect. To much of the world's surprise however, on June 18, 2015, the bill failed in dramatic fashion. On that day, after the Speaker rejected the pro-Beijing camp's request for a 15-minute suspension, the group of lawmakers believed they could buy enough time with the walkout to suspend the vote.¹³ But due confusion among members, an insufficient number of lawmakers walked out, and the attempt failed. Where there should have been many more votes in favor of the new system, only 8 legislators were present who supported the bill when the vote took place. 14 Thus only 37 out of 70 lawmakers were present for the vote, with only 8 affirming the bill, far less than the 47 needed for it to pass. 15 The failure of the bill and the grand display of disconnect within the pro-Beijing camp caused the whole event to be extremely embarrassing for the bill's supporters, including the PRC. Because the bill failed, the election of the Chief Executive in the 2017 election will continue to be carried out by a 1,200 member electing committee, the same system previously in place in Hong Kong. What is notable to point out, however, is that the current system, the system voted for by many pro-democracy legislators, is much less democratic than the system proposed by the Beijing government. While this would have allowed citizens to cast their votes in who became the next Chief Executive, they would be choosing from a list compiled by a pro-Beijing nominating committee. Still, Hong Kong voters would have had more political efficacy had the bill passed. Instead of the election committee, a nominating committee would have been in place, and the voters could have had some say in who they wanted to be Chief Executive. But pro-democracy supporters in Hong Kong are still pushing for more drastic reforms to be made by the Beijing government. They looked at the proposed system as too great of a compromise, which they believed would have created a stagnant system of unchanging structure in Hong Kong. Even so, the new system would have been more democratic

^{13 &}quot;Hong Kong lawmakers reject Beijing poll plan," BBC, last modified June 18, 2015, accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33179247.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

than the old system in China's Hong Kong, and much more democratic than the system in place when Hong Kong was under British rule. It was ultimately this British system that laid the foundation for the modern political system of Hong Kong, but interestingly enough, there were never any grand protests during British rule.

П

The current political system in Hong Kong, *i.e.* the semi-sover eignty the PRC has over that system, was structured through two documents: the Sino-British *Joint Declaration* and the *Basic Law*. However, the influences over the composition of these documents began during the age of colonialism, and the First Opium War.

In the early nineteenth century, Britain supplied China with opium in exchange for silver and tea, but in 1839, after the emperor of China named a new imperial commissioner for the port of Canton, all opium trade ceased. Naturally the British were enraged, as they were dependent on selling opium to receive tea, which was (and is) very popular in England. In a short period of time, Britain had invaded, under what it claimed as its "responsibility to protect British citizens," demanding that China open its ports back to the English opium trade. Having underestimated the British force, China soon conceded, and thus reengaged in trade with England. In the *Treaty of Nanking*, which ended the conflict, China also ceded the small island of Hong Kong to the British. 18

Hong Kong was then officially a British territory, and had no real government or constitution separate from that of the United Kingdom. In the years following the Treaty of Nanking, however, some rudimentary laws were set in place. Three basic constitutional documents were written and approved: the *Charter* of April 5, 1843, which constituted the island of Hong Kong as a colony; the *Order in Council* of October 24, 1860, which annexed the peninsula of Kowloon to the original colony; and the *Order of Council* of December 27, 1898, which added new territories to it.¹⁹

The *Charter* of 1843, which included the *Letters Patent* and *Royal Instructions*, formulated the system of government that remained in place

¹⁶ Norman Miners, *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 8.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, 9.

¹⁹ Ibid, 55.

during Hong Kong's colonial era. It founded the office of Governor and defined its powers, which were to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the colony.²⁰ The Letters also authorized the creation of the Executive and Legislative Councils. The Executive Council was to be composed of chief government officials, all of whom were appointed by the Crown. Dr. Norman Miners, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hong Kong, writes that the Executive Council was "the authoritative final decision maker for the whole of the government machine, and though many of [its] conclusions were legally subject to ratification elsewhere ... in practice this was normally achieved without much difficulty."21 The Legislative Council was composed of 57 members, who were appointed by the Governor.²² The true purpose of the *Letters* was to make sure the governance of Hong Kong continued to be subject to the British Crown and Parliament. The system contained almost no characteristics of a democracy until 1985, when 24 of the 57 members of the Legislative Council were allowed to be elected through competitive election. 23 This relatively undemocratic system of government remained in Hong Kong until 1997, when it was returned to the PRC.

The reason why Britain ceded sovereignty of Hong Kong back to the PRC instead of retaining the port as a colony began with *The Order of Council* of 1898. This document leased the "New Territories" surrounding Hong Kong for 99 years, a lease which ran out in 1997. Because of this, in the late–1970s, individuals living in or owning land in the New Territories began feeling nervous about what would occur when that land would be handed over to the communist PRC. ²⁴ These land owners urged the British Government to come up with an agreement with the PRC that would allow them to retain property rights over their land. China realized this was an opportunity to regain sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong and the Kowloon peninsula, and therefore reacted accordingly. The result of this was the *Joint Declaration* of 1984.

After many talks and conferences between the UK and the PRC, the *Joint Declaration* was signed on September 26, 1984. The document

- 20 Ibid, 56.
- 21 Ibid, 75.
- 22 Ibid, 114.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 William McGurn, Perfidious Albion (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1997), 43.

outlined what would happen to the British Colony of Hong Kong on and after July 1, 1997. The main sections of the *Joint Declaration* pertinent to our story of Hong Kong are the following:

- i. 3. (1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity, and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish...a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
- ii. 3. (4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government...
- iii. 3. (5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the lifestyle. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative region. Private Property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.²⁵

The government of the United Kingdom relinquished its sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong and the Kowloon peninsula to ensure that the property rights and freedoms of those living in the New Territories were protected from the potential communist agendas of the PRC. The *Joint Declaration* makes clear that Hong Kong would be considered a Special Administrative Region with rights and privileges distinct from the PRC. The new governmental system of Hong Kong would be very similar to the old government, with the only

changes being that the Governor would then called the Chief Executive, and all appointments would be made by the PRC instead of the British Crown. These rights were later solidified in the *Basic Law*.

The Basic Law, adopted on April 4, 1990 by the People's Congress of the PRC, serves as the current "constitution" of Hong Kong. Article 11 of the document clearly states, "No law enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall contravene this law." Though many of its sections restate portions of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law also includes details pertaining to the future of Hong Kong. Article 5 states, "The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years." In relation to the Umbrella Movement, however, there is one article in particular that needs to be analyzed: Article 45. It reads:

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government.

The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.²⁶

The *Basic Law* gives autonomy to the government of Hong Kong for domestic procedures, but grants no electoral autonomy on the subject of the Chief Executive to the city. It clearly states that "The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures." There is no clear definition of what a "broadly representative nominating committee" is, but the 1,200 member committee based upon a wide range of social groups seems to fit the description. In the new system, universal suffrage would still take place. Though interpretations of the phrase in different contexts may vary, the words "universal suffrage" themselves simply

imply that every adult citizen has the freedom and opportunity to vote, which, in the new system, would be the case. The proposed electoral system was also in accordance with the *Joint Declaration*, which was ratified and accepted by the United Nations and states "The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of results of elections or consultations to be held locally." With the proposed electoral system, the elections that would have occurred would have been held locally, in Hong Kong, and the PRC would have appointed the Chief Executive based on the results of those elections. The PRC did not violate any laws or constitutions in their creation of an appointed nomination committee. They were actually allowing citizens of Hong Kong more political efficacy than in previous years in regards to who becomes the next Chief Executive. The PRC never intended for Hong Kong to function as a true democracy, but has been chastised by the West for attempting to give Hong Kong more autonomy than the United Kingdom ever did.

Obviously these sections of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration are extremely detrimental to the Umbrella Movement's cause. Near the beginning of the movement, there was some disagreement over whether to call it the "Umbrella Movement" or the "Umbrella Revolution," and this concrete legality of the new system is precisely why. While most people claimed that the two terms were synonymous, they really refer to two fundamentally different things. Encyclopedia Britannica defines a social movement as a "loosely organized but sustained campaign in support of a social goal, typically either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society's structure or values."27 Based on this definition, the Umbrella Movement is certainly a social movement, composing of an organized and sustained campaign supporting the prevention of the Beijing-proposed governmental system and the implementation of a new, completely democratic system. In contrast, the Merriam-Webster defines a revolution to be "a fundamental change in political organization; especially the overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed."28 The Umbrella Movement was protesting for a revolution to occur, but it was not a revolution itself. Because of this, the events of September 26 to December 15 of 2014 should be considered the true "Umbrella Movement," and the ongoing struggle

^{27 &}quot;Social Movement," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/topic/social-movement.

^{28 &}quot;Revolution," Merriam-Webster, accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revolution.

for a truly democratic Hong Kong, because it involves not only a change in government, but a change in constitution, to take place, is the true "Umbrella Revolution." Thus these terms should, in fact, refer to different things, and though the Umbrella Movement of 2014 has ceased, Hong Kong's Umbrella *Revolution* is ongoing. However, due to the revolution's abundance in proportion of youths to elders, it will ultimately fail.

Ш

As we touched upon earlier, the younger population of Hong Kong are much more dissatisfied with their current situation than those of middle to late age. A recent survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong found that though 40% of Hong Kong citizens aged 50 or above held trust in the Beijing Government, only 27% of those aged 30-49 and only 11% of those aged 18-29 trusted the PRC.²⁹ Perhaps even more notable is that 85% of the youngest group (18-29), a staggering majority, answered that they had no-confidence in the "one country, two systems" policy set forth by the Joint Declaration and Basic Law. 59% of those in the middle group (30-49) agreed. 30 Perhaps even more interesting is that according a study published by two academies on Ming Pao, over 75% of Umbrella Movement protesters were under the age of 39.31 Coupling these two statistics together, it is easy to see that a majority of the protesters were not just unhappy with the new electoral standards set forth by the PRC, they were unhappy with the "one country, two systems" philosophy altogether. The revolution is not about the new system the PRC proposed, or what "universal suffrage" actually means, it is about the fact that the Basic Law itself is a flawed document, and that the citizens of Hong Kong deserve greater political freedom than it allows. Because so many protesters were under the age of 39, it can be assumed that a large portion were born near or after the signing of the Basic Law, and through social contracts were "born"

^{29 &}quot;HKU POP releases the latest trust and confidence indicators," HKU POP SITE (Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong), last modified September 23, 2014, accessed May 24, 2015, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1186. html.

³⁰ Ibid.

^{31 &}quot;After umbrella sports, farewell politically apathetic age," Ming Pao, last modified November 28, 2014, accessed May 24, 2015, http://news.mingpao.com/pns/後雨 傘運動: 告別政治冷感的年代-作者:鄭煒、袁瑋熙/web_tc/article/20141129/s00012/1417197542046, (obviously this broken-English title of the article is not what the authors intended, but as I do not speak Chinese, through a little help from Google Translate I was able to read the article, and I have thus given the "translated" article title).

into consenting to it. Though this is the case for everyone around the world, with the signing of the *Basic Law* being so recent, it has created an ideological cleavage. On one hand, the young are very discontent with the document, but on the other, the elders can recall how undemocratic the British system was, and therefore accept the *Basic Law* for what it is. But for these youth of Hong Kong, the only outlet they have for voicing their malcontents is through revolution, for the very system they revolt against is the one which prevents them from taking political action. Unfortunately for them, however, the deck is stacked against them, and democratization will never occur in Hong Kong.

Before a democracy can be instated in any authoritarian country, a very specific and significant process must occur. Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, writes in *Competing Chinese Political Visions* that there are six factors that determine the course of democratization: elite, class, cleavage, geopolitics, political culture, and social movement.³² Naturally, no political theory can predict the outcome of certain events with absolute certainty. If only one or two of the criteria for democratization are met, as is the case in our Hong Kong, it would truly take a miracle for democratization to occur. Since we have already touched on ideological cleavage between age groups in Hong Kong, and we have obviously covered social movement, the remainder of this section will discuss why the youth of Hong Kong (and therefore the revolution as a whole) fail the remaining four criteria for democratization.

Concerning the political elite, Shiu-Hing Lo writes, "In the event that the dominant elite, or the soft-liner, adopts a liberal-minded and tolerant attitude toward public criticisms and citizen protests, and that it accepts the electoral defeat of the ruling party, a threshold in democratization — the rotation of political party in power — is reached." In other words, those who are currently in power must be willing to convert their government from an autocracy to a democracy, because without their willingness, in the absence of a coup, any change in regime would be impossible. But in Hong Kong, because of the political system set up by the *Joint Declaration* and *Basic Law*, the People's Republic of China had and has the most political power and is largely in charge of the how the system of governance functions. Yes, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong still has to *approve* whatever changes the PRC makes to the

³² Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010), 2.

³³ Ibid.

functionality of HKSAR, but as we saw earlier this year, with the Legislative Council's rejection of the proposed electoral system, nothing changed. The PRC announced they would not attempt to revamp the system in favor of what the pro-democracy supporters had in mind. Since the Legislative Council cannot do anything itself to change the electoral process, Hong Kong is stuck with a 1,200 member election committee and controlled by the PRC. Thus, the political elite in Hong Kong do not have enough efficacy themselves to change the system to become more democratic for the citizens of Hong Kong, and, even if they did, might not even listen to the qualms of the youth. In a fact sheet released by the Research Office of the Legislative Council Secretariat on October 23, 2014, the average age of a Hong Kong legislator is listed as 57 years old, with the oldest member being 78, and the youngest 35.34 From here it is easy to draw the conclusion that the Hong Kong Legislative Council is much more content with the Basic Law and the governing procedures set forth by it than the youth and protesters of Hong Kong are. What is truly detrimental to the revolutionaries' cause, however, is the fact that the closer they get to becoming the age group in power in Hong Kong, the closer the end of the 50 years of semi-autonomy promised by the *Joint Declaration* looms. 2047 is barely 30 years away, and in the nearly 20 years which have already passed there has been no significant change. It's difficult indeed to then imagine anything great changing in that near future. By the time Hong Kong's current youth are being elected into the Legislative Council, even if they can issue in some sort of reform, it will be extremely short lived. Whatever change they can usher in will die when their lease on autonomy runs out.

The second factor influencing democratization, class, is well described by David Potter, who stated that, historically speaking, "democratization has been both resisted and pushed forward by the changing dynamics of class relations and different classes pursuing their separate interests. Subordinate classes have usually pushed for democracy, dominant classes nearly always have resisted it." The land-owning class has historically been the most anti-democratic because democracy is seen as harmful to profits. In retaliation the peasantry or farm laborers have often been pro-democracy, but are usually too unorganized and uneducated to make any viable push for change. The urban

^{34 &}quot;Legislative Council in Figures," GovHK, last modified October 23, 2014, accessed August 22, 2015, http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/1415fs02-legislative-council-in-figures-20141031-e.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid. 4.

workers on the other hand are both pro-democracy and organized, and typically contribute the greatest force for democratization. Finally, the bourgeoisie are often ambiguous, for democracy will tend to allow them more freedom for their capitalism, but also more protection for the labor of the working class. However, historical analyzations of class democratization simply does not apply to the modern world, and especially not in Hong Kong.

The recent Umbrella Movement and the resulting Umbrella Revolution are composed almost entirely of the disadvantaged middle class and youths, and led primarily by academics, students and professors who are well-educated about the current political process and who understand why it needs to change. Though the protests themselves disrupted economic activity in the city, the fact that they have ceased means no part of the revolution is currently affecting how the economy functions. According to Richard C. Bush, director of the Center of East Asia Policy Studies, this is the most important factor in a revolution succeeding. Bush writes in his article "The Roots of the Hong Kong Protest" that:

In most advanced societies, democracy provides a check against excessive wealth and market concentration. Not in Hong Kong. Beijing designed the territory's political system to limit the scope of democracy and give preferential access to political power to its supporters (mostly wealthy businessmen, some members of communist trade unions) ... the question is whether middle class protest cause enough damage to business that the tycoons themselves decide that more democracy will actually enhance stability rather than undermine it.³⁶

Without protests which disrupt their profits the tycoons have who have the power in Hong Kong have no reason to lobby for democracy. More importantly, because so many of Hong Kong's youth are either in school or cannot find employment, forcing the hand of the corporate oligarchs without major support from the upper-middle class would be extremely difficult. To give an idea of how much power these oligarchs actually have, in 2014, the top 45 billionaires in Hong Kong had a combined net worth of \$214 billion, nearly

^{36 &}quot;The Roots of the Hong Kong Protest," Brookings Institution, last modified September 30, 2014, accessed August 22, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/09/30-roots-of-hong-kong-protest-bush.

80% of Hong Kong's total GDP in 2013.³⁷ It would be nearly impossible for one of Hong Kong's revolutionary youths to gain enough wealth to actually gain enough efficacy to influence political events through lobbying. Indeed even if one did, 2047 is only 32 years away when all hopes of democracy may very well be dashed.

The third factor leading to the failure of the Umbrella Revolution, geopolitics, affects democratization in a very direct way. Just as Vietnam and North Korea fell to communism after China's revolution, states surrounded by democratic regimes have tended to become more democratic. In the past, ideologies quickly spread, by word of mouth or mail, and across state borders, allowing those who were oppressed to hear about newer, more egalitarian political systems. While in the current age of the internet the geographical spread of ideology is not as common, the economic dependence of countries close to one another forces cooperation between regimes, which tends to come in the form of similar political structures.

Hong Kong is at a dynamic place geographically, economically, and internationally. The most notable aspects of its geopolitics are its history as a British colony and China's political and economic strangle-hold over it. As previously touched upon, the British rule of Hong Kong as a true colony, with all the lack of rights and privileges granted it thereof, forced its citizens to become accustomed to colonial rule. This is essentially the same rule that the PRC currently has over them. Because of this, the older citizens are more content with the current system, and the younger citizens are stuck without enough pressure to place by themselves on those in power. In addition, China's grip on power within Hong Kong can only be bolstered through its growing power over Hong Kong's economy. Since 2005, not only have Hong Kong's exports to the PRC decreased, its imports from the PRC have been steadily increased.³⁸ With such a one-sided economic relationship with mainland China, Hong Kong cannot afford to antagonize a government that clearly desires that the Umbrella Revolution fail. So unless Hong Kong's youth can fix Hong Kong's growing economic dependence on the PRC, the revolution cannot hope to gain footing.

 $Finally, political \, culture \, pushes \, democratization \, through \, a \, state's \, core$

^{37 &}quot;Beyond The Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong's Struggle With Inequality In 8 Charts," Forbes, last modified October 8, 2014, accessed August 22, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2014/10/08/beyond-the-umbrella-revolution-hong-kongs-struggle-with-inequality-in-8-charts/.

³⁸ Ibid, 2.

ideology. Western civilizations evolved to place stress on individuals, and in contrast the East exalted collectivism. It is, therefore, no surprise that democracy, and liberal democracy at that, succeeded greatly in the West, but struggled to find footing elsewhere. Capitalism, individuality, and even the definition of property itself grew out of Western philosophy and religion. By contrast Eastern philosophies stress respect, peace, harmony with the world, and further the idea that it is better to simply be an average laborer, a cog in a larger machine, than to push back, and break the machine as a whole.

Since we are discussing the subject of political culture, it seems only appropriate to quote Samuel Huntington, who wrote in his *Clash of Civilizations* that:

China's Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarch, and the supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates obstacles to democratizations. Yet economic growth is creating in South China increasingly high levels of wealth, a dynamic bourgeoisie, accumulations of economic power outside governmental control, and a rapidly expanding middle class. In addition, Chinese people are deeply involved in the outside world in terms of trade, investment, and education. All this creates a social basis for movement toward political pluralism.³⁹

Unfortunately, Huntington's 1996 essay now seems out of date. The "dynamic bourgeoisie" he spoke of now collude with the Chinese government to only grow richer instead of using their wealth to push back against political oppression. In addition to this, as stated many times before, Hong Kong's olderage groups" "political culture" is still more Confucian, and more accepting of both their "place" in the world and their submission to authority. Only the young, who were born near or after the return of Hong Kong to the PRC, seek liberalization. But again, by the time all of Hong Kong will have this new political culture, 2047 will have come and gone, removing any autonomy the new political culture could have ushered in.

To conclude, the Umbrella Movement is the most recent in a series of social movements that have occurred in Hong Kong since its return to PRC rule in 1997, with the other main event being the July 1 marches of 2003. The July 1 marches have been used to show the populous' support for increased political autonomy every summer. Half a million citizens showed up in 2003, and a smaller but still confidently large number attended every year since. These

³⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 228.

movements have given hope to many who believed that a peaceful solution could be reached in which Hong Kong would be given democratic elections of the Chief Executive and legislative Congress. The Umbrella Movement took the same idea, but on the anniversary of the signing of the Joint Declaration used a more forceful protest to make their point clear. For days, weeks, and even months, the movement looked as though it had a solid footing. But a year has now passed, and the results of the protests are thoroughly disappointing. No change has been made in the election process of the Chief Executive, and many citizens of Hong Kong have cried tears for the oppression of their autonomy, with or without the use of tear gas. The Umbrella Movement and the current Revolution has attracted support from the young, but it has simply not attracted enough of the middle-class or elite to gain the numbers or power needed to be truly effective. Perhaps a significant will occur on some eventful day this year or in the years to follow, but as of right now, the Umbrella Movement was a failure, and the current struggle for a democratic Hong Kong will be a failure as well. There are too many obstacles that Hong Kong must overcome in order to change the Basic Law and receive the true democracy it desires.

With an individualistic and liberal culture, Western states looked at the protests occurring in Hong Kong and still believe Hong Kong should be guaranteed a right to free and fair democratic elections. But in doing this, they ignored the history behind what Hong Kong is: a piece of land that was traded from one state to another, and that has been stepped on by superpowers for its economic prosperity. They completely ignored the constitution and foundational documents that modern Hong Kong was founded upon. The Basic Law provided many rights to the citizens and property owners of Hong Kong, but it protected the sovereignty of the People's Republic over that Special Administrative Region. Hong Kong never had democracy, its constitution shows that it never legally should, and the result of this revolution are that it never will. It was a colony, is a colony, and will remain a colony, as long as China's red flag flies.

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A Reality between the Transcendent and Immanent in Early Chinese Thought

GuoJu Lee

GuoJu Lee is a senior at the National University of Singapore. She is a Chinese Studies major with a minor in Philosophy. Over the course of her undergraduate career, both her summer and exchange program at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and National Taiwan University respectively have had a great impact on her intellectual growth. While interested in Chinese culture in general, she is particularly fascinated by Chinese intellectual history. Currently she is looking forward to Philosophy summer school at Beijing Normal University before graduating in Fall 2016. She hopes to continue with graduate studies after her undergraduate program.

INTRODUCTION

It is often the case that the transcendent contrasts oddly with the immanent from the Western point of view as Western thought is often permeated with bifurcation, of which all sorts of entities or phenomena are arrayed one against the other. Holding onto such segregational mode of thought inevitably leads to myriad incongruities in the universe, thus setting numerous things in implacable hostility. The instances of antithesis of this kind might be infinitely multiplied. In contrast, an examination of the Chinese thought sheds light on a realm of aesthetic harmony where a sharp divide between the immanent and transcendent is absent. For those accustomed to dichotomist thinking, this may be utterly unintelligible, but for the Chinese, it was not even an issue of contention, because such differentiation simply did not exist. The burden of my paper, then, is to argue that this entirely different picture of the world

Thomé H. Fang, "A Philosophical Glimpse of Man and Nature in Chinese Culture," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 1 (December 1973): 7, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.1973. tb00638.x

arose out of unique Chinese imagination.

AN AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION OF BOUNDARIES

Zhuangzi epitomizes this ambiguity of boundaries beautifully in the qiwulun (齊物論) chapter. In his dream, Zhuangzi saw himself transformed into a flitting butterfly, and later when he awoke, he could not help but wonder if he was in reality a butterfly dreaming of being a human. While dreamscapes may be a sublime creation of the slumbering imagination – surrealistic and provoking a sense of otherworldliness, dreams can also appear to be as lucid as the "real" world. In other words, the waking "reality" may also transcend into an ineffable dreamlike state and vice versa.

The story is too familiar to require further elaboration, but the point is this: Zhuangzi does recognize that objectively, "there is a distinction between himself and the butterfly" (周與蝴蝶則必有分矣). However, transcendence can still occur by means of opening up our imagination in order to be able to accommodate the myriad things without discrimination. A radical transcendence to a foreign realm would be uncalled for. Zhuangzi, by virtue of being himself, was always deferentially engaged in the world of humans, but his stories indubitably revealed his knack for rendering what we think to be grounded in reality in an unfamiliar way, in an attempt to challenge our conventional ways of perceiving.

TIANREN HEYI 天人合二 - A CORRELATIVE WORLDVIEW

The notion of tianren heyi (天人合一) is a central component of Chinese thought with pervasive influence till this day. The meaning of this concept evolved throughout history, and by tracing its development, we can also relate it to the breaking down of the transcendent-immanent dichotomy.

The Heaven (tian 天) and man (ren 人) categories were already present in antiquity, but it was particularly during the Han Dynasty, when Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) highlighted the convergence and harmony of tian and ren, that this interrelatedness was stressed upon, and such a mode of thinking through the two categories became quite rooted in the Chinese mentality. However, how these two tiers interacted was not definite. For instance, in his monumental Shiji (史記), the Grand Historian of China, Sima Qian (司馬遷), wrote that he needed to examine the realm of Heaven and the realm of man (究天人之際) as he was fascinated by the capriciousness of history. Unlike Dong Zhongshu though, Sima Qian was uncertain about a direct

correspondence between the two spheres. Dong Zhongshu saw humanity as a replica of heaven and conferred rich and deep cosmic meanings onto human actions. In spite of their differences, it is evident that these two categories were already firmly established.

Apparently, in high antiquity, the realms of Heaven and man were kept distinct. This, we get a greater understanding from Bodde's work:

Anciently, men and spirits did not intermingle. At that time there were certain persons who were so perspicacious, single-minded, and reverential that their understanding enabled them to make meaningful collation of what lies above and below, and their insight to illumine what is distant and profound. Therefore the spirits would descend into them. The possessors of such powers were, if men, called hsi (shamans), and, if women, wu (shamannesses). It is they who supervised the positions of the spirits at the ceremonies, sacrificed to them, and otherwise handled religious matters. As a consequence, the spheres of the divine and the profane were kept distinct. The spirits sent down blessings on the people, and accepted from them their offerings. There were no natural calamities. ²

That kings still needed the assistance of shamans in performing rituals shows that the idea of tianren heyi back then was considered an exclusive right of the royalty. However, during Confucius' time and later on when the Hundred Schools contended and flourished, a reinterpretation of this concept took place. This reinterpretation is important because the access to the realm of Heaven was no longer a royal monopoly. When it became universalized, Confucius was thus able to say that at fifty, he knew the decree of Heaven³ and averred that a junzi (君子) stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven⁴. This implies that the idea of tianming (天命) underwent a subtle shift from reinforcing the legitimacy to rule to something that everybody had access to.

- 2 Derk Bodde, "Myths of Ancient China", in *Mythologies of the Ancient World*, ed. by Samuel Noah Kramer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1961), p.390
- 3 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, (Beijing 北京: zhong hua shu ju 中華書局, 2012), p. 54 *Lunyu* 2.4: 子曰: 吾十有五而志于學, 三十而立, 四十而不惑, 五十而知天命, 六十而耳順, 七十而從心所欲, 不踰矩。」
- 4 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 173 Lunyu 16.8: 孔子曰: 「君子有三畏: 畏天命, 畏大人, 畏聖人之言。小人不知天命而不畏也, 狎大人, 侮聖人之言。」

Moreover, Confucius believed that he was vested with Heavenly-endowed virtue and tasked to transmit the culture (wen $\dot{\mathbf{X}}$) of the past. He was fully confident of this and therefore remained composed and unafraid whenever he was held captive or faced dangerous situations during his decades of wandering.⁵

The changing meanings of *tianren heyi* shows a reinterpretation of tradition rather than a total rejection of it. In this reinterpretation, the reformulated ideology stands in continuity with history but its political overtones of *tianming* were played down. Instead of leaving the transcendent and immanent as two independent and mutually exclusive concepts, the Chinese sought to reconcile them. Perhaps the statement 'Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear' in the Classic of History gives this very idea its full expression.

ROLE OF THE MIND-HEART (XIN △) IN CHINESE SPIRITUALITY

So, what constitutes the core of the Chinese imagination? How exactly did it collapse the alleged transcendent-immanent dichotomy? Based on this writer's understanding, the solution to the ontological bifurcation lies in the xin (\wedge), or more commonly rendered as the mind-heart.

It is perhaps little wonder that the notion of xin should be so closely associated with Neo-Confucianism given the overwhelming concentration on xin following the rise of xinxue (心學), or 'Learning of the mind-heart'. However, on closer examination, the idea of xin was already long present in Chinese thought. It was just that Neo-Confucian developed it to its full maturity. The Mencian thesis is that by fully penetrating our minds, we can be led to comprehend our self-nature and eventually understand Heaven?' Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, there is the mention of the famous 'fasting of the mind-heart' (心深 xinzhai) to gain communion with the Dao. All these examples signify the direct linkage between tian and ren by turning inwards and seeking resources from oneself, instead of searching beyond the realm of humanity, as is often the case in Western thought. The function of the xin finds its quintessential expression in Chan Buddhism as well. In the Platform Sutra, it is said that "From the outset the Dharma has been in the world; being in the world, it transcends the world. Hence do not seek the transcendental world outside,

⁵ See *Lunyu* 7.23, 9.5 for such instances.

⁶ See *Shangshu*尚書 "Taishi" 太誓chapter: 「天視自我民視, 天聽自我民聽。」 Also quoted by Mencius, see *Mencius* 5A:5.

⁷ Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 356

by discarding the present world itself." Thus, it is possible that the notion of xin was already a defining feature in Chinese thought and served as a form of cultural conditioning so that when Chan Buddhism started teaching about seeing into one's own nature and becoming a Buddha, it was readily accepted.

In addition, *xin* could possibly have played a part in the Chinese epistemology as well. Knowledge and knowing may not necessarily be established through empirical understanding in early Chinese thought. It is often intuitive, going beyond what contemporary thinkers would dub as scientific, yet it has nothing to do with superstitions either. Mote makes an important point in his explanation of what intuition is:

"Intuition is not reason, for the process by which one intuitively knows is not subject to analysis and reasoned understanding. Nonetheless to intuit is to know and to know with great certainty (even should the knowledge so acquired prove to be erroneous); it is not like faith which demands that one believe without knowing."

Indeed, experience of direct, immediate knowing seems to be made possible through the *xin*. For instance, Zhuangzi feels that language is at once limiting and divisive. Although ideas cannot be adequately conveyed through words, they can be realized in the mind-heart. Thus, the *xin* is the medium through which the transcendent joins with the immanent.

To end off this section, the conversation between Wang Yangming and his friend, as follows, will also serve our purpose of understanding the *xin* well:

The friend pointed to flowering trees on a cliff and said:

You say there is nothing under heaven external to the mind. These flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms of themselves. What have they to do with the mind?

Wang replied:

Before you look at the flowers, they and your mind are in a state of silent vacancy. As you come to look at them, their colours at once show up clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to your mind.¹⁰

⁸ Philip Yampolsky, *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York: Columbia University Press), p.140

⁹ Frederick W. Mote, *Intellectual Foundations of China (zhongguo sixiang zhi yuanyuan)* 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1989), p.19

Wang, Yangming, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.222.

On the surface, what is internal seems to be diametrically opposed to the external. But ontologically speaking, they are intertwined. Just as the flowers are devoid of significance without the mind, so both the internal and external are inseparable. The external cannot be negated, rather, it is the mutual engendering that drives one's creative imagination.¹¹

DIVINITY WITHOUT THEOLOGY

The Western theological perspective is typically associated with theism. Given the ontological dualism in the form of a vertical disjunction, religion in the sense of a wholly transcendent seems to require the support of an unflinching faith. In the interest of brevity, this paper shall not attempt to prove, or disprove religious metaphysics, but suffices to point out that the absence of theology is a salient feature of the Chinese tradition. This is very much in the spirit of Zhuangzi if we consider this observation in light of the statement "as to what lies beyond the universe the sage admits its existence but does not theorize". ¹²

In the Lunyu, it is recorded that when Confucius offered sacrifice to the dead, he felt as if the dead were present. When he offered sacrifice to other spiritual beings, he felt as though those spirits were present too. Hence, he said, "If I do not participate in the sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice at all." From this, it is apparent that when Confucius made sacrifices, he did not concern himself with the existence of spiritual beings. Even if they really did exist, that fact itself would be irrelevant. To genuinely participate in sacrificial rites is to feel a deep sense of reverence, it is the emotions evoked that counts.

The cogent intimations of reality that imagination provides is also eloquently evidenced in the Book of Rites:

The severest vigil and purification is maintained and practised in the inner self, while a looser vigil is maintained externally. During the days of such vigil, the mourner thinks of the departed, how and where he sat, how he smiled

¹¹ Yuet Keung Lo 勞悅強, Wennei Wenwai: zhongguo sixiang shi zhong de jingdian quanshi 文內文外:中國思想史中的經典詮釋 (taibei: taida chuban zhongxin, 2010), p.vi

¹² Qian Mu錢穆, Zhuangzi zuan jian 莊子纂箋, (Taipei 台北市: Dongda tushu gongsi東大圖書公司, 2011), p.18.

¹³ Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 64 (*Lunyu* 3.12: 祭如在, 祭神如神在。子曰: 「吾不與祭, 如不祭。」)

and smoke, what were his aims and views, what he delighted in, and what he desired and enjoyed. By the third day he will perceive the meaning of such exercise. On the day of the sacrifice, when he enters the apartment [of the temple], he will seem to see [the deceased] in the place [where his spirit-tablet is]. After he has moved about [to perform his operations], and is leaving by the door, he will be arrested by seeming to hear the sound of his movements, and will sigh as he seems to hear the sound of his sighing...¹⁴

The above describes in some detail the psychological state of the filial son in mourning. As Fung Yu-Lan notes, "to gain communion with the dead through abstraction"¹⁵ is to give satisfaction to the emotions of affectionate longings. In the Han lexicon Shuowen jiezi (說文解字) compiled by Xu Shen (許慎), etymologically, the Chinese character 廟 miao, where ancestral worship takes place, is an iconic representation for the countenance of the ancestor. This corroborates with the above view that sacrificial rites are about expressing one's deep-seated feelings through imagining the spiritual presence of the dead.

Due to the absence of a sharp division between the transcendent and immanent, the Chinese civilization has often been criticized of lacking religious import. Are the Chinese really irreligious people then? To answer this question, one has to probe much deeper. Does one need a religion to be religious? What is a religion anyway? In a sense, a 'religion' is a mere label, an appellation given to a particular system of belief. If religions all share the same essence in awakening an internal quest, then naming is ultimately divisive. Seen in this light, perhaps the whole question about Chinese religiosity is meaningless because the West do not share the same sort of metaphysical understanding, and thus their charge is groundless to begin with.

AN EMIC VERSUS ETIC PROBLEM

Throughout the paper, there has been a focus in attempting to argue that the early Chinese people were constantly engaged in some form of imagination that has helped shaped Chinese thought and produced a beguiling philosophical worldview. Such an imagination offers us a reconciliation of the 'actual' and

- 14 Fung Yu-Lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Derke Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), I, p.351-52. Fung quotes from the *Liji*禮記.
- 15 Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I, p.352
- 16 See Shuowen jiezi 說文解字,卷九 (juan 9) 广部:「尊先祖皃也。从广朝聲。」(清) 段玉裁注:「尊其先祖而以是儀皃之。故曰宗廟。諸書皆曰。廟,皃也。祭法注云。廟之言皃也。宗廟者,先祖之尊皃也。古者廟以祀先祖。凡神不爲廟也。爲神立廟者,始三代以後。」

'transcended' world, which continues to have an enormous purchase on our current imagination, through which this tradition will live on. That a tradition can be anything but invented is hard to conceive of, for it is a human creation, one that necessarily reproduces and reinvents itself. This paper is thus a retrospective study, and so its tenability is also a matter of framing. But it has to be emphatically pointed out that framing is determining, it is not merely about putting things into context. Hence, therein lies an emic versus etic problem, an implication of this paper which warrants some discussion. Simply put, this is a question of interpretation whereby a particular *problématique* may be considered from either the insider or the outsider's perspective. (It may also be suggested that the insider and outsider are equally capable of producing both emic and etic accounts, but for definitional purpose and to simplify things a little, this need not concern us here.) The key is just that any attempt to understand the past necessarily involves historical inquiry into the subject matter. Ergo it is important to distinguish between emic and etic accounts so as to better understand our understanding.

For instance, during the time of Confucius, the House of Zhou had fallen into disuse, and rites and music had fallen into neglect. It was under such circumstances that Confucius committed himself to preserving historical records by compiling anthologies. From conventional sources, we know that this included the editing and arranging of the Classic of Odes (shijing 詩經), Classic of History (shangshu 尚書) among others. Despite being a descendant of the Shang, Confucius staunchly defended the Zhou. While the Zhou empire continued its decline, he nevertheless remained resolute in 'following the Zhou'. Although some modern historians have argued that the Duke of Zhou is at best a shadowy figure in ancient history, 17 he was indubitably a luminous figure in the eyes of Confucius, and the surest evidence that the Mandate of Heaven had indeed passed to the House of Zhou.

Regardless of the fact that Confucius might have misconceived the past, this meaningful reconstruction of a historical and cultural symbol would not have been able to come about without a dose of creative imagination. The Zhou that Confucius had in mind was a romanticized one – a fantasy of a laudable moral universe which was no less a reality for him. The ontological possibility of such a realm was made plausible by relying on the extant literary culture

established. Confucius had effusively praised the resplendent literary culture of Zhou¹⁸, and this eventually became the sustenance of his imagination. In the compilation of the Classic of Odes for example, he was selective in the material, expunging undesirable works which were the ones that probably did not exemplify the normative order of ancient times. As recorded in the Analects, Confucius believed that for the three hundred and five pieces that he retained, they may all be succinctly described in a word as having not deviated¹⁹. Clearly, Confucius had projected his own ideals onto his works. His ingenuity lies in re-writing tradition, re-organizing and synthesizing a culture while building his own cultural enterprise on it.

On the other hand, from Confucius' point of view, he was a self-proclaimed lover of antiquity, a 'transmitter' instead of 'creator'²⁰, intent on upholding the integrity of history. He continued the honoured tradition of recording and memorializing human deeds of the past. He also sought to celebrate and glorify the literary culture of the Western Zhou, which he ardently admired and desired to revive. Indeed, Zhou culture was great, but according to Confucius, it already had before it the examples of two previous dynasties, and thus its achievements were also built upon them. Therefore, in urging his contemporaries to follow the wisdom embedded in the golden past, Confucius did not think that he was proposing something radical. In a Gadamerian sense, Confucius does stand in continuity to tradition because he sees himself recapitulating and transmitting what has been handed down to him²¹.

Is there, then, a 'right' interpretation? Both are relevant, and perhaps a more nuanced question deserving of some contemplation would be if Confucius had actually intended the social evolution that drew ideological support from his teachings. Oftentimes by choosing to take a historical approach, one tends to think it is safe enough to assume that the results of the study offer an objective point of view. We fall into a ridiculous delusion that the historical approach allows us to be observers who write from a thoroughly detached point of view. But the truth is that; because we are situated as part of this creation of history,

¹⁸ Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, p.29

¹⁹ Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 65.

²⁰ Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 53. Lunyu 2.2: 子曰: 「詩三百, 一言以蔽之, 曰『思無邪』。」

²¹ Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 93. Lunyu 7.1: 子曰: 「述而不作, 信而好古, 竊比於我老彭。」

we also inevitably write from a contextualized point of view.

CONCLUSION

In the twilight zone between transcendence and immanence, the Chinese finds reality and the fullest meaning of life. As Bertrand Russell insightfully points out:

"Instinctive happiness, or joy of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of Chinese civilization."²²

'Instinctive happiness' is certainly a very apt phrase for this Chinese asset. Something instinctive surely comes from within, yet it also cannot arise without influence from without. The prima facie mundane self is clearly the locus for restoring the equilibrium and harmony between the self and that which is external to it. Pursuing this further, we may conclude that the secular is also the sacred, and vice versa in the Chinese imagination.

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A Failed Mission in Liberation: Japanese Women's Enfranchisement and American Occupation

Malcom Ethan Johnson

Malcom Ethan Johnson is a junior at Berea college located: a small liberal arts college located in the foothills of Kentucky. He is a double major studying history and Asian studies who has had the fortune of spending his time at Berea college as a teacher's assistant in the history department. His current research interests include comparative feminist movements in East Asia, the effects of western colonization, and the cartographic spatiality of ethnographic accounts.

"The struggle that woman is now carrying on is far more far-reaching than any other; and, if no diversion occurs, it will finally surpass in fanaticism any war of religion or race." These powerful words, written by the Swedish author Ellen Key, would come to embody a steady push for gender equality in the twentieth century. Born from the strong discourse of the nineteenth century, this female struggle—best defined as gender equality, or feminism—was a siren call heard around the world. Though the words feminist and feminism are French in conception, the movements they have come to describe have worked to annihilate the prejudices that established an inequality between the sexes around the globe. Each feminist movement was very much dictated by the social, political, and economic climate in which it operated. Often, leaders would look to their international counterparts—who were divided into socialist, liberal, conservative, and radical factions—to develop innovative methods and

- 1 Ellen Key, tr. Arthur Chater. Love and Marriage (New York, NY 1911), p. 214.
- 2 Key's definition of feminism and gender equality are especially important when considering the contrasting voices of prolific Japanese feminists, like Yosano Akiko.
- 3 Karen Offen offers an excellent treatment on the conceptions of feminism in Europe, tracing the concept all the way to its roots in the French Revolution of 1789. Her analysis delves into the strata of development and the varieties of European feminism that would have undoubtedly influenced Japanese women during the age of expansion and modernization in the Meiji Era.

ideas that would ultimately decide what it meant to be a woman. For some factions, characteristics of gender equality would be defined by a state that works to enable and protect the female ability to control reproductive rights, to earn a livelihood, exercise the right to divorce, and access to universal suffrage. For others, gender equality is rooted in the family as the primary political and social unit, and defined by an ethic of care, rather than an ethic of competition.

Japan is no different. During the early twentieth century, several factions of Japanese feminists were doing something very important for their movement: disagreeing. Their discourse, undoubtedly an echo of their feminist predecessors, created the Meiji New Women. 4 While these women recognized the importance of becoming involved in the state to attain protections under the law, they mainly focused on attaining equality in a more practical sense: one in which men recognized women's contributions to their families and country. Thus, the New Women set out to challenge the tradition and convention that dictated those characteristics. However, because of a series of government fiats and a history of Confucian inspired subordination, they experienced very little social or political realization of their work. Indeed, the government's resistance and the stalwart traditions would prove strong barriers to the dissemination and acceptance of New Woman ideas. As social and political changes began to stagnate, though the New Women had crafted new and refashioned old arguments, a wholesale regime change, incited by the Fifteen Years War, would alter their discourse even further.⁵ This total war

- 4 "New Woman" is a very broad, internationally employed term that was first coined in the late nineteenth century. Largely, it describes a woman who was offering political discourse for defining womanhood in a rapidly modernizing world, regardless of which school of feminist thought she belonged to. Accordingly, the term became associated with the modern trappings of the Meiji Era and its women. As Dina Lowy explains in her work, *The Japanese New Woman*, these women sat goals aimed around an ethic of care that grew from a heightened awareness of self, of gender distinctions, and of an enhanced sense of worth gained from becoming actively engaged in society. Certainly, these women sought to define womanhood by its modernity *and* its Japaneseness—a goal that demanded equal respect and recognition from their male countrymen.
- The "Fifteen-Year War" is defined by the period of Japanese military aggression from the Manchurian Incident in 1931, to Japan's defeat during the Second World War in 1945. Making this distinction is important because the Pacific War, starting with the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese military in 1941, generally refers to the war between Japan and the US, but not to the war with the other Asian countries. The term Fifteen-Year War is used here in preference to "Second World War" or Pacific War because the focus of the discussion covers the period from 1931 to 1945 and is not limited to the narrower period of 1941 to 1945.

required all resources, both material and human, to be allocated in ways suited to the absolute purpose of the nation-state, thus everyday citizens became an element of the governmental project of controlling resources that prioritized production. One of those sources of production, not surprisingly, was centered on women's reproduction. Japanese feminists were aware of this move by the state, and began to change their arguments accordingly, effectively plotting a scenario that emphasized the importance of women as pillars of the state and participants in state activities, which thereby made women's contributions known to the national and local government authorities. This new message altered the New Women's discourse that sought to redefine womanhood in the early twentieth century, and ultimately shows that Japanese women were working to attain full citizenship long before American occupation. While the American democratization effort would grant women legislative rights, I would argue that, in spite of the work of these women, this foreign allocation meant that meaningful social change on the practical level never occurred.

Operating under the aegis of American democracy, Macarthur's occupation administrators and constitutional drafters worked to create a Japan that epitomized American ideas of freedom, justice, and citizenship; and in many ways, they failed. Their work, which appeared to set a standard for democratization where both sexes held equal positions in society, actually used the old mediums of administrations to curtail any meaningful change in Japanese ideas of hierarchy. While American occupation forces regarded Japanese women's suffrage and women's visibility in the national election as a barometer by which to measure the overall improvement of life under occupation, this legislation never changed the underpinning ideas in Japanese society that so rigidly restricted the roles of women.⁶ Thus, American ideas of gender equality mainly took root in the revolution from above, but had very little impact on every day life of Japanese women. Though Japanese women have achieved forms of full equality through suffrage, property ownership, marriage, divorce, guardianship, education, and business operation, they hardly see those legal rights transformed into practical equality in their day-to-day lives. The challenge, then, for Japanese women was not one of gaining formal rights, as it is for many women around the world, but of gaining actual equality

Lisa Yoneyama, "Liberation under Siege: U.S. Military Occupation and Japanese Women's Enfranchisement", *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 3, Legal Borderlands: Law and the Construction of American Borders (Sep., 2005): p. 887.

in practice.⁷ I would argue that, in light of this ongoing struggle for practical equality for Japanese women, American ideas of gender equality had little impact on Japanese ideas of gender equality during the occupation period.

The New Japanese Woman: Creating Discourse for a Modernizing Nation

The day the mountains move has come. I speak, but no one believes me. For a time, the mountains have been asleep, But long ago they danced with fire. It doesn't matter if you believe this, My friends, as long as you believe: All the sleeping women Are now awake and moving.⁸

This poem, written by Yosano Akiko, appeared in the first issue of the Japanese women's magazine, Seito, in September of 1911. Yosano, an already famous poet and writer, penned these words to announce the reawakening of Japanese women across the island nation. This image of the new Japanese woman harkened to the feminine power of a distant past where women created classical works of literature, while simultaneously declaring the fresh eruption of contemporary female power and creativity. Remarkably, her work noted male skepticism of the new Japanese woman, and also hinted at the controversy that would ensue. Yosano's role in political discourse only began with this poem. In the well circulated magazine Taiyo (The Sun), Yosano wrote an opinion piece titled "Eliminating Overestimation of Motherhood," and waded head first into what Takeda Hiroko has called the "Motherhood-Protection and Abortion Debates"—controversial facets of the "woman problem," which had much of the country in tumult, and would come to define the New Woman. In this work, her point was twofold: that motherhood was not the only element of a woman's life, and, second, to criticize the idea of sexual division of labor. A mother, writer, artist, and activist, her voice came right

⁷ The accomplished scholar Iwao Sumiko explores this a great deal in her work "The Quiet Revolution: Japanese Women Today" published in the *Japan Foundation Newsletter* in 1991: (Issue XIX), 1-9.

⁸ Carole McCann, and Seung-kyung Kim. Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives. Routledge, 2013, 30.

up against western authors like Leo Tolstoy and Swedish feminist Ellen Key.⁹ Yosano's awoken women were the antithesis of their predecessors, who were depicted as complacent good mothers and wives. Instead, the New Women would challenge the tradition and convention that dictated a female's role in life, and would do so, most importantly, independent of Western ideas of gender equality.¹⁰

The New Woman Debates in the early twentieth century was not a spontaneous boiling over of repressed feminine power, but rather the culmination of decades of what came to be known as the "woman problem." This discussion penetrated all strata of society, spanning across government, schools, and media, and ultimately deciding the role of women in the family and across society. Initially, this conversation occupied the space of masculine power, but moved into the female realm in the 1910s, as women in Tokyo organized the feminist group Seitosha (Blue Stocking Society), and its journal, Seito. Women used this outlet as a medium for expression, as a testament to new female ideas and contributions, and to challenge old conceptions of femininity and gender norms. 11 Traditionally, the ability of Japanese women to challenge the status quo in such a work had been less viable than that of their male counterparts. Seito became increasingly radical and was the center of much criticism. After seven years of publication, the short lived society had created a climate that seemed to embody the New Women debate, and was ultimately stifled by the criticism they received from traditional women, who had a deeply personal understanding of womanhood, and the power of imperial censorship. 12 Yosano and other Seito women understood that challenging convention and custom in Meiji Japan was no easy task, and would require more than changing legislation or condemning chauvinistic masculinity.

The Blue Stocking Society was undoubtedly a reaction to the Ministry of Education's edict of 1910 that strictly limited women to a secondary position in society. A fusion of Confucian-inspired samurai values and Victorian ideas about the importance of monogamy and chastity, the essence of this edict

- 9 Takeda Hiroko, The Political Economy of Reproduction in Japan, 49.
- Barbara Malony offers an in-depth analysis of the indigenous and imported conceptions of rights to argue that, though Japanese women were aware of international feminist movements, they ultimately refashioned imported ideas to suit their needs. See "Women's Rights, Feminism, and Suffragism in Japan", Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 69, No. 4, (November, 2000), pp. 639-661.
- 11 Lowy, Dina. The Japanese "New Woman": Images of Gender and Modernity, 3.
- 12 Henshall, Kenneth. Dimensions of Japanese Society: Gender, Margins and Mainstream. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 21-22.

stressed the superiority of men to women. This edict evolved from the Civil Code of 1898, which "established the institution of the household as the basic unit of Japanese society." ¹³ In the case of Japan, the household was essentially a corporate entity where the husband's unwavering authority was solidified by female subordination. This widespread acceptance of a patriarchal household system ushered the reduction of female power in all dimensions of Japanese society. Under this system, the true marker of womanhood was defined by being a "good wife and wise mother." As Baron Kikuchi, Minister of Education and president of both Kyoto and Tokyo Universities, wrote at the end of the Meiji period:

Our female education, then, is based on the assumption that women marry, and that its object is to fit girls to become "good wives and mothers." The question naturally arises what constitutes a good wife and wise mother, and the answer to the question required a knowledge of the position of the wife and the mother in the household and the standing of women in society and her status in the state...[The] man goes outside to work to earn his living, to fulfill his duties to the State; it is his wife's part to help him, for the common interests of the house, and as her share of the duty to the state, by sympathy and encouragement, by relieving him of anxieties at home, managing household affairs, looking over the household economy, and, above all, tending to the old people and bringing up the children in a fit and proper manner. ¹⁴

This excerpt accurately reflects the prevailing ideas about the roles and responsibilities that women were expected to fulfill, as well as the ideas that underpinned both the edict of 1910 and the Civil Code of 1898. The emergence of the new woman, working to challenge convention and tradition, should have been be a steady, prolonged ascent toward legislative equality. Instead, because of the chaos of American Occupation and the devastation of total war, the work of these women was never fully realized.

The work of the new woman in Meiji Japan, though relatively successful, was wracked with controversy and would have to adapt as total war swept the Asian continent. Before the Fifteen Years War, the work of Japanese feminist

¹³ Robert J. Smith. "Making Village Women into 'Good Wives and Wise Mothers' in Prewar Japan." Journal of Family History 8, no. 1 (March 1, 1983), 72.

¹⁴ Dairoku, Kikuchi. "The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890)." *Japanese Education*. London: John Murray, 1909, 2–3.

organizations writ large encountered complicated developments that further softened the imposition of American conceptions of gender equality. Ultimately, the discourse they offered, embodied in the Motherhood Protection Debates and the Abortion Debates, would light the path for their successors, but would not effectively change preexisting ideas of gender equality in the nation.

Total War: Altering the New Woman Discourse

Attaining full legal rights for women has, historically, evolved from a binary approach: on the one hand lies an aspiration for full participation in the public realm, and on the other hand lies the aspiration for full female control in the domestic sphere.¹⁵ It was this binary approach that characterized the Japanese feminist movement in the early twentieth century, and the realization of one would, it seems, cause the other to abate. As Tomie Nokao argues in his work, the scenario Japanese feminists came up with during mobilization for total war was "aimed at increasing women's awareness of their being pillars of the state, participating in state activities as responsible citizens, and thereby making women's contributions to the state known to the national and local government authorities."16 By making these contributions known, women leaders, like Ichikawa Fusae, began to assert that mother-child protection and other total war legislation was not a form of civil equality, but rather compensation from the state for fulfilling their public duty as mothers for producing the "future nation." I would posit that contemporary historians can understand this adoption of opportunist strategies as an effect of the realization of Japanese feminists that the viability of a political movement in a time of war was, essentially, non-existent. It was during this time that feminists began to turn their narrative into an argument about the responsibility of women to provide for their country, rather than an argument that calls for full female

¹⁵ I use the term "domestic sphere" here to refer to production that happens inside the home. In the West, this tends to be referred to as the cult of domesticity, but that's a major mischaracterization of the Japanese women's movement. Historians Sharon Nolte and Sally Hastings make the distinction between the Western "cult of domesticity" and, what I've called the domestic sphere, which is also referred to as the Japanese "cult of productivity" very clear. For the purposes of this work, that distinction is less important than understanding the ways in which Japanese feminists altered their discourse to work with the total war regime, rather than against.

¹⁶ Tomie Naoko. "The Political Process of Establishing the Mother-Child Protection Law in Prewar Japan." Social Science Japan Journal 8, no. 2 (2005): 241.

¹⁷ Ibid, 240.

enfranchisement.

Legislation under the total war regime was one of the biggest factors for altering the course of the work of Japanese feminists. As the government became more and more committed to crafting a population policy in the 1930s, their motivations were clear: total war had made reproduction a matter of national concern. As Takeda Hiroko argues, "the increase of the Japanese population statistically hit its pinnacle in 1926, and subsequently, the population trend turned in the direction of gradual decrease, with the fall in birth rates and the decrease in the juvenile population attracting particular attention after the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937." This alarming phenomenon caused serious anxiety over human resources, particularly those needed for supporting total war. Perhaps the most pronounced concern for the government was the shortage of soldiers and new recruits for the workforce. These concerns fueled the Japanese population policy of the 1930s that introduced legislation for the growth of "population of good quality" in order to secure enough human resources for waging the war.¹⁹ These policies, however, were based on the exploitation of female bodies. Effectively, the total war regime commandeered the wombs of "good mothers" to maintain the war effort, which ultimately led to further legislation that consolidated and supported soldier production. These ideas were embodied, for militarists, in the Mother-Child Protections Act, which was connected to the discourse on the Motherhood Protection Debates of the Blue Stocking Society. The machismo of this legislation "reinforced the role of a paternalistic and patriarchal state in 'protecting' its women and children, and the nationalist and militarists project which circumscribed the meanings attached to motherhood."20 Thus, the incorporation of females into the nation-state was quite different from the course laid out by New Women, as Japanese womanhood became increasingly defined in means of war production.

The alteration of their course, however, proved to be a minor impediment on realizing full social and political rights. Undoubtedly, the most trying times for every Japanese inhabitant were yet to come. As New Women adjusted their discourse to challenge old patriarchal systems by channeling their power as producers for the state, the Total War Regime began to recognize their

¹⁸ Takeda Hiroko. *The Political Economy of Reproduction in Japan: Between Nation-state and Everyday Life.* Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies: 78.

¹⁹ Tomie Naoko. "The Political Process of Establishing the Mother-Child Protection Law in Prewar Japan.": 242.

²⁰ Vera Mackie, Creating Socialist Women in Japan: Gender, Labour and Activism, 1900–1937. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997): 162.

efforts. The chaos of occupation, however, would complete New Women's efforts in many ways. In an article featured in *The New York Times*, which was ironically titled "Democratic Rule Ordered in Japan," George Jones captures Macarthur's motivation for enfranchising women: "He urged the emancipation of Japanese women through the right to vote so that they might introduce a 'new concept of government directly subservient to the home." 21 Indeed, Japanese women would take to the polls and elect new female leaders who would enact legislation on their behalf—all the while, the efforts of Japanese feminists would be sent into disarray as they had to set new goals, arrange new groups, and navigate new legislation. If gender equality were defined by a state that works to enable and protect the female ability to control reproductive rights, to earn a livelihood, exercise the right to divorce, and access to universal suffrage, then Japanese women had attained it. If, however, they sought gender equality is rooted in the family as the primary political and social unit, and defined it by an ethic of care, rather than an ethic of competition, then this immediate liberation would prove quite detrimental.

The Great American Coup

The dawn has slowly begun to break in the Land of the Rising Sun for Japan's most depressed class—the patient, plodding Japanese women. For uncounted generations the Japanese woman has tramped along the muddy roads three paces behind her lord and master. Now all of a sudden, and mostly through the insistence of the Allied occupation authorities, she has become a member of Japan, vested with the power to vote, choose her government, organize meetings as she feels like it and express her thoughts without fear of the secret police—even, possibly, by a stretch of extreme imagination, talk back to her husband.²²

As Lindesay Parrott, Tokyo Bureau Chief for the New York Times, commented in a series of articles: the occupation forces had instituted revolutionary changes for the Japanese women. While his observation was undoubtedly accurate, the implications of this revolutionary act were yet to

²¹ George E. Jones "Democratic Rule Ordered in Japan." New York Times. October 12, 1945.

²² Lindesay Parrott. "Now a Japanese Woman Can Be a Cop: She Likes the Idea, Too, and Is Looking about for Many More Similar Opportunities. Now a Japanese Woman Can Be a Cop." *New York Times.* June 2, 1946, sec. The New York Times Magazine.

be understood. Parrott's observation is an especially poignant reminder that much of the West had believed that only through the power of democratization could this "depressed class," regardless of their aspirations, achieve suffrage and other constitutional rights. General Douglas Macarthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers²³ during the six years of occupation, was not immune to such thought. Accordingly, he named the enfranchisement of women, and their full integration into society as number one on his list of "Five Great Reforms," which he presented in a late afternoon meeting with Japan's new Premier, Baron Kijuro Shidehara. Within days, the Japanese government would comply with Macarthur's demands. ²⁴With American powers dominating the political scene, the progress that Japanese feminists were making under the total war regime and the aims of their struggle would be realized, oddly enough, to their detriment.

Mire Koikari, associate professor of Women's Studies at the University of Hawaii, has argued: "Like Japanese women's suffrage, the constitutional revision including the Japanese Equal Rights Amendment was initiated from above, that is, by American occupiers in the Government Section with little involvement of Japanese."25 This revolution from above, or the democratic imposition by occupation forces, didn't reach too far beyond SCAP's documents and the new Japanese constitution. The drafters, while granting suffrage, did not fundamentally change Japanese hierarchical conceptions of gender. This is largely because of the failure of a sustainable grassroots movement that would empower Japanese women to become the pillars of the state, for which they had been fighting so diligently for decades. Barbara Molony discusses an instant during a visit from women in the Civil Information and Education Section,²⁶ who were responsible for instituting gender democracy in postwar Japan, that embodies this sentiment quite well. In the village that the CI&ES visited, an elderly woman, upon hearing that the Americans were urging Japanese women to exercise "the rights benevolently bestowed on them by the Americans,' indignantly demanded how the Americans could ignore the

²³ Hereafter, I will refer to General Macarthur and his team as SCAP: an acronym for the full title.

²⁴ Burton, Crane "New Laws to Free Japanese Women: Statutes to be Changed to Fit New Constitution." New York Times. August 23, 1946.

²⁵ Mire Koikari, "Exporting Democracy? American Women, "Feminist Reforms," and Politics of Imperialism in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952" A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2002): 30.

²⁶ Hereafter referred to as CI&ES.

efforts of Ichikawa Fusae, one of the most prolific Japanese feminists of the total war period, and her colleagues to gain the vote for women."²⁷ Indeed, American occupiers were largely ignorant to the work of Japanese feminists before their arrival, crippling the power of the revolutionary fiat from SCAP.

Perhaps the only viable opportunity that Japanese women would have to realize a practical implementation of gender equality under American occupation was those same low-ranking female soldiers of CI&ES; after all, it was they who were trying to organize a grassroots mobilization of women in the name of democracy. Encouraging the leaders of women's groups to run for office was a cornerstone of the CI&ES's work, and would be the ultimate signifier or the success of the American democratization effort. For these American female officers, this encouragement took the form of "educating" the Japanese women in the school of democracy. Mire Koikari explains the scope of the education effort: "The CI&E created information centers and libraries, showed motion pictures, broadcast radio programs, and offered numerous workshops and lectures. Through these mediums, the Americans tried to inject into the Japanese the American ideal of democracy."28 For democracy to be successful, American leadership considered it paramount to "give the Japanese" an opportunity to discard those of their past ways which made them a menace to the rest of the world and to establish democratic principles in all spheres of political, economic and cultural life."29 With their mission clearly dictated by SCAP, the women of CI&ES sat out to liberate what they had perceived to be a stifled, weak, and ignorant Japanese woman—a misguided and erroneous mission that would ignore the work of New Women, and, ultimately fall short of Macarthur's idyllic vision of American democratization.

With great insight, Parrott was very careful not to trumpet SCAP's achievement as a top-down victory for American democracy. In an interview with Parrott, one of the most prolific Japanese feminists of the time, Ichikawa Fusae, introduced American readers to the long history of the Japanese women's suffrage movement. In this interview, Ichikawa asserted that, regardless of American occupation, Japanese women would have achieved full citizenship

²⁷ Barbara Molony. "Women's Rights, Feminism, and Suffragism in Japan, 1870-1925"): 661.

²⁸ Koikari, Mire. "Exporting Democracy? American Women, 'Feminist Reforms,' and Politics of Imperialism in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952." Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 23, no. 1 (2002): 33.

^{29 &}quot;Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the CIE Fields," October 1, 1949, SCAP Records, box 5246, file Staff Studies.

in due time, primarily as a result of their efforts in the war. She continued, "It is the hope and belief of Japanese feminists that in this new situation the ancient feudal custom which kept women in bondage will simply and quietly be permitted to lapse by mutual consent without further comment." It was this sentiment that many Japanese feminists shared as they saw American Occupation as a new era of their struggle. In many ways, their hopes were never achieved.

The End of an Era

While American legislation opened the door for Japanese women to achieve gender equality, the failure to empower Japanese women during occupation led to a weak transmission of American ideas of gender equality, and no practical realization of gender equality in Japan. In spite of the work of New Women, the immediate realization of their efforts meant that meaningful social change on the practical level never occurred. While Macarthur's occupation administrators and constitutional drafters worked to create a Japan that epitomized American ideas of freedom, justice, and citizenship, in many ways, they failed. Thus, in light of this ongoing struggle for practical equality for Japanese women, American ideas of gender equality had little impact on Japanese ideas of gender equality during the occupation period. The New women would challenge the tradition and convention that dictated a female's role in life through the Motherhood Protection Debates and the Abortion Debates, which would light the path for their successors, but would not effectively change preexisting ideas of gender equality in the nation. As I have argued, these debates in the early twentieth century were not a spontaneous boiling over of repressed feminine power, but rather the culmination of decades of what came to be known as the "woman problem." Yosano and other Seito women understood that challenging convention and custom in Meiji Japan was no easy task, and would require more than changing legislation or condemning chauvinistic masculinity. Instead, because of the disruptive force of total war, the work of these women was never fully realized.

In the thralls of the war, Japanese feminists adopted opportunist strategies upon the realization that the viability of a political movement in a time of war was, essentially, non-existent. It was during this time that feminists began to

³⁰ Parrott, Lindesay. "Out of Feudalism: Japan's Women: Under Allied Pressure They Have Suddenly Been Granted a New Place and a New Role in Their Country's Life." *New York Times*. October 28, 1945, sec. The New York Times Magazine.

turn their narrative into an argument about the responsibility of women to provide for their country, rather than an argument that calls for full female enfranchisement. The legislation enacted under the total war regime, and the demands of the war were two of the biggest factors for altering the course of the work of Japanese feminists. With women voicing their role in society, especially for contributions to the war production, they increasingly pressured the total war regime to grant them rights under the Meiji Constitution. But, with the end of the war, and the devastation of national resources, American occupiers, much to the detriment of their social equality, granted women full enfranchisement. This was largely due to the ignorance of low ranking female officers who were charged with educating Japanese women in the school of democracy. Compounding their ignorance, these American occupiers were largely uninformed about the work of Japanese feminists before their arrival, crippling the power of the revolutionary fiat from SCAP. While it was the hope and belief of Japanese feminists that "the ancient feudal custom which kept women in bondage" would simply and quietly lapse by mutual consent, the American occupation did not inspire such a silent slipping away. Understanding the deeply rooted historical context of the occupation era tells contemporary scholars a great deal about gender inequity in Japan. From Yosano's journal, with words scribbled a century ago now, she outlines the hopes for Japanese women that American Occupation could not realize:

Far from such vague ideals as "wise mother and good wife" or the "protection of motherhood," ... these conditions amount to the sort of thoroughgoing individualism, personalism, and humanism, in which all persons can enjoy life equally and harmoniously, without bias or inequality.³¹

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