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From the Editors:

Greetings from the editors of the *Wittenberg University History Journal*. As you may notice, the format for this year's publication has changed from previous issues. We hope that this change is the first step in redefining the journal by making the physical publication even more professional. The within articles are, as always, excellent examples of what students here at Wittenberg are writing, and we hope that you will enjoy reading them.

A very special thanks is due to **Tom and Tina Lagos**, the **Admission Office at Wittenberg** and the **Wittenberg History Club** for their generous donations. Without their financial assistance, this publication would not have been possible. We would also like to thank all those involved in making this journal possible and congratulations to all the writers on creating such superior works.

Mark Huber, Mandy Oleson and Dustin Plummer

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The Hartje Papers

The Martha and Robert G. Hartje Award is presented annually to a Senior in the spring semester. The History Department determines the five finalists who write a 600 to 800 word narrative essay dealing with a historical event or figure. The finalists must have at least a 2.7 grade point average and have completed at least six history courses. The winner is awarded \$500 at a spring semester History Department colloquium and the winning paper is included in the *History Journal*. This year's Hartje Paper award was presented to Kevin Rose.

Table of Contents

Hartje Award Winner

The Life and Death of 30 Ferncliff Place

by Kevin Rose 1

The Doolittle Raids

by Eric Cusick 5

Ideology & Manipulation: A Comparative Study into What Separated
Saigo Takamori and Yamagata Aritomo in the Satsuma Rebellion of
1877

by Greer Illingworth..... 25

Stalin the Philosopher-King: The Soviet Totalitarianism as
Realization of Plato's Republic

by Ryan Miller 33

The Centrality of Neutrality: The Significance of Austria's
Geostrategic Location in the Heart of Europe.

by Amanda Oleson 59

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The 2002-2003 edition of the *History Journal* is dedicated to Dr. Joe O'Connor, who will enter semi-retirement at the conclusion of this academic year. O'Connor's areas of specialty are Russia and Yugoslavia, with particular emphasis on the twentieth century. He has taught classes on Russian and Soviet history, Stalin, the former Yugoslavia, the Balkan Wars, Western Civilization, Renaissance and Reformation, and twentieth-century Europe. O'Connor's most recent scholarly work has focused on modern Croatian sculptors, and he once said of himself, that if he could begin again, he would be an art historian. He first brought his passion for teaching undergraduates to Wittenberg in 1967, after earning his B.A. from the University of Notre Dame and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. O'Connor has given great service to Wittenberg and the history department, providing inspiration, encouragement, and guidance to many students.

Thank you, Dr. O'Connor.

The Life and Death of 30 Ferncliff Place

Kevin Rose

"If only those walls could speak."

Most people disregard a house's ability to live. For them, life is an exclusive scientific and religious phenomenon separated from the natural world of lumber and brick. If one observes life as a child's first breath of air or a flower leaning to reach more sunlight, this is certainly true. Imagine a house as assuming the life of the people calling it home. Like any individual, it consists of the memories and stories that occur in its presence. Words are not used to exemplify its beauty, as most of its stories are lost in the shuffle of life and never find their way to words. For a house that remains part of our landscape, these words are not needed. The walls breathe a story that can never be recorded and therefore never duplicated. Families and eras will come and go, a cycle repeating long after our lives are through. If still standing, these stories are never complete. Unfortunately, walls cannot speak in demolished houses. This narrative has ended for them, as they will only be remembered through photographs and words. In Springfield, Ohio, this story has ended for the house and home that sat at 30 Ferncliff Place. Once great, it now lives through narration alone.

In a city described as "booming" in the 1880s, due to its important role in the modern industrial revolution, this house was born to Cyrus A. Phelps in 1887.¹ While Phelps, a cashier at a local bank, provided the finances for his new home, it was most likely Charles Cregar who supplied the vision. Cregar helped shape much of late nineteenth century Springfield, including City Hall, the market, and numerous churches dotting the city landscape.² It is appropriate that he should design such a prominent house in appearance to sit among the Ferncliff mansions. Out an east window one would see the King mansion, set upon a hill overlooking a growing metropolitan area in the front and Wittenberg College to the rear. To the west sat the grand white Geiger mansion, home to both a Wittenberg founder and its first graduating female.³ For years to follow, the Phelps house would sit among these mansions overlooking the city their owners helped to build.⁴

Phelps is an individual to which little information survives. He was the first cashier and founding member of the First National Bank in Springfield, Ohio. There he worked for twenty-six years before building the house at 30 Ferncliff Place for his family to live.⁵ In their home, Phelps' five children might have had many roles maintaining their living, including his only daughter, as their mother died years prior.⁶ Two sons had regular jobs, with the eldest working at the bank as a clerk. Phelps left the bank in 1899 and sold the property two years later to John and Glenna Webb.⁷ John Webb made his fortunes in the railroad industry, working various jobs in the field. Shortly after moving into the house, John was President of the Columbus, Delaware and Marion Railway Company and ran his own railroad construction company when he moved to New York 1910.⁸ Passing from railroad tycoon to

industrialist, the Webbs sold the property to entrepreneur William H. Stackhouse.⁹ Stackhouse, like the house itself, characterized Springfield at the turn of the century. He was a wealthy industrialist in the American city that defined the word. Industry brought Stackhouse to Springfield, as part owner and branch general manager of the Bettendorf Metal Wheel Company, and made him a name of national repute. While calling 30 Ferncliff Place home, he was twice an advisor to President William G. Harding and president himself of both the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers' Association. Stackhouse moved from the house in 1922 when he became general manager of the entire company, based in Iowa, and moved his permanent residence there.¹⁰ Though maintaining a residence in Springfield, Stackhouse did not require such an expensive and elaborate mansion.

The house at 30 Ferncliff Place sat through two forlorn years vacant while Springfield continued to grow. The city surrounding this empty house added roughly ten thousand people by 1925 when Dwight Roush bought the property and began his own sanitarium.¹¹ The house underwent obvious remodeling to accommodate such a practice after years of being solely a private residence. This property became both a medical practice and home to Roush, his wife, and various nurses for over twenty years until they abandoned it during World War II. After another brief vacancy, the house was carved into nine different apartments, a fitting fate for a house now so close to a growing Wittenberg College. For fifty years, 30 Ferncliff Place was home to hundreds of renters until it was purchased by the Delta Sigma Phi fraternity in 1992.¹² Though renovated and used as their fraternity house from 1993 to 2001, neglect allowed University politics to take control. The University purchased the house in 1998 from a struggling fraternity and ended 30 Ferncliff Place's impressive one hundred and fourteen year life in one day to make way for new low maintenance student apartments.¹³

While people often copy architecture and styles, a house can never be duplicated. There are paths worn into the floorboards that can only come with a hundred years of walking and children running with their friends. There are scratches in tiles from long forgotten accidents and soot marks on window ledges from a recently replaced wood heater. The traits breathe its life and history to anyone entering its doors. The Phelps' home and Cregar vision at 30 Ferncliff Place had a story all its own. These walls can no longer speak and we are now forced to remember this marvel of a home through lonely words and dusty archives. Selected Bibliography

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Wolf, Tom to Nathalie. 22 March 1999. Ohio Historic Preservation Office, Columbus, Ohio.

Endnotes

¹ Tom Wolf to Nathalie, 22 March 1999, Ohio Historic Preservation Office, Columbus, Ohio, 1. The name and date are from *Williams' Springfield City Directory For 1887-88* (Cincinnati: Williams and Co, 1887), 317. Tom Wolf only presupposes this as a possible theory. This educated assumption is due to the architectural and structural similarities to Cregar houses and its date of construction coinciding with the height of his work. While there is no documentary proof of this postulation, all evidence supports this theory.

² Wolf, 1. This is drawn from architectural styles from across the city. Most features of the house belong to Cregar's style. This is only an educated supposition as no documentation of the architect survives.

³ *A Biographical Record of Clark County Ohio*, (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1902), 84-6. H. R. Geiger actually replaced a professor that left after the first year, but he is regarded across most accounts as a founding member of the University. Alice Geiger is listed in some accounts as one of the first to graduate from Wittenberg.

⁴ *Williams' Springfield City Directory for 1887-88*.

⁵ *First National Bank: 63 Years of History* (1914), 6-7.

⁶ *Williams' Springfield City Directory for 1887-88*, 317.

⁷ Deed Record, Clark County Recorders' Office, 14 October 1901, v. 135, 44

⁸ A discrepancy exists between this paper and earlier versions. It was originally thought that the Webb family did not live at the property due city-wide address changes. From 1887-1908 the property was listed as 2 Ferncliff Place. This changed to 30 Ferncliff Place in 1909. *Williams' Springfield City Directory for 1908*, 753. 1909, 685. 1910, 697. 1911, 673.

⁹ Deed Record, Clark County Recorders' Office, 22 March 1910, v. 169, 178.

¹⁰ "W. H. Stackhouse, Aid to W. G. Harding, Dies," *Springfield Daily News*, 5 July 1935, p. 1-2. and Williams, 673.

¹¹ *Williams' Springfield City Directory for 1923. and Williams' Springfield City Directory for 1925.*

¹² Numerous *Williams' Springfield City* directories were used to gather this information.

¹³ Crista Kunkel, "Delta Sigma Phi Fraternity to Relocate from 30 W. Ferncliff to 926 N. Fountain," *The Torch*, 3 April 2001, p. 3.

The Doolittle Raids

Eric Cusick

On April 18, 1942, eighty men embarked on one of the most extraordinary and daring air raids in American History. Undoubtedly, most historians view the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo as an example of bravery and ingenuity present in the United States military during World War II. As General Doolittle remarked, "I was proud of my crew and all the other volunteers who were willing to lay their lives on the line for a risky mission that I could not tell them about until we were on the carrier."¹ Although the bravery and heroism of the mission leaves no doubt, there is a great deal of debate regarding the success and impact of the mission. Most histories of the Doolittle Raid credit the mission with raising American morale, lowering Japanese morale and confidence, and precipitating the Battle of Midway, which the Japanese lost. The difference between these histories rests with the emphasis the historian places on each positive consequence of the raid, and the extent to which the historian acknowledges the negative results of the raid. Carroll Glines, the most prolific scholar of the Doolittle Raid, argues that the psychological effect on the Japanese public and military was the most important result of the mission. James Merrill and others make a case that the rise in American morale was the most important part of the mission. The final group of historians question the true success of the Doolittle Raid. They weigh its positives against its negative in alerting the Japanese and causing thousands of deaths to the Chinese. In all, the historiography of the Doolittle Raid starts with the foundation set by Carroll Glines. Historians researching the Doolittle Raid, begin their research by analyzing the psychological effects of the mission. Although not explicitly aimed at explaining the Doolittle Raid, John Dower sheds light on America's anger and need for revenge against the Japanese. Dower's research, combined with Merrill's history, forms the thesis of this paper. The Doolittle Raid relieved America's strong desire for revenge and provided a significant morale boost that pushed the United States to ultimate victory in the Pacific.

Carroll Glines is the foremost scholar on the Doolittle Raid and has spent much of his life writing books related to the topic. A World War II veteran himself, Glines hails the raid as an important part of American victory in the Pacific. Although he may write with some bias and over glorify the accomplishments of the military, Glines supports his arguments with very solid research and documentation. Glines's most prominent work, *Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders*, was the first comprehensive and analytical book written solely on the Tokyo Raid. This 1964 book made Glines' interpretation fundamental to researching and analyzing the Doolittle Raid. It is also very important for scholars researching the critical points of the World War II. Glines emphasizes the psychological impact the raid had on the entire country of Japan. He states, "the impact on Japanese morale, the primary objective of the raid, was considerable."² In his view, the Doolittle Raid completely changed the mindset of the Japanese people. Before the war and after Pearl Harbor, they were confident in their

leadership and safety of their homeland. The Japanese believed they could defeat America as they continued to hear about the victories of their military. From Pearl Harbor onward, the Japanese continued to dominate without any strong display of Allied resistance.³ After the Tokyo Raid, "The psychological effect was a creeping, insidious realization that, in spite of propaganda to the contrary, the confidence of the people was severely shaken."⁴ Doubt began to enter their minds, and they lost confidence in their government and military. The Japanese government recognized the negative effect this could have, and continued to produce propaganda that would alter the impact of the raid.⁵ The military leaders also experienced the negative psychological effects of the Doolittle Raid. In Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders, Glines points out the anger and shock the raid caused to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and other leaders. As a direct result of the Doolittle Raid, Yamamoto moved to take possession of Midway Islands and secure the Japanese position in the Pacific.⁶ This raid proved to be disastrous for the Japanese and was a major turning point in the war.

Glines' analysis of the Doolittle Raid's psychological effects has remained constant throughout his works. Consequently, it has caused other historians to focus on the psychological effects of the event. In his 1984 book, *The Doolittle Raid: America's Daring First Strike Against Japan*, Glines continues to focus on the negative psychological effects of the raid on the Japanese citizens and leaders. Using much of the same language from his 1964 book, Glines adds a little emphasis to the immediate effect of the Doolittle Raid on the Japanese government. In the philosophy of the Japanese government, losing credibility to the public was a catastrophe.⁷ Glines summarizes his interpretation of the Doolittle Raid by saying, "the psychological after-effects and the fact that the Battle of Midway might not have been fought except for the Doolittle raid are the real reasons this single air raid has become a legend and deserves to be remembered."⁸ Glines focuses on the psychological effects because he believes they are the most important impact of the Doolittle Raid. Little physical damage resulted from the Tokyo Raid, but the psychological damage on the Japanese led them to a decisive defeat in the Pacific. Glines' emphasis on the psychological effects of the raid has pushed other historians to begin their research in this area.

Many other scholars have continued in Glines' footsteps in writing about the Doolittle Raid. Duane Schultz, John Keegan, and Janusz Piskalkiewicz have focused their history on the raid's impact in changing the course of the war. They have concentrated on the raid's psychological affect on Japanese military leaders in persuading them to initiate the Battle of Midway. Writing after Glines, these historians base their ideas on Glines' foundation, and continue to support his arguments. Although Schultz, Keegan, and Piskalkiewicz place little emphasis on the Japanese citizen, they follow Glines' analysis that the Doolittle Raid forced the Japanese military leaders into a decisive defeat in the Pacific. Duane Schultz examines Admiral Yamamoto and his personal sense of failure, by quoting Yamamoto's biographer. Yamamoto's "normally clear judgment was warped by the Doolittle Raid."⁹ Everything Yamamoto was assigned to protect seemed to have been destroyed. This created a sense of urgency for Yamamoto to increase Japan's defensive capabilities. Schultz argues that this led Yamamoto to push prematurely for the battle of Midway, which was a pivotal and decisive battle in the War in the Pacific.¹⁰ Like most scholars, Schultz acknowledges other effects of the Doolittle

Raid, including the boost it provided for American morale. However, Schultz makes very clear in his introductory summary that the primary success of the Doolittle Raid was the psychological blow it provided to the military leaders of Japan. This blow caused the course of the war to be forever altered in the Battle of Midway.¹¹ Like many scholars writing about the Doolittle Raid, Schultz bases his interpretations on the foundation established by Carroll Glines.

John Keegan agrees with this interpretation and states that the Doolittle Raid "might nevertheless have been judged a fiasco if it had not registered with the Japanese high command."¹² Keegan dismisses the psychological effect on the common Japanese citizens and emphasizes the influence the Doolittle Raid had in pushing the Japanese high command to "provoke a decisive battle" at Midway Island.¹³ Although the Doolittle Raid was not the only reason Japan moved to Midway, Keegan writes that it was an important factor in turning the tides of war in the Pacific. Janusz Piekalkiewicz also emphasizes the psychological effect the Doolittle Raid had on Japanese military leaders. Piekalkiewicz states that the raid scared the Japanese high command and caused them to focus more on defending their homeland. In his view, the raid was extremely important in causing Japan to bring forces back to protect their homeland and to set a date for the Battle of Midway.¹⁴ Carroll Glines was extremely influential in emphasizing the psychological effects the Doolittle Raid had on Japanese citizens and high command. His research and history has helped to solidify the importance of the Doolittle Raid in changing the course of war. Many other historians have followed in his footsteps and have further outlined the importance of the Doolittle Raid in precipitating the Battle of Midway. Although some historians have questioned the strength of this connection, most historians acknowledge that the Doolittle Raid had some effect in causing this important naval battle.

Other historians have argued that the main success of the Doolittle Raid was its ability to raise American morale in a time of need. Morale is vital to a country's war efforts and is of particular interest to military historians. The pioneer and leader of this philosophy is James Merrill. Merrill writes about the many other accomplishments of the Tokyo Raid, but focuses on its significance in providing good news to Americans and shifting the momentum of war in the Pacific. Like Glines, Merrill emphasizes the psychological effects of the raid. In his 1964 book *Target Tokyo*, Merrill discusses the barrage of negative news following Pearl Harbor. The numerous problems caused Americans to become concerned about their military strength in the Pacific.¹⁵ Merrill connects the negative news for the allies and the United States, to a strong need for something good to happen. As military defeats continued to take place, this need grew in urgency and importance. Merrill states that public "concern intensified by the death of the British battleships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off Malaya in the Gulf of Siam."¹⁶ In Merrill's interpretation, the most influential impact of the Doolittle Raid was its success in breaking this string of bad news and setbacks for the United States. It created an end to American military problems and started a large string of successes in the war against Japan.¹⁷ Momentum shifted, morale soared, and the United States used the Doolittle Raid to push for further success. Merrill writes, "The Eighteenth of April, like a false dawn, held the promise of eventual victory in the Pacific."¹⁸ Americans sensed this promise and gained an increased confidence in their military and ability to achieve victory.

Other historians have also followed in Merrill's interpretation of the Doolittle Raid. Although C.L. Sulzberger and B.H. Liddell Hart write more general histories of World War II, they still argue that the most important result of the Doolittle Raid was the lift it provided to American morale and confidence. Written after 1964, these histories continue in Glines' lead and focus on the psychological effects of the raid. However, they support Merrill's argument that the greatest psychological impact was with the Americans. Sulzberger also emphasizes the bad news and failures of the American military in the first months of the war. The first months of the war offered little hope and encouragement for the American public, with news of the U-boats sinkings, defeat in Luzon, and the destruction of large parts of the allied fleets.¹⁹ Sulzberger states, "It was clearly necessary for Americans to prove to themselves that they were capable of hitting back, and to prove to the Japanese that they would suffer for their imprudence."²⁰ The Doolittle Raid offered this proof to the American public and military. Although Sulzberger writes that the Doolittle Raid did not directly change the course of war, he concludes that it provided an important psychological lift to Americans.²¹ In his book, *History of the Second World War*, B.H. Liddell Hart credits the Doolittle Raid with significantly raising American morale, and forcing Japan to concentrate more on the defense of their country and surrounding islands. Even so, Liddell Hart writes, "The prime result of the raid was the fillip it gave to American morale, which had been badly shaken by Pearl Harbor."²² This raid gave the United States a lift and provided momentum for the rest of the war. Liddell Hart writes only two pages about the Doolittle Raid in his seven hundred-page history of World War II. Despite this, Liddell Hart describes the Tokyo Raid as one part of the puzzle that changed the course of war for the Americans and Allies. Merrill, Sulzberger, and Liddell Hart all argue that the most important effect of the Doolittle Raid was the psychological boost it provided to American momentum, confidence, and morale. This view on the Doolittle Raid remains an influential part of its historiography.

Although most historians recognize the successes of the Doolittle Raid, many also acknowledge the negative effects of the raid. Even Glines, the most glorifying historian of the raid, recognizes the devastating after effects on the Chinese. In *Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders*, Glines includes a chapter entitled "The Chinese Help...And Suffer the Consequences." This chapter describes the horrific punishments and deaths the Japanese inflicted on the Chinese for helping the Doolittle Raiders. In one account, the Japanese captured the man who had harbored Lieutenant Watson, "wrapped him up in some blankets, poured the oil of the lamp on him and obliged his wife to set fire to the human torch."²³ Glines includes this example to show the swift and horrific revenge the Japanese pursued as a result of the Doolittle Raid. This shows that the impact of the Doolittle Raid was not all positive. In his 1984 book, Glines provides even more details and statistics regarding the plight of the Chinese. He uses Chiang Kai Shek's statements, government records, and General Claire Chennault's observations, to portray the cruel three-month campaign that claimed the lives of approximately two hundred fifty thousand Chinese.²⁴ Many innocent people were killed, and Glines recognizes that it was an effect of the Doolittle Raid. In examining the Doolittle Raid, Glines says that "it is the aftermath of Japanese terror and brutality, which has few equals in modern military history, that provides a reminder for all of man's capacity for cruelty to his fellow man."²⁵ Glines's insight on

the plight of the Chinese calls for historians to take a step back and look at the total effects of the raid. Even so, he blames the Japanese, and still credits the Doolittle Raid as an integral part of American victory in the Pacific.

Other historians weigh the negative effects of the Doolittle Raid more heavily. Donald Miller strongly considers the negative effects of the raid in his history of World War II. Although Miller credits the raid with raising American morale, he discusses the executions of three Americans and the death of a quarter million Chinese.²⁶ He links these deaths to the Doolittle Raid and questions whether we should really consider it a success. Miller never explicitly states his opinion of the Doolittle Raid, but infers that it created more harm than success. In Samuel Eliot Morison's book, *Strategy and Compromise*, he portrays the Doolittle Raid as "spectacular," but with little real impact on the war.²⁷ In other words, it was a show of bravery that was not strategically significant in the grand scheme of World War II. Morison continues to write that the raid "probably did us more harm, by putting the enemy on his guard, than it did us good in lessons learned."²⁸ In this statement, Morison directly refutes the notions of Glines and other scholars who claim that an important effect of the raid was to make Japan more defensive. Similar to Glines, Miller and Morison acknowledge the negative effects of the Doolittle Raid. In contrast, they emphasize these effects more heavily and infer that the Tokyo Raid was not a success.

The historiography of the Doolittle Raid has sparked interest in the popular press as well. Recent newspaper articles on the Doolittle Raid tend to glorify and emphasize the bravery of the Doolittle Raiders. In addition, these articles have used the arguments of Glines and Merrill regarding the psychological effects of the raid. Much of this recent attention is also due to the fact that the raid was nearing its sixtieth anniversary. In a 2002 article appearing in the *Houston Chronicle*, Jeff Wilkinson writes very nostalgically about the Doolittle Raiders and their contributions to the country. He writes, "They lifted American fighting spirit when it was at its lowest ebb, giving the country hope for the long struggle ahead."²⁹ This is directly related to the historical argument made by James Merrill in his book *Target Tokyo*. Wilkinson tells the story of the Doolittle Raid in a way that expresses his appreciation, respect, and awe of their bravery. He portrays the raiders as long shots who made significant contributions to American victory in the Pacific. Agreeing with Merrill's interpretation of the raid, Wilkinson portrays the amazing boost in morale that the Doolittle Raid provided.

In a 2002 *Boston Herald* article, Tom Farmer also writes about the tremendous success of the Doolittle Raid. Farmer depicts Doolittle and the raiders as national heroes and symbols of bravery. In his view, the raid was successful in boosting morale, causing the Japanese to be more defensive, and to hurry into the Battle of Midway. This threefold success was highlighted by the raid's ability to boost spirits and change the attitude of the American people. Farmer includes part of an interview with Doolittle Raider Royden Stork, which exemplifies his point that the Doolittle Raid provided a huge emotional lift to America.³⁰ Wilkinson and Farmer's interpretations of the raid reflect a combination of the different scholarly interpretations. Although they agree with Merrill's interpretation about the primary effect of raid, they tend to mirror Glines' glorification of the raid.

Jichuan Wang expressed his concern about this type of glorification in a recent article in the *Dayton Daily News*. Of Chinese descent, Wang is particularly concerned with the Chinese role in the Doolittle Raid. He discusses the recent depictions of the raid, including the silver screen portrayal in *Pearl Harbor*. Recent articles and the movies have glorified the American bravery and success of the mission, but have failed to acknowledge the role of the Chinese. Wang asks the question, "What price did the Chinese pay for rescuing the American pilots?"³¹ He refers to the fact that two hundred and fifty thousand Chinese were killed as a result of the raid, and compares this number to the under ten thousand Allied soldiers that were killed on D-Day.³² The Chinese suffered greatly as a result of the Doolittle Raid, and Wang states that they should be given some credit. Wang also infers that the large number of Chinese casualties might suggest that the Doolittle Raid was not quite the success that it has been portrayed as in recent articles in movies. Recent history and articles on the Doolittle Raid have tended to place an increased significance on the bravery and impact of the Doolittle Raid. Wang's article is a call to step back and analyze the larger picture of the historic Tokyo Raid. Wang is influenced by his own connection to China as well as history of the raid that has discussed the Chinese role. Wang challenges historians to consider the Chinese role more strongly in the future. Only time will tell how historians respond to this type of argument. As the plight of the Chinese becomes better known, historians will surely pay more attention to their important role in the Doolittle Raid.

The historiography of the Doolittle Raid has contributed different interpretations regarding the impact and legacy of the daring mission. Carroll Glines has provided the foundation for interpretation of the Doolittle Raid and has encouraged most historians in this field to consider the psychological effects of the mission. Important insight into the impact of the Doolittle Raid has come from historian John Dower. In his book, *War Without Mercy*, Dower describes the strong hatred for the Japanese that appeared after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were viewed as evil, sneaky, conniving, primitive, and most of all "treacherous."³³ These feelings continued to grow as Japan remained aggressive and on the attack. As a result of Japan's surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Americans developed "a thirst for revenge" that the Japanese never anticipated.³⁴ Dower provides a powerful description of the climate that fostered the creation of the Doolittle Raid. The American public, military leaders, and President Roosevelt called for revenge against the Japanese, and would not relent until this objective was achieved. Mixing Dower's ideas with the philosophy of James Merrill produces an argument that will be the central focus of this paper. The Doolittle Raid satisfied America's need for revenge against the Japanese and provided a morale boost that propelled the United States to victory in the Pacific.

Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor created a great deal of anger and resentment in the United States. Responding to this attack, President Roosevelt delivered his famous address to congress asking for a declaration of war. He stated, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941-a date which will live in infamy-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by the naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan."³⁵ Roosevelt chooses his words carefully and emphasizes the date December 7, 1941, as a day the United States will avenge. Roosevelt also points out

the fact that the Japanese had "deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace."³⁶ Portraying the Japanese as deceitful, treacherous, and evil, Roosevelt mobilizes the United States for revenge against the Japanese.

Vengeance was on everyone's mind in America after the Japanese surprise attack. At Pearl Harbor, the United States lost five battleships, one hundred and sixty-two planes, and suffered over forty two million dollars worth of physical damage.³⁷ The most significant and personal loss, however, rested with the two thousand four hundred and three casualties. These heavy losses resonated with Americans and triggered feelings of racism, hatred, and a powerful desire for revenge. John Dower emphasizes the existence and consequences of America's need for revenge following Pearl Harbor. In fact, Dower states that Japan's "surprise attack provoked a rage bordering on the genocidal among Americans."³⁸ The public and military were so angry at Japan that the idea of striking back neared the point of obsession. Along with obsessing about revenge, Americans developed a strong sense of racism. Both revenge and racism were fueled and perpetuated by the media. In a *Time Magazine* article, they reported that the main reaction to Pearl Harbor was expressed in the statement, "Why, the yellow bastards!"³⁹ Also, the *New Yorker* magazine classified the Japanese as "yellow monkeys."⁴⁰ This type of racist portrayal of the Japanese was typical in the time period following Pearl Harbor. Despite the cunning and well-planned attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were often portrayed as primitive and unintelligent. In fact they were often represented as "ape-like" and "subhuman."⁴¹ In the eyes of many Americans, the Japanese were capable of participating in dastardly attacks that were beyond the civility of other countries. Throughout America, in the form of newspaper articles, magazine articles, movies, and songs, the Japanese were touted as racially and mentally inferior to Americans. Swift revenge was necessary to affirm Americans' ideas of superiority. This would raise morale to the level necessary to achieve victory in the Pacific.

President Roosevelt and high profile military leaders fueled racism and the passion for revenge. As James Merrill states, "Since the Day of Infamy, 7 December 1941, President Roosevelt had been eager for the army and Navy to strike at the very heart of Japan, deliver the destruction of war to the Japanese people, and retaliate for Pearl Harbor."⁴² Roosevelt exuded this necessity of quick revenge to the American public and military leaders. Doolittle states in his autobiography that Roosevelt expressed his strong desire and demand to achieve revenge on Japan as soon as possible.⁴³ In this meeting with military leaders, Roosevelt relayed an order that resonated with the entire United States military. Doolittle states that this order was repeated numerous times by Roosevelt and led to a tremendous amount of brainstorming. Roosevelt's obsession for revenge only increased the obsession of the many military leaders. One man who became extremely obsessed with achieving revenge on the Japanese was Admiral William Halsey. Halsey's famous saying was "Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs."⁴⁴ This saying was varied at times to the motto, "Remember Pearl Harbor-keep 'em dying."⁴⁵ Halsey not only expressed his desire for revenge to the public, but also added to the fire of racism and Japanese hatred. Halsey's attitude became typical of the American public's attitude. President Roosevelt fueled racism and Japanese hatred by implementing Japanese internment camps.

Japanese Americans were taken away to camps as a result of distrust, racism, and homeland security. On February 19, 1942 President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 and endorsed a policy taking over a hundred thousand Japanese from their homes.⁴⁶ This government endorsement of racial profiling encouraged more racism, distrust and hatred of the Japanese. It also increased the American desire to seek revenge. America was continuing to protect itself from an attack, but had yet to strike back at Japan. The American people realized the threat of Japan but had yet to see its own military offer a significant threat.

The New York Times depicted the Japanese as time bombs that could attack at any time. In the days following the Pearl Harbor attack, the *Times'* front page was filled with headlines describing Japanese aggression and invasions. The headlines continued to report the damage at Pearl Harbor as well as Japanese attacks in Malaysia and the Philippines. The Headline of December 10, 1941 read, "Roosevelt Sees a Long, World Wide War; Japanese Invade Luzon, Fight in Malaysia; 2 Big British Warships Sunk, Tokyo Says."⁴⁷ These headlines were common for many days after Pearl Harbor and created the picture of the Japanese as an aggressive and significant threat to America. On December 21, 1941, the *Times* ran a section of photographs, including the Manhattan skyline and military defensive preparations.⁴⁸ This section stressed preparation and insinuated that the Japanese were planning another sneak attack on America. These types of headlines and photography sections not only increased fear, but also increased hatred and the desire for revenge against the Japanese.

After Pearl Harbor, the mood of the United States was filled with anger and disbelief. No Americans experienced these feeling more than members of the United States military. Admiral Donald D. Duncan was a critical part of planning the Doolittle Raid and remembers the origins for the dangerous mission. He remembers the public cries of "Where is the Navy?" and "Why don't we do something?"⁴⁹ The military experienced strong pressure from the public and the President to devise a plan to attack Japan. In addition, members of the military possessed the most intense desire for revenge. Realizing the importance of satisfying America's need for revenge and restoring confidence in the military, the dangerous Doolittle Raid was planned. A sense of urgency and excitement among the military leaders helped to put the plan together quickly.⁵⁰ Although, the raid would be a large risk, the rewards would be even greater. Admiral Duncan describes how the excitement and desire to avenge Pearl Harbor led to the efficient and effective planning of the Doolittle Raid.

Colonel Ross Greening, a Doolittle Raid pilot, provides a vivid description of the sense of urgency for revenge against the Japanese. Greening explains the role of the press in emphasizing the need to bomb Japan and avenge Pearl Harbor.⁵¹ In fact, "Large sums of money were offered to the first individuals to carry out such a raid."⁵² The American public was so obsessed with the idea of revenge, that they were offering rewards to anyone who could satisfy their obsession. Japan had made things personal by initiating a surprise attack on America's homeland. The public and military of the United States was determined to make it personal for the Japanese. As a symbolic gesture of revenge, the Raiders attached medals to the bombs. These medals had been given to a number of Americans "symbolizing Japan's everlasting friendship with the United States."⁵³ Those aboard the USS *Hornet*, held a ceremony

attaching these medals to the bombs that would rain terror on Tokyo. In addition, men who had loved ones killed at Pearl Harbor were allowed to write messages on the bombs.⁵⁴ This enabled the men to gain a sense of revenge and finality. This ceremony aboard the aircraft carrier is a perfect example of the strong desire for revenge that demanded the Doolittle Raid. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor had created an emotional response in all of America. Everyone wanted to strike back, and the military realized the importance of doing so. Perhaps the most telling sign of America's dedication to revenge comes from the Doolittle Raid's stand-by crews. As the Raiders prepared to take off on the most dangerous mission of their lives, the stand-by crews ran around shouting, "You lucky devils! You lucky devils!"⁵⁵ These men offered money to the Doolittle Raiders hoping to take their place and have the opportunity to bomb Japan. "Co-pilot Thadd Blanton would always remember that men were willing to pay \$150 to die."⁵⁶ The spirit of these men was typical of the United States military at this time. Everyone wanted a shot at hitting Japan. Americans demanded revenge against the Japanese and would not relent until it had been achieved. Consequently, American morale rested on this point.

Doolittle himself recognized the low American morale after Pearl Harbor. America had suffered a long string of defeats following the surprise attack and was in desperate need of positive news. Doolittle writes, "I hoped we could give them that by a retaliatory surprise attack against the enemy's home islands launched from a carrier, precisely as the Japanese had done at Pearl Harbor."⁵⁷ Nothing would boost American morale more than finally getting revenge on the Japanese. Bombing Tokyo, even with a small number of planes, would quench America's desire for revenge and provide a significant morale boost. President Roosevelt demanded this from Doolittle and other military leaders. Doolittle recalls, "Roosevelt emphasized that he wanted a bombing raid on the home islands of Japan as soon as possible to bolster the morale of America and her allies."⁵⁸ Although the Doolittle Raid was limited in the physical damage it could produce, it was specifically produce the necessary effect. Roosevelt and military leaders designed a mission that would satisfy America's need for revenge and provide a boost in morale to all of America.

Admiral Henry Miller shines light on how the Doolittle Raid was specifically aimed at achieving these goals. For one, the military designated their best men to the successful implementation of this mission. Doolittle, Halsey, and Admiral King were three of the best military officers of their time. This caused Miller to think, "My gosh, this is pretty fast company I'm in."⁵⁹ The fact that the military was willing to risk its best men on the Tokyo Raid signifies the importance attached to making it a success. The military realized the urgency of avenging Pearl Harbor and raising the morale of Americans. Although the mission was small, the resources committed to it were large. Miller describes the amazing amount of detail present in the planning of the raid and states his pride in the accomplishments of the crew.⁶⁰ When everything was said and done, the raid's plan was successful in providing a "big shot in the arm to the great American public."⁶¹

As Carroll Glines put it, "no group of airmen ever undertook a more dangerous combat mission with less chance of survival."⁶² The Doolittle Raid was extremely risky for all those involved. Yet, it was the only way possible for America to strike back at Japan. Despite the risk, the military deemed it necessary to achieve revenge

and change the tides of war. Many of the Doolittle Raiders have written accounts of the raid that shed light on the careful planning and perceived impacts of the mission. Ted Lawson does so in his vivid portrayal entitled *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*. He discusses with great detail the time aboard the USS Hornet en route to the launch point. As Lawson and the other raiders finally were told the destination was Tokyo, the pieces of the puzzle began to come together. Lawson writes, "We began to realize just how incredibly well planned the mission was the following day."⁶³ On board the Hornet, the raiders listened to a series of lectures, from top military minds, on procedural issues and the differences between the Japanese and Chinese.⁶⁴ This would be extremely important for safety and security after the mission was carried out. Training was thorough and well planned from the moment the Doolittle Raiders were chosen, to the moment they took off from the deck of the USS Hornet. The military dedicated their bravest, brightest, and most organized men to plan this mission. Obviously, they planned the Doolittle Raid in way that would best meet their objective of getting revenge and lifting the morale of the American people.

Detail was of the utmost importance to the success of the Doolittle Raid. Minute problems could spell the difference between a disaster and an important victory. Although the Doolittle Raid was designed to raise the moral of the American people, a failed mission could logically produce the opposite effect. Therefore the military recognized the importance of detail and careful planning and dedicated their best men to the mission. This instilled confidence in the Doolittle Raiders and allowed them to accomplish their mission. Jacob Manch exuded this confidence as he prepared for take-off. He thought about the long hours of preparation, and believed in the abilities of his crew.⁶⁵ Manch writes, "I had the fullest confidence in the B-25's and that we would make it off the deck safely."⁶⁶ Manch's account is a testament to the many men who helped plan and prepare for the Doolittle Raid. In addition, Manch sheds light on the importance the military placed on this mission. The Doolittle Raid was carefully planned, organized, and orchestrated to fulfill the ultimate goal of avenging Pearl Harbor and raising American morale. As discussed earlier, the public, military, and president's demand for revenge precipitated such an intense and well-planned course of action.

The planning and preparation all ended on April 18, 1942 at 8:20 A.M. Doolittle took off from the USS Hornet and led the first B-25 to Tokyo.⁶⁷ The other fifteen planes followed and the Doolittle Raid was underway. The Raiders bombed different targets in and around Tokyo but caused little physical damage. The "official survey of the consequences of the Doolittle raid listed fifty dead, 352 wounded, and ninety buildings gutted by fire and explosions."⁶⁸ Although this was far from the damage done at Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raiders had accomplished their objective. They had struck back in the heart of Japan and had helped to satisfy America's desire for revenge.

Americans were finally able to read the newspaper and see that the United States had struck back at Japan. On April 18, 1942, the headline of the *New York Times* read "Japan Reports Tokyo, Yokohama Bombed by 'Enemy Planes' in Daylight."⁶⁹ In contrast to many of the headlines since Pearl Harbor, this one did not point out another Japanese victory. Although the article goes on to say that the Japanese reported light damage, the bold print signified to Americans that something had

finally been done. Apparently, the United States military had finally taken the first step in avenging Pearl Harbor. For the following two days, *Times'* headlines continued to draw attention to the Tokyo Raid. The headline of April 20, 1942 stated, "Tokyo Factories Reported Hit in Raid; Two New Alarms Keep City on Alert."⁷⁰ For the first time since the United States entered the war, there was news of an attack on Japan. The *Los Angeles Times'* headline on the morning of April 18, 1942 was even larger and more dramatic. It read, "Tokyo, Kobe, Yokohama, Bombed!"⁷¹ The word "Bombed" was printed in enormous bold letters that covered a fourth of the page. Although the headline did not specifically give credit to the United States, Americans could infer that they had finally struck back. This type of headline jumps at the reader and connects right with their sense of pride and revenge. The attack was downplayed by the Japanese, but this did not change the fact that Americans were finally able to read some positive news.

Printed in Lima, Ohio, *The Lima News* provides a good example of a small town newspaper headline. *The Lima News* actually produced more provocative headlines to describe the Doolittle Raid. This was probably the case because the editors did not have to concern themselves as much with being objective. On April 18, 1942, the headline read in large bold letters, "Yankees Bomb Tokyo."⁷² In addition, there is a picture of the Tokyo skyline with the headline "Gets First Taste of Own Medicine."⁷³ *The Lima News* goes a little further than the *New York Times* and expresses the public sentiment. *The Lima News* was subjective, but at the same time, provided a more accurate depiction of the anticipated public reaction to the Doolittle Raid. The public would view the Doolittle Raid as Japan getting what they deserved. These types of headlines gave people a sense of satisfaction and helped to quench their desire for revenge. Also on the front page of the April 18th edition of *The Lima News*, there was a story titled "Bombs Over Tokyo Promise Better Times For World."⁷⁴ In the article, Dewitt Mackenzie discusses how this was an organized attack that showed the Americans and Allies were turning the war around.⁷⁵ The April 19th headline of *The Lima News* also provides insight to how American morale and sentiment was improved. It read, "Japs Fear More U.S.Bombs."⁷⁶ In the eyes of Americans, fear was finally shifting from the United States to the country of Japan. Since confidence and morale are interrelated, the shifting of fear was an important impact of the Doolittle Raid. The April 18th and April 19th editions of *The Lima News* are perfect examples of how American morale was raised by the Doolittle Raid. The American public read these headlines, saw the American military was avenging Pearl Harbor, and believed in their abilities to be victorious over the Japanese. *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, and *The Lima News* may have produced headlines to a different degree, but they share one important similarity. They both let the public know in big black letters that the United States had finally struck back.

In *Target Tokyo*, James Merrill includes primary sources to show how the Tokyo Raid helped to satisfy America's need for revenge and provided an immediate impact on morale. Harrison Forman, Chinese correspondent to *The New York Times*, sent a dispatch regarding the Chinese reaction to the Doolittle Raid. In this dispatch, he reported the reaction of the Chungking War Minister who stated, "The nightmare of the Japanese militarists can be shattered only by bombs. These raids on Japan proper are only the beginning."⁷⁷ Although this represents the Chinese reaction, it helped to

influence the reaction of the American people. As the media reported these types of opinions, Americans were more likely to believe that the United States would continue to successfully attack Japan. Confidence leads to higher morale. Also in *Target Tokyo*, Merrill includes two cartoons depicting American sentiment about the Doolittle Raid. In the cartoon from the *Arizona Republic*, two unintelligent looking Japanese men are running frantically to a bomb shelter. The caption at the top of the cartoon reads, "Oh Son of Heaven, How D'ylike Them Apples?"⁷⁸ This is an obvious expression of America's satisfaction with its first taste of revenge. In a cartoon from *The Milwaukee Journal*, an apelike, primitive, Japanese man is sitting in a pile of debris reading a sign that says, "Jimmy Doolittle Led Tokyo Air Raid."⁷⁹ Both cartoons play to America's desire for revenge, giving the average American a renewed belief in his own superiority. This belief provides confidence and increased morale. Cartoons like these appeared in newspapers all over the country and helped to increase the effects of the Doolittle Raid. Americans enjoyed finally reading about an attack on Japan, as it allowed them to bask in their satisfaction of revenge.

James Doolittle did not immediately recognize the success of the Tokyo Raid. In fact, after he and the members of his crew were forced to bail out, Doolittle stated, "I had never felt lower in my life."⁸⁰ He believed that he might even be court marshaled for his part in the raid.⁸¹ Part of this is due to the fact that Doolittle held himself to such high standards. Although a perfect raid with no lost planes or men was a virtual impossibility, Doolittle believed it could be done. As time passed, Doolittle began to realize the success of the raid. He "learned that the surprise bombing of Tokyo was everything President Roosevelt had wished for and what we hoped we could deliver for him."⁸² Taking a step back and listening to the press and public opinion, Doolittle was able to see that the raid had provided a huge increase to American morale.⁸³ Doolittle concludes the reason for this boost in morale is the fact that America had finally "fought back."⁸⁴ America had finally gotten some revenge on the Japanese, and answered the demands of the public.

After Doolittle returned to the United States, he received an enormous amount of congratulatory letters from both the public and other military men.⁸⁵ Some of these letters from the public even included money and bonds made out to Doolittle.⁸⁶ This shows how much Americans wanted revenge and echoes the reward offers made before the raid. People were so exhilarated and appreciative of Doolittle's efforts that they found the time and generosity to write letters that included money. Although Doolittle returned the money, the overwhelming number of congratulatory letters made him realize that the Tokyo Raid was successful in raising American morale. Doolittle also received many letters from military men showing their appreciation for his efforts. One letter from Admiral Halsey had a particularly profound effect. Halsey writes, "I do not know of any more gallant deed in history than that performed by your squadron, and that it was successful is entirely due to the splendid leadership on your part."⁸⁷ Admiral Halsey gives a great deal of credit to Doolittle, but also stresses how important the raid was in the overall course of the war. Also, Halsey shows his appreciation for Doolittle finally achieving revenge on the Japanese. Again showing his hatred for the Japanese, Halsey tells Doolittle to "Keep on knocking over those yellow bastards."⁸⁸ Doolittle received a number of letters from the public and military that showed everyone's joy in the bombing raid on Japan. All of these letters provide

important insight on how the Tokyo Raid was perceived by Americans. Clearly, the Doolittle Raid helped to satisfy American's need for revenge, which led to a significant rise in confidence and morale.

The Doolittle Raiders have written firsthand accounts that show how the raid led to a significant rise in American and Allied morale. Eldred Scott writes about how important the Chinese viewed the Doolittle Raid. After the raid, the Chinese helped Scott and many other Doolittle Raiders to safety. Knowing that they may have been putting themselves in jeopardy, the Chinese helped the Americans "so they could bomb Tokyo again."⁸⁹ In addition, many of the Chinese viewed the Doolittle Raid as a sign of hope for the people of the world.⁹⁰ After experiencing and reading about the attitudes of the Chinese, Scott knew that the Doolittle Raid was a success.⁹¹ The attack on Japan, provided a means for restoring hope and confidence in America. Scott knew that Americans would share the same sentiment as the Chinese.

Perhaps the most emotional and gripping account of the Doolittle Raid was written by Captain Ted Lawson. In his primary account, *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*, Lawson begins by describing the personal pain he suffered as a result of his part in the bombing raid. He writes, "I watched a buddy of mine saw off my left leg. And finally I got home to my wife after being flown, shipped, and carried around the world."⁹² Lawson obviously experienced a great deal of physical and emotional suffering from the Doolittle Raid. Despite his huge sacrifices, Lawson still considered the Doolittle Raid to be a success. Although Lawson says that he thought about himself for a while after raid, he eventually turned his thoughts to the impact his mission had on the American people.⁹³ Naturally, it took some time for Lawson to get past his own severe injuries and analyze the larger picture. Stepping back, Lawson was able to see that the Tokyo Raid provided a tremendous boost to American morale. Lawson responded to a fellow Raider's question asking him if he thought the mission fulfilled its purpose. He said that that he believed the Tokyo Raid was a success for the main reason "that our people got a lift out of it."⁹⁴ Lawson continued by saying, "It made them sure that we could go to work on the Japs, no matter how far away they were."⁹⁵ In other words, Lawson emphasizes that the main reason for the success of the Doolittle Raid was that America finally struck back at Japan. Achieving revenge and showing an active military, gave satisfaction and confidence to Americans. This triggered a significant rise in morale among the American public. Lawson's account of the Doolittle Raid is both powerful and insightful. Written only a year after the raid, it goes a long way to prove the importance Americans placed on striking back at Japan. Even in a disabled state, Ted Lawson realized that the major success of the raid was to help satisfy American's need for revenge. In addition, this raid proved to the public that the United States military was capable of more attacks that would ensure further revenge against the Japanese.

Lawson also includes in his book a copy of the War Department's official communiqué. Although it was released nearly a year after the raid, it includes important information concerning the government's evaluation of the raid. Regarding the targets and attack guidelines, the War Department writes, "This objective was carried out with accuracy and complete success."⁹⁶ The report goes on to take credit for "freezing" Japanese forces and preventing them from being used in offensive scenarios.⁹⁷ Although the report does not explicitly mention increasing American

morale, it shows the way that the government wanted the public to perceive the raid. Almost everything in this report points to the raid as a success and worthwhile mission. After the Doolittle Raid, the government only released materials that would point towards the ultimate success of the raid. As shown earlier, many high ranking officials felt strongly about the importance of achieving revenge on the Japanese. President Roosevelt, Halsey, and Doolittle all realized the importance of raising American confidence and morale. Consequently, they understood the necessity of maintaining a positive perception about the raid. Most reports after the raid included little concrete information, but stressed the bravery, intelligence, preparation and courage of the United States military. All of these things gave confidence to the American public and led to a surge in morale. The War Department's report a year later included more information, but was also a culmination of self praise designed to further convince the American public of the Doolittle Raid's success. As stated in the report, "One by one, each objective of each plane was checked off."⁹⁸ For the American public, the objective of striking back at Japan was finally achieved.

The Doolittle Raid lifted the moral and confidence of the American public, military, and the president. President Roosevelt reacted with jubilation when he heard about the success of the mission. Roosevelt's speechwriter, Samuel I. Rosenman provides a description of Roosevelt's reaction and mood after hearing the good news. Rosenman described the president as "overjoyed," knowing "the heartening effect it would have on American morale and the morale of our Allies."⁹⁹ President Roosevelt was determined to avenge Pearl Harbor and had finally realized this objective. Although Roosevelt could only tell the public the bombers came from "Shangri-La," he made sure to emphasize the importance of the symbolic mission.¹⁰⁰ Since President Roosevelt had been calling for a bombing raid on Tokyo immediately after Pearl Harbor, the realization of this demand had a strong personal impact. The Doolittle Raid increased the morale and confidence of President Roosevelt. Consequently, he enthusiastically relayed these feelings to the American public and military. The newspapers had just the effect Roosevelt wanted as they jubilantly "speculated on every possible angle of the Doolittle Raid."¹⁰¹ The entire nation was caught up in the accomplishment of the Doolittle Raid even though they did not know the specific details. The only detail they needed to know was that the United States had finally bombed Japan. This knowledge led to soaring morale throughout the country.

As James Merrill states, "The Eighteenth of April, like a false dawn, held the promise of eventual victory in the Pacific."¹⁰² After Doolittle's Tokyo Raid, Americans had reason to believe in their military again. They had the confidence and satisfaction that the United States could attack Japan just like they had attacked Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, revenge was extremely important to a majority of Americans. President Roosevelt exemplified this need for revenge in his famous speech to Congress following Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt declared, "No matter how long it takes to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory."¹⁰³ Roosevelt point blank tells the American people that they will get revenge and defeat the Japanese. This call for revenge permeates throughout America and creates a strong hatred towards the Japanese. John Dower discusses how this hatred leads Americans to view the

Japanese as primitive and "ape-like."¹⁰⁴ As these feelings of hatred and revenge continued to grow, it became all the more necessary for America to strike back at Japan. Although the Doolittle Raid was small compared to the Japanese forces at Pearl Harbor, it was specifically designed to achieve important objectives. The military dedicated its best men to organize, plan, and implement the raid. This shows their belief in the importance of bombing the homeland of Japan. President Roosevelt and military leaders realized the necessity of avenging Pearl Harbor and raising the morale of the country. In the end, the Doolittle Raid accomplished these goals. The extraordinary bravery and courage of eighty men, with the powerful leadership of "Jimmy" Doolittle, caused the tides of war to change in the Pacific. Living in New York City or Lima, Ohio, people were finally able to experience the first tastes of revenge. President Roosevelt, the military, and the general public were all energized by the accomplishments of the Doolittle Raiders. In fact, Doolittle was "flattered to learn how much the American people appreciated the raid on Japan."¹⁰⁵ April 18, 1942, marks one of the most amazing and influential air raids in American History. In the end, the Doolittle Raid should be remembered for giving Americans their first taste of revenge and providing a significant morale boost that led America to victory in the Pacific.

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Ideology & MANIPULATION

A Comparative Study into What Separated Saigo Takamori and Yamagata Aritomo in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877

Greer Erick Illingworth

Introduction

After the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868, the immediate necessity of the time was to institute a government that could adapt to the turbulence of imperialism, the indoctrination of western systems, and the development of a national consensus.² The young, determined, and progressive men who arose to lead this government had a daunting road ahead of them. Among these leaders were Saigo Takamori and Yamagata Aritomo, each of whom embodied his own unique characteristics.

Saigo was a man of "sincerity, integrity, simplicity, and selflessness."³ He heralded from the southern province of Satsuma³ and rose to prominence during the Meiji restoration. He has become one of the most romanticized figures in Japanese history, with many regarding him as a "brilliant thinker" and "military genius."⁴ However, Saigo was simply a sincere and gentle man of uncomplicated tastes caught in a complex chapter in Japanese history.

The character of Yamagata is not nearly as diluted as Saigo's, since he was not as romanticized. Such differences are found in the characteristics he embodied while alive, acting as a pragmatic, rational, and logical leader. While he has been ranked higher than Saigo on almost every scale of importance in Meiji history, he is not nearly as celebrated.⁵ Yamagata was born into a low-ranking samurai family in the province of Choshu and like Saigo rose through the samurai ranks in the Meiji Restoration to become a key figure in the creation of the new Meiji government.

Mutually, Yamagata and Saigo were given the task of creating a modern army that could one day withstand western threats. They endeavored not to dismiss western technology and tactics as before but to embrace them, believing that if they could adapt to the conventions that defeated Japan during the *sonno-joi*⁶ from then it could have the wherewithal to become an international power.

Along the way, however, specific events and people would gradually pull the two men apart. Spiraling to the fall of 1877 when these two former colleagues would find themselves opposite one another as generals in the Satsuma Rebellion. Arguments have been made to suggest that ideology stood as the separating factor between them; however, the following pages will demonstrate that what separated Saigo and Yamagata in the Satsuma Rebellion was not their ideology but an intricate web of deceit woven by upper echelon samurai who manipulated Saigo's ideology to advocate resistance against Meiji reforms.

I. Analogous Ideology

Saigo and Yamagata largely held similar beliefs. They both wanted a modern army with the intentions of developing into a nation strong enough to resist the increasing threat of western powers. The common notion that Yamagata wanted solely a conscript army, while Saigo desired the samurai class to remain a focal part of the modern military, is too subject to myth to be a plausible estimation of the two men's comparative ideology. Saigo and Yamagata largely held the same ideology of military modernization.

Mutually, Saigo and Yamagata recognized that Japan needed a strong military establishment loyal only to the emperor and the state. They agreed that the "best way to provide such a force" would be "through conscription and universal military service."⁷ They were determined to push Meiji reforms through to success in order to finish the revolution begun in 1868. Saigo and Yamagata both realized first hand how antiquated Japanese military systems were and they clearly wanted to bring Japan to a position of equality with the West.

It is universally agreed that Yamagata advocated a conscription army; however, there is some division when it comes to Saigo. Most scholars subscribe to the view that he opposed any measures that would weaken the samurai.⁸ However, Saigo was not the "single-minded champion of the samurai that many have made him out to be."⁹ Contrary to popular belief, he supported the implementation of conscription. While he was not outspoken on the issue, his quiet support and lack of clear defiance were key factors in its successful adoption.¹⁰ In 1871, he articulated to his brother, Saigo Tsugumichi, then the assistant vice-minister to Yamagata, that he encouraged the idea and expressed doubt regarding the efficiency of an all samurai modern military.¹¹ It is important to note, however, that while Saigo quietly supported conscription a select group of Satsuma samurai were vocally opposing the new measure. Among them were Kirino Toshiaki, Shinohara Kunimoto, and Murata Shinpachi.¹² These men would play a key role in Saigo's involvement in the Satsuma Rebellion later on.

The Korean Crisis of 1873 is one of the principle bases of illustrating their similar ideology. The incident steamed from Korea's refusal to recognize Japan's new government. It caused a decisive debate over the question of whether or not Japan should invade or pursue diplomatic solutions to resolve the matter. Saigo and Yamagata both opposed any premature action, which might cripple the growth of the new army. However, Saigo has been interpreted to have advocated the opposite. Common views describe him as a fiery aggressor out to re-establish samurai worth through glorious adventures in Korea. But, his writings suggest benevolent and cautious intentions. His writings imply that he did not want to see Japanese military action. He wanted it to come only after every effort had been made diplomatically. As he wrote,

It would not be good at all to send troops. If doing so should lead to war, it would be contrary to our true intentions, and so the proper thing to do at this point is to send an emissary...We must try to realize our original aim, to establish a firm friendship with Korea.¹³

This quote and his collective documents suggest that he advocated that Japan build a cooperative relationship with Korea before a malevolent one. It is certainly provocative to think Saigo wanted war with Korea to re-establish samurai worth in Meiji society but the fact remains that there is little to base this theory on except the romanticized myth that follows him today. Some historians equate this moment as the beginning of the spilt between Yamagata and Saigo; however, they were not splitting apart, the public's perception of them was.¹⁴ As will be argued later, the popular conception that Saigo wanted to invade Korea to reassert samurai worth was more the work of others utilizing his status to manipulate public opinion than his actual opinion.

Most see Saigo's resignation from the Meiji Government in 1873 as a direct result of his disgust with the Meiji leaders following the Korean Crisis.¹⁵ Some go as far as to say that the way the Meiji leaders handled the Korean Crisis triggered bitterness within Saigo that motivated him to incite and lead the Satsuma Rebellion. However, it is more than likely true that he simply wanted to retire from public life. In 1873, he was approaching the age of 50 and the constant illness and physical ailments associated with his size were beginning to wear on him.¹⁶ But more importantly Saigo had reached a point in his life that he believed that he had fulfilled his duty to Japan. He wrote several poems that expressed his, "satisfaction" saying "he had done all he could to get the government off to the right start, and that posterity would remember him kindly."¹⁷ The actions and writings following his resignation further establish that his aim was to retire into private seclusion, not to organize and lead a rebellion against the Meiji central authority.

The impression gained from Saigo's actions and words are of a man content with what he had achieved and who now desired to live out the remainder of his life in seclusion and simplicity. Upon returning to Satsuma, he almost immediately headed into the tranquil mountains of his childhood straying from turbulent Kagoshima¹⁸ and remaining out of the public eye. Day after day he basked in the hot springs and enjoyed the company of his dogs.¹⁹ He corresponded with friends discussing his contentment simply farming, hunting, fishing, and relaxing.²⁰ Little exists that would lead one to conclude that Saigo was an embittered samurai out to plan and incite a rebellion. He displayed the characteristics of a man at ease with himself, enjoying retirement amidst Satsuma's serene and pleasurable mountains.

Saigo has been misunderstood on three fundamental fronts, his opinion on universal conscription, his opinion on the Korea Crisis, and the reasons for his resignation from the government. Those three misunderstandings have been the traditional delineators of difference between the ideology of Saigo and Yamagata, that in turn lead directly what separated the two men in the Satsuma Rebellion. However, as demonstrated above, they agreed on conscription, they agreed on pursuing diplomatic solutions in Korea, and Saigo did not resign out of anger with the Meiji government (including Yamagata) but out of reasons of health and satisfied ambitions. Therefore, the question remains, if it was not ideology that separated them then what was it?

II. The Intricate Web of Deceit

What separated Yamagata and Saigo was an intricate web of deceit woven by Satsuma's upper echelon samurai who manipulated Saigo's ideology to advocate resistance against Meiji reforms. Men like Kirino Toshiaki, Shinohara Kunimoto and Murata Shinpachi purposely idealized and construed Saigo's image in the hearts and minds of the Satsuma samurai to incite rebellion. Saigo was, in effect, a victim of a misunderstanding between who the public had been manipulated to think he was and who he actually was. He was turned into a mythic figure who advocated decisive action against centralized reforms despite the fact that he helped initiate many of the reforms the samurai were protesting.

Most of this logic behind the belief that Saigo planned and incited the Satsuma Rebellion derives from the fact that when Saigo returned to Satsuma following the Korean Crisis he helped establish several private samurai schools (*shigakko*).¹⁹ It is believed he helped create the *shigakko* academies in order to raise a private army with the aim of rebelling against the corrupt centralized power. However, Saigo's connection was indistinct when one considers that he spent most of his time away from the academies in the seclusion of the mountains. A more founded assertion would be that his subordinates namely, Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata, who oversaw the operations of the *Shigakko*, were the principle planners and inciters of the rebellion. These men were left to lead and determine what the academies stood for.²⁰ They directed and utilized the *shigakko* academies in order to propagate their aims not Saigo's. They rallied the *shigakko* samurai behind the banner of resistance and defense of their ancient birthright.

One of the key components of the *shigakko* academies that were utilized by Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata were Saigo's edicts that littered the campuses. Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata manipulated these indistinct philosophical statements to call for decisive action against Meiji centralized authority. One of his edicts in particular that was used stated, "even if one is a wise man who disciplines the body and rectifies the self, if one cannot act, one is the same as a wooden puppet."²¹ Saigo's quote is manipulated by Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata to signify the decisiveness that is called for in resisting centralized reforms. Saigo's edicts advocated no specific action against the Meiji government but they came to associate Saigo with the opposition movement. It was precisely at that level of vague association that Saigo came to be identified and looked toward as the guiding figure for the opposition movement.

Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata also manipulated Saigo's views through their portrayal of his actions in the Korean Crisis. They argued that he wanted decisive action against Korea but that the insincere Meiji Cabinet denied the proposal. Kirino stated:

Saigo and I were totally committed to our cause...Saigo, myself, and others wanted to dispatch an army abroad...[but] the little princesses of the Cabinet expressed fears...while they secretly conspired to deceive with a trick strategy.²²

Kirino's mocking references to the centralized leaders as "princesses" and his honorable view of Saigo working for the rights of the samurai leads one to believe that he was in favor of rebellion. However, he was very much the opposite but Kirino

in this quote leads the *shigakko* samurai to believe that Saigo wanted to invade Korea in order to re-establish samurai worth and end the corrupt and deceiving central government.

Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata used Saigo and his puritan existence to characterize the Meiji Leaders in Tokyo as lavish, decadent, and self-serving.²³ They distinguished Saigo from the Meiji establishment to manipulate a logic that connected centralization and modernization as being an evil. However, while Saigo did live a Spartan existence and he did disagree with the lifestyles of Okubo and other Meiji leaders, the linkage of those views to his advocacy of rebellion is more the work of Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata.²⁴ The distinction made by them was utilized more to portray Saigo as anti-modernization than what it meant to Saigo as being a faithful follower of Confucianism.

Saigo's absence from the public eye amidst all of the propagating by Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata was also a crucial aspect of their manipulation because it enabled them and the public to magnify the aura that already surrounded him. Because most samurai had never actually been in contact with Saigo, they did not know the kind of man he was; and since almost all of his writings were personal letters only a select few actually had the opportunity to understand Saigo's beliefs first hand. Most knew him only through intermediaries like Kirino, Shinohara, and Murata who misconstrued his rhetoric. Consequently, his relative seclusion from 1873 to 1877 allowed his mythic character grew until he was almost a deity. Everything anti-Meiji became Saigo. Those on the outside of Saigo's inner circle had no reliable way of gaining a true understanding of his beliefs. "Kirino Shinohara, Murata, and a dozen or so others in upper echelons of the *shigakko* utilized the banner of 'Saigo the Great' in, order to incite the rebellion."²⁵

When the rebellion broke out Yamagata found it hard to believe that Saigo joined in the first place. He was surprised, having known Saigo personally without the misconstrued image created by the *shigakko* leadership. Yamagata recognized that Saigo's involvement in the rebellion was more the doing of others than his own. In Yamagata's final letter to Saigo amidst the closing days of the Satsuma Rebellion he wrote to his colleague, "it is unwillingly that I come against a master and friend. But loyalty to the Son of Heaven requires. I believe it is your students who have forced your hand. You will understand me."²⁶ Yamagata knew that they shared the same ideology of military modernization but he also recognized that while ideology was what caused the rebellion it was not what separated them. Yamagata and Saigo were separated by an intricate web of deceit and woven by Satsuma samurai who manipulated Saigo's ideology to initiate resistance to centralized reforms. But if Saigo didn't want to lead a rebellion and if he helped initiate the measures the samurai were opposing then why did he join the rebellion?

III. Saigo's burden

The single factor that most historians identify as the event that ultimately lead to Saigo's direct involvement in the rebellion was an apparent assassination attempt ordered by Okubo Toshimichi. A group of Tokyo police confessed that childhood friend of Saigo and high-ranking Meiji leader, Okubo Toshimichi had sent them to

assassinate Saigo and restore order in the province. Accurate or not this confession convinced Saigo to join the rebellion.²⁷ When he committed to leading the insurrection all of the misperceptions surrounding his name were heightened. His decision to join the rebellion validated the public's manipulated and glorified view of him. The vision of him coming down from the mountain to lead the righteous samurai against the corrupt and decadent centralized leaders played into all of the *shigakko* samurai glorified precepts of Saigo.

The reason Saigo lead the rebellion beyond specific actions was an overriding sense of obligation within him to Satsuma. He didn't have a grave distain for the centralized authority; he simply had a higher calling to his home region. His decision was similar to that of Robert E. Lee in the American Civil War. Saigo and Lee didn't necessarily agree with their side's ideological aims but they felt a higher duty to their state or province then to their country. Much of his obligation derived from promises he had made to the Satsuma samurai when he went to serve in Tokyo alongside Yamagata.²⁸ He had vowed to uphold the samurai way, and while he didn't necessarily do this in Tokyo, the people of Satsuma still expected him to be their leader. He fought for the samurai out of obligation not out of belief in the cause.

Conclusion

On September 24, 1877 nearly seven months after the rebellions outbreak, Saigo, lying huddled along side many of the men who months and years before had manipulated his ideology and incited the rebellion gazed out into the dew covered mountains of Satsuma and sent final word to his troops saying that "they were about to go into battle for the last time...he urged them all to resolve to die bravely, so that shame would not tarnish their memories later." That morning he and his men made there final charge into Yamagata's conscript soldiers. It must have been a bittersweet moment for Saigo, being able to witness the confirmation of the army he helped create but that would now be responsible for his death. Nevertheless, Saigo's life from that day would go from samurai and statesmen to cultural icon. He would become shrouded by generations of embellishment. Behind all of that, however, there was a relatively simple man who in all actuality was quite similar to Yamagata in ideology. He was not the fiery pro-feudal Satsuma samurai that history has ignorantly decided to remember him as.²⁷ He was a sincere statesman who was caught between who he was and whom people had come to think he was. Yamagata on the other hand, who lived a life of clear intentions and left nothing to doubt. He was a man of single principle. Whether it be Saigo's engaging personality or Yamagata's vision above all else they will be remembered for their guidance in creating the framework for a nation that underwent one of the most drastic transformations socially, economically, spiritually, and internationally in the history of mankind.

The Meiji Era was a dynamic time, a time that saw two diametrically opposed armies square off against one another, one fought to preserve its birthright and one fought to prove its worth, but let it not be forgotten that the opposing commanders that battled one another for those seven months were men that fundamentally agreed with one another's views and who both enjoyed a piece of victory that fall afternoon

in 1877. For Yamagata as well as Saigo saw the confirmation of the framework they had helped establish for a modern conscript army.

Endnotes

- ¹ Jennifer Oldstone-Moore, interviewed by Greer Illingworth, 18 November 2002, Springfield.
- ² Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, (London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 334.
- ³ Charles L. Yates, *Saigo Takamori: The Man Behind the Myth*, (New York, Kegan Paul International, 1995), 185.
- ⁴ Geographically isolated province on the southern tip of Japan known at the time for its fierce independence and military superiority.
- ⁵ Charles L. Yates, "Saigo Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan", *Modern Asian Studies* 28, no. 3 (1994), 468-469.
- ⁶ Richard T. Chang, *Historian's and Meiji Statesmen*, (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1970), 45.
- ⁷ Rallying anti-Tokugawa slogan that dominated national life between the late 1850's and early 1860's meaning, "Respect the emperor, out with the barbarians."
- ⁸ Yates, *Man Behind the Myth*, 137.
- ⁹ Among others, Merion and Susie Harris, *Soldiers of the Sun*, (New York, Random House, 1991), 28-29 articulates this common view.
- ¹⁰ Yates, *Man Behind the Myth*, 131.
- ¹¹ Roger F. Hackett, *Yamagata in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922*, (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1971), 63.
- ¹² *Ibid*, 63.
- ¹³ Yates, *Man Behind the Myth*, 143.
- ¹⁴ Yates, *Man Behind the Myth*, 148.
- ¹⁵ Hackett, 70.
- ¹⁶ Ivan Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, (New York, The Noonday Press, 1975), 257.
- ¹⁷ Yates, *Man Behind the Myth*, 131.
- ¹⁸ Yates, *Man Behind the Myth*, 157.
- ¹⁹ Capital city of Satsuma, location of frequent anti-Meiji protests by disgruntled samurai.
- ²⁰ Saigo Takamori: *The Man Behind the Myth*, 12, 131, 158 & 162.
- ²¹ Saigo Takamori: *The Man Behind the Myth*, 158.
- ²² Morris, 259.
- ²³ Derek Wolf, "Life With(out) Saigo: Ideological Formation in the Kagoshima Shigakko" (unpublished manuscript), 9-10.
- ²⁴ Wolf, 17.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*, 17.
- ²⁶ Wolf, 22-23.

²⁴ Wolf, 16.

²⁵ Saigo Takamori: The Man Behind the Myth, 168.

²⁶ Josef Washington Hall, *Eminent Asians: Six Personalities of the New East*, (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1929), 183.

²⁷ Yates, *Man Behind Myth*, 165-166.

²⁸ Yates, *Man Behind Myth*, 135.

²⁹ Yates, *Emergence*, 473.

Stalin the Philosopher-King: The Soviet Totalitarianism as Realization of Plato's Republic

Ryan T. Miller

It is not an extraordinary visage; it could belong to any factory worker struggling through life. But the expression of fierce determination gives one pause; the stars of destiny shine behind the squinted eyes, the chin juts forward defiantly, pointing towards historical immortality. No, this is not the face of a simple worker; it is their champion, the man whose life is the personification of the proletarian struggle. Their force is in him. Joseph Stalin, whose very name is an accolade ("Man of Steel"); Stalin, in whose mighty hands an entire nation was forged according to his iron will.

Joseph Stalin endures as perhaps the most perplexing figure in the annals of history. He accumulated personal power that would awe Caesar, his crash programs in modernization propelled the Soviet Union from a backwards agrarian country to the fore of world powers, and he was the source of hope for not only the peoples of his realm, but also for those who still tasted the bitter wormwood of colonization. And yet his legacy is stained with blood, his nation's earth is filled with the bodies of his victims, and the benign smiling face of Comrade Stalin appears menacing and evil—the face of a tyrant. During his lifetime he was lauded with a myriad of titles, almost embarrassing in their adulation: "the Greatest Genius of Geniuses," "the Most Brilliant Strategist of All Times and Peoples," "the Best Friend of Counterintelligence Operatives," and "the Leader of All Progressive Humanity."¹ A few short years after his death he had fallen from the Empyrean, cast into the Pit, as castigated as the Enemy of Humanity who reigns over that land.

Back across the epic span of time, long before the Man of Steel stood atop the world stage, an erudite student of Socrates was penning his *summum opus*. It attempted to answer a profound question, "What is justice?," easily postulated but onerous in its complexity. Plato, who is the acknowledged master of Western philosophy, attacked this question with alacrity in his *Republic*. In attempting to bring the mystery of justice to resolution, Plato sketched the blueprint for the perfect state that would be established entirely on this most lofty of principles. This state was condemned to the pages of the book, imprisoned in the world of the intellect, until the brilliant, albeit sinister, mind of Stalin constructed Plato's state, bringing it out of the inert world of academia and into the dynamic realm of politics.

Republic was the instructions for the most oppressive and powerful state ever realized in the age of humanity: Stalin's totalitarianism. The Worker-Tsar saw himself as a Platonic guardian², the leader-type found in the tract, and numerous parallels (far too many to be a simple coincidence) between *Republic* and the USSR can be seen by the observant eye. In the Red regime, Joseph Stalin and Plato, two of history's giants, come together from across millennia to at last establish the reign of the Philosopher-King.

I. Historiography

A.) PLATO

Plato's immortal tract has been the subject of scrutiny for some of the world's best minds, as is appropriate for a work of its scope and originality. This investigation has yielded much that is both intriguing and controversial. The historiography breaks down into a bipolar world, each side analyzing the political proposals found in the work and each reaching a bold conclusion. One school contends that the political system devised by Plato is the precursor to totalitarianism, while the rival camp advocates that *Republic* is that system's antithesis, the forerunner of democracy. Certainly, the implications of this matter are profound; Plato is esteemed as the foundation of Western thought. The burgeoning student of philosophy is often reminded by his instructor: "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."³ Was, then, this coryphaeus a believer in totalitarianism or democracy? If it is the former, then serious doubts are raised as regard either the inherent values of Western civilization or the placement of Plato as its principal philosopher. In the case that the latter emerges triumphant, our society will be strengthened in the knowledge that it is the product of an ancient ideal.

1.) *Republic as Totalitarianism*

Those who oppose Plato as an enemy of democracy form an imposing company of guerrilla warriors, seeking to undermine the established viewpoint of Plato as an enlightened thinker. The charge is led by R. H. S. Crossman with the audacious declaration, dripping with raw vitriol: "Plato's philosophy is the most savage and the most profound attack upon liberal ideas which history can show."⁴ Crossman does not let this claim stand naked; he goes on to clothe it in robes of proof.

The civilians, by far the largest contingent in the society, must content themselves with toiling in the fields and laboring in their artisan shops, because their sole function is to produce society's goods and produce.⁵ There is no political participation; there is no self-determination. There is only the hammer and the sickle. But the civilian's lot does not merely deny them the right to choose their fate. They must also endure a total lack of personal security: "For the good of the state the ruler must punish and banish and kill the citizen who objects to the political operation the State must undergo."⁶ These powers of the ruler have chilling implications—the life of any opponent is forfeit. Even worse, perhaps, is the necessity of suffering needlessly in the present for some future happiness that may be nothing but a chimera. This "end justifies the means" policy is a hallmark of the brutal totalitarian regimes of the Twentieth Century.

A key feature in *Republic* is the "noble lie"—a concept that Plato never explicitly defines. Crossman sees the noble lie as propaganda, a means for instilling certain viewpoints into the masses. This indoctrination with simplified socio-political principles, Crossman argues, is the only education the bulk of society will ever receive.⁷ All media—including literature, music, and theater—will be censored and regulated so as to inculcate a slavish devotion to the regime of the philosopher-kings among the populace at large.⁸

Crossman concludes that Plato's perfect state "gives to the many not self-government but security, not freedom but prosperity, not knowledge but the 'noble lie...'. [It] is not a democracy of rational equals, but an aristocracy in which a hereditary caste of cultured gentlemen care with paternal solicitude for the toiling masses."⁹ The biting rancor with which Crossman passes his sentence convinces even the incredulous reader of his deep conviction that Plato is an opponent of democracy.

Crossman is not alone in the ranks of the guerrillas. He was but the first wave. Lesley Brown joins the struggle, penning her own article in an endeavor to prove Plato a totalitarian. Brown begins by examining a totalitarian state, finding that its essential feature is its intolerance of any rival loyalties. She then focuses her gaze on *Republic*, learning that the State will countenance no opposition to its constitution.¹⁰ In this respect, then, *Republic* is a totalitarian entity.

A further necessary characteristic, continues Brown, is the presence of "repressive measures to ensure conformity and to stifle dissent, including lies, state propaganda, and censorship of free speech, art, music, and literature."¹¹ Once again, Plato (through his mouthpiece in *Republic*, Socrates) openly proclaims these features as integral to his system.¹²

Plato's ultimate ambition, it must be credited, was to make the people of his *polis* happy. And further to his credit, he did not want a single stratum of society to have a monopoly on bliss, but rather the whole city drinking from the fount of mirth.¹³ But even these noble sentiments were tools in Plato's hands. Brown finds in *Republic* the idea that a city can only be happy when the philosopher-kings rule with the aid of the auxiliaries (the police force), while the "mass of workers must simply mind their own business and do what they are told."¹⁴ They are not individuals, but rather "good cogs in the great machine."¹⁵ It is clear that Plato, while wishing for the happiness of the citizenry, believes this can only be achieved through the stamping out of liberty and individuality.

Both Crossman and Brown's arguments are persuasive and scathing, but Karl R. Popper emerges to deliver the most damning attack of them all. He finds two basic elements in Plato's *Republic*:

- a) The strict division of the classes; i.e., the ruling class consisting of herdsmen and watch-dogs must be strictly separated from the human cattle.
- b) The identification of the fate of the state with that of the ruling class; the exclusive interest in this class, and in its unity; and subservient to this unity, the rigid rules for breeding and educating this class, and the strict supervision and collectivization of the interests of its members.¹⁶

Popper does not mask the force of his words with academic prose; he cuts to the very foundation of *Republic*, a foundation that *a priori* totalitarian; it places the burden of proof on the gainsayers.

Popper does not allow Plato to recover from his first stinging blow; he connects with another, even more damaging charge: that Plato cynically pretended that *Republic* was a treatise on justice, when it was in fact a means of disseminating totalitarian literature—the masquerade of the totalitarian state as one founded on justice would further win over followers.¹⁷ This is a damning indictment, but unfortunately it cannot be corroborated by any of Plato's extant notes (a man of his

intelligence would surely have destroyed any evidence of such an act). Popper must instead prove his contention by analyzing the work in question.

Popper argues that the goal of education in the ideal State is not "the awakening of self-criticism and of critical thought in general"¹⁸—it is, on the contrary, indoctrination, the suppression of any critical thought and the acceptance of decrees of the government as axiomatic.

He goes on: Plato's primary interest is in the collective body, the state as a whole; justice is nothing more than the health and well-being of this polity.¹⁹ An action that would benefit the state is a just one, whereas an action that blights the institution is wicked and unjust. "*The criterion of morality is the interest of the state* [emphasis is Popper's]."²⁰

Popper contends that Plato wished not only for the workers to live in a fog of lies, but that it was his solemn hope that the rulers themselves, after a few generations, would subscribe to the propaganda. Thus, without any access to the truth by any stratum of society, the lie will become, in effect if not in form, truth. The goal of this is nothing less than the strengthening of the ruling caste (in Popper's evocative words, a "master race") and the total halting of all societal progress.²¹ Plato knew as well as Orwell that the halting of progress froze the material conditions in a certain state, bringing unshakable stability to the status quo.

In sum, the guerrillas of the Totalitarian camp rely on the social structure of the *polis* to corroborate their charges; specifically, the extensive use of propaganda, the sanctioned use of terror against the populace, and the granting of political power to an elite body of sages, who control all aspects of their subjects' lives.

2.) *Republic as Democracy*

The forces battling Plato and his classic work are puissant indeed, but they are not unopposed in their advance. No, like the Red Army that halts the *Wehrmacht* juggernaut at the gates of Moscow, a group of warrior-poets comes to defend Plato and his ideal state. It is a far more difficult road to flesh out elements of democracy in this work, and even if they should fail in their mission, their names are emblazoned on the historiography of Plato's *Republic*.

The counterattack is led by John H. Hallowell. He begins by declaring that Plato "meant by philosophers lovers of wisdom, seekers after the good."²² Plato believed that only a handful of individuals in a generation could reach this level, while today we hold that all human beings are capable of reaching beyond the stars.²³ It is but a small step to progress from Plato's concept to our own; in a democracy, all the people are philosopher-kings (at least in the ideal).

Hallowell then turns his attention to debunking the totalitarian charge. The totalitarian dictators believe that there is no standard by which they can be judged; their will is in the right simply because it is their will.²⁴ Plato rejects such tautological arguments; philosopher-kings must serve the truth and wisdom—those are the standards by which they are to be judged.²⁵

Hallowell is relieved by John Wild, who crafts an eloquent argument in support of Plato and his democratic leanings. But Wild first makes a statement brimming with daring:

[Plato] identified [Athenian] democracy with irresponsible anarchy and condemned it both in itself and in being the mother of tyranny. Indeed, in Book VIII of the *Republic*, he places the pure form of democracy under oligarchy and holds that it is exceeded in degeneracy only by tyranny.²⁶

Wild is able to reconcile this historical fact with his stance by defining Athenian democracy as mob-rule, simple majoritarian democracy. But democracy is more than simply statistical majorities having political power—in fact, it is not even a necessary characteristic.²⁷

Democracy, Wild continues, can be viewed as a system seeking the avoidance of tyranny coupled with a profound “sense of the dignity and worth of human life, the fundamental equality of all under God, and the universal brotherhood of men.”²⁸ Furthermore, Greek philosophy has contributed its love of reason, faith in human nature, and hope for the future.²⁹ Certainly, Plato can be seen to have a deep respect for human beings, and the final category (Greek philosophy) might have a little to do with him as well.

Wild then succors the philosopher-kings, claiming that they are not arbitrary rulers, but rather “guardians of the law, who try first to understand it, then to apply it for the benefit of the whole community...”³⁰

Wild addresses the issue of the “noble lie,” attributing its negative definition to a basic misunderstanding of its principles. It is not propaganda; instead, it is the simplified truth—only the philosopher-kings can comprehend the world as it really is, and they must dilute it for consumption by the masses.³¹ It is comparable to adults explaining complex events to children.

Furthermore, Plato’s society does not have slaves—in the economic or the political sense. The natural rights of all citizens are protected, especially education.³² Plato was an ardent supporter of education, recognizing its value as a guard against the advent of tyranny.³³ As Thomas Jefferson wisely said, “Information is the currency of democracy.”³⁴

The Democratic school differs markedly from the Totalitarians in its methodology; whereas the latter are more concerned with the practical proposals, the Democrats focus on the theoretical aspects of the work. Their words are eloquent and their remarks valid, but the arguments lack the force found in the charges of Crossman, Brown, and Popper. It is a truism that words and ideals count for little when trumpeted over a grim reality. While the values espoused by Hallowell and Wild may flow logically from Platonic thought, the application of *Republic’s* political schema is incontrovertibly totalitarian. The volcanic eruption that razes a village today will, once the lava cools, form the ground on which a megalopolis may one day flourish.

It has been illustrated that Plato’s *Republic* inspires vastly different readings. The totalitarian camp curses him even as he is extolled by the democrats. Through the historiography, it becomes clear that Plato’s ideas can be used to forge entirely different systems—imagine the potential of *Republic* when interpreted by the extraordinary mind of Joseph Stalin.

B.) STALIN

The reign of Joseph Stalin was a drama on the world stage, and he succeeded in his ambition of carving his name into the Story of Humanity. For as long as civilization covers the globe, imposing the vision of humankind onto the body of nature, his deeds will be seared into the collective consciousness. The Twentieth Century, that most wondrous and bloody of epochs, is largely the tale of his movement and its clash with its antithesis, fascism; of his personal battle with an adventurer-conqueror who betrayed him and the world: Adolf Hitler.

Stalin, like Plato, is a complex figure whose life inspires several different interpretations. One school of thought holds him to be a great leader—although even this school must concede that he was marred by several severe flaws. The second camp contends that Stalin was a brutal tyrant, his “vermin fangs imbued in human gore.”³⁵ The last group contemns him as an incompetent ruler, his record of criminal acts unbalanced by any redeeming features. Which was the true Stalin? This question must be answered if his specter is to be exorcised from the earthly realm.

1.) *Stalin: Great Leader*

During his lifetime, official Soviet biographies heaped praise upon the “Leader of All Progressive Humanity,” painting his picture as a benign champion of the common man, friend to the worker, and titan of history. He was the Soviet Union’s *vozhd'*—a term difficult to translate into English, meaning something like unquestionable and all-powerful leader, similar to the German *Fuehrer*.³⁶ This view as an infallible ruler clearly could not survive Stalin, and his image was tarnished when reports of the terrible costs of his leadership became known. Still, he is not without defenders, scholars who seek to return some of the lost glory to Stalin’s name.

Robert H. McNeal is, if not an all-out Stalinist, a man who respects his vast contributions to Soviet Society and the world. Stalin’s ultimate loyalty, McNeal argues, was the Soviet Union itself, which he regarded as the socialist motherland and the keystone of any future proletarian revolution. Throughout his career, Stalin served his country devotedly, and reaped much success for it and the Communist movement.³⁷ This last claim, certainly, is undeniable; Stalin found the USSR an industrially weak agrarian nation and left it a world superpower with an empire spreading from the Elbe River to the Pacific Ocean.

To explain the monstrous purges of the party and society, McNeal proclaims that “it [was] not necessary for a victim to be literally in the pay of the class enemy. If he was thwarting or threatening Stalin, he was objectively serving the imperialists.”³⁸ So, McNeal says, what is commonly regarded as tyrannical repression is in fact a necessary move to provide strong leadership and, ergo, protection against a menace.

The workers were rarely the victims of these purges, and were ardent believers in class warfare, backing Stalin in his efforts to crush kulak and bourgeois counterrevolutionary activity.³⁹ Furthermore, McNeal stresses that the violence employed against the party elite is often greatly exaggerated. The purging of the party’s upper echelon lasted only two years of Stalin’s long reign. Many of the cases were not at Stalin’s behest at all, but were rather conducted under the impetus of opportunistic, unscrupulous underlings seeking to blaze a trail for career advancement.⁴⁰

McNeal hints that perhaps it is not Stalin who should bear the full burden of responsibility. It is instead the chief of the secret police, Yezhov, who is to blame for its excesses. He writes that any contention that

Yezhov and not Stalin was supreme is unjustified, but the most widespread arrests, deportations to the Gulag, and executions among the Soviet elite did occur during Yezhov's tenure as head of the police, September 1936-December 1938, and it is highly probable that the violence and scope of these repressions owed something to his personal management or mismanagement of Stalin's terror.⁴¹

In the area of collectivization, one of Stalin's most-lamented policies, McNeal contends that Stalin made bona fide efforts to limit the brutality of the implementation. He issued secret decrees that placed ceilings on the arrests of kulaks, and made a clandestine speech to party functionaries that called for an end to "administrative measures," a common euphemism for coercion, confiscation of land, and exile to labor camps.⁴²

Another point McNeal hastens to convey is that Stalin did not approve of his cult of personality, for which he is so reviled by his opponents. Rather than the instrument of vainglory, it was "necessary as a beacon for the masses—who were too easily influenced by false movements and leaders—and was the guarantee that a reliable Marxist-Leninist would retain supremacy."⁴³ The cult, then, was a political tool to promote stability, not the hero-worship of a semi-divine ruler.

McNeal concedes that Stalin was guilty of oppression, deceit, and murder on an epic scale, but that he did all this in the service of a just war⁴⁴—the attempt to build a new kind of society and a new citizen to inhabit it.

Nathan Leites makes a single—albeit salient—contribution to the great leader school of thought. He finds evidence that Stalin engaged in philosophical debate with mid-level bureaucrats, who often differed with Stalin on several key points. None of these technocrats suffered torture or any other punishment for their stance.⁴⁵ This proves that Stalin could countenance criticism in an area as sensitive as philosophy (of vital importance to a Soviet ruler, because the CCCP leader was expected to be a master theoretician).⁴⁶ This evidence undermines the oft-repeated claim that Stalin was an ego-maniac, and even instills a degree of magnanimity into his personality.

Jules Archer declares that Stalin was truly a Man of Steel, that human misery and suffering were trifling matters in the quest to build a mighty nation.⁴⁷ It was not the individual, but the mass of humanity that he cared about. This may make him seem a monster, but he served this ideal with conviction.

Archer admits that Stalin showed no degree of clemency to his enemies. He ordered grain seized from all collective farms that failed to realize their quota, accusing the peasants of deliberately sabotaging the harvest. The crop confiscation resulted in a terrible famine, but the will of the peasants to resist was forever broken.⁴⁸ Soviet power at last established dominion in the countryside.

Seeking to end Russia's industrial weakness, Stalin ordered the advent of a Five Year Plan to hurl the country from out of the darkness. The Plan was designed to industrialize the Union at the fastest possible speed, regardless of difficulty or resistance.⁴⁹ Archer finds that "despite Stalin's blunders and inhuman cruelty, he drove Russians to accomplish in one generation the work of ten."⁵⁰ Only a man like Stalin could have attained such a result.

Archer concludes that Stalin, while brutal in his methods, achieved his historical mission—he brought the Soviet Union to the fore of world powers, and changed its people from peasant-folk to an educated modern citizenry with a love of culture.⁵¹

These historians support Stalin and work to wash some of the blood off his hands. It is undeniable that Stalin was responsible for countless deaths; his defenders provide evidence to illustrate Stalin either working to assuage the victims or as a man fighting for the Great Cause, which necessitated the loss of life. They succeed in their mission; while not absolving the Man of Steel of his crimes, they illustrate that his regime accomplished momentous deeds.

2.) *Stalin: Tyrant*

Stalin was not able to silence all of his enemies with a pistol. They cannot be silenced, because no sooner does one fall than another appears, armed with moral indignation that even Stalin's staunchest supporters cannot match.

Helene Carrere d'Encausse is such an enemy. She curses his reign as "years of unadulterated tyranny."⁵² Dmitri Volkogonov, a former Red Army officer and propagandist, has broken with his Communist past to corroborate Carrere d'Encausse's contention; "Stalin's political 'principle' was monistic—everyone was to be ruled by the single method of coercion."⁵³ This is the method not of a great leader—for leaders do not require the use of repressive force—but of a tyrant, able to keep control only through fear and death.

Volkogonov further charges that Stalin did not even properly understand economics, a damning critique indeed for the leader of an essentially economic movement. His comprehension only went so far as recognizing the need for rapid and profound improvement in industrial capacity, and exhorted for this general improvement.⁵⁴ The Five-Year Plan did result in massive increases in industrial potential, as well as the creation of several new markets (automobiles, chemicals, aircraft),⁵⁵ but many of the achievements rested on the backs of political prisoners, who were extensively used as slave labor.⁵⁶

Alan Bullock is widely respected as one of the premiere Hitler-historians, but he aggrandizes his expertise to include the other great Twentieth-century dictator in his massive dual biography of Hitler and Stalin. In this tome, he scrutinizes collectivization of agriculture as one of the principal actions of the Stalinist government. Carrere d'Encausse presents the fact that the collectivization campaign resulted in monstrous losses, hardly conceivable by the human mind. There were "millions of dead, with unimaginable sufferings, with a rural society decimated physically and doomed morally."⁵⁷ What makes it even more bitter is that it was an economic debacle, entirely ruining the once fertile Soviet agriculture.⁵⁸ This was, of course, never admitted. The official party line is that sabotage and wrecking caused the poor harvests of collectivized agriculture.⁵⁹

Carrere d'Encausse condemns Stalin's use of secret police, the ultimate key of his power over society. These secret police, whose name changed several times and whose powers continued to expand, created a state of perpetual fear in order to smash the bonds of human society—such as friendship and family (after all, friends and family members could be police informants)—to break the will of those who would resist until nothing is left but malleable, frightened husks, into which anything can be

inculcated.⁶⁰ Daniel Myerson evokes the terror of the police headquarters, the Lubyanka; "Men and women are strapped to tables. Their teeth are kicked out;... they are forced to stare at two-thousand-watt light bulbs,...needles are stabbed through the back of the neck until the spinal cord is injured and convulsions begin."⁶¹

The adherents of the Tyrant school have a far easier task than did the Great Leader contingent. They need only expose the ghastly wounds that the Red Tsar gouged into the Socialist Motherland. The death toll during his reign is so astronomical as to cease to be comprehensible to the human mind. His projects for social development, they argue in unison, resulted in a bloodbath and the enslavement of the people of the USSR to the will of a vainglorious megalomaniac. His achievements were incidental. The Tyrant camp poses a serious threat to the Great Leader squadron; the former claims with righteous indignation that the results of Stalin's programs did not justify their brutality; the latter stoically contends that the Cause is greater than morality. The loyalty of students of history is contingent upon that individual's own value system, whether that person is dedicated to the human being or to humanity as a whole.

3.) Stalin: Incompetent Ruler

There exist even more vehement opponents of Stalin than the tyrant camp. These scholars disdain Stalin and do not even afford him the dignity of being an effective tyrant, let alone a leader. The sole accomplishment of his reign is that he was able to have a reign. Striking after the death of Stalin, during the "Thaw" of Khrushchev, Roy A. Medvedev burst forth like a thunderbolt to topple the statues of the "Greatest Genius of Geniuses." Stalin, Medvedev begins, was a man consumed with raw ambition, the desire to become one with power. Unfortunately, he was not especially endowed with any talents or qualities that might justify his placing the signet ring on his covetous finger. This "limitless ambition" coupled with his "limited abilities" necessitated that Stalin remove any potential rivals...that is, he must destroy those who are superior to him until he stands as a titan.⁶²

Stalin's purges were the largest in scale in human history. The death toll is truly nauseating. Medvedev rages, "these were not streams, these were rivers of blood, the blood of honest Soviet people."⁶³ So many innocents were killed because Stalin was incapable of distinguishing between actual enemies and loyal citizens.

Stalin continually attempted to shirk responsibility for his failures. After the debacle of collectivization, he penned the article "Dizzy With Success" in an endeavor to place the blame for the excesses on local officials.⁶⁴ When the paucity of qualified individuals became manifest following the purge, Stalin charged Yezhov with committing the excesses.⁶⁵ And finally, he declared that the Five-Year Plan, optimum version, was fully realized

in order...to get the people to see some justification for the sacrifices forced on them by collectivization and industrialization, which were not so much due to the actual needs of the economy as to the poor leadership of Stalin and his aides.⁶⁶

The horror of this time could perhaps be palatable if it served some great cause, but Medvedev argues that there was no point, that it was all engendered by Stalin's bungling.

Gary Kern joins this camp by analyzing Stalin as portrayed by the great Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn's epic novel *The First Circle* uses the labor camps to symbolize the drudgery of life under Joseph Stalin.⁶⁷ The Red Tsar is not even entirely human—he is a “moral monster...who cannot be redeemed by a single fact or rationalization.”⁶⁸ This is a devastating portrait, denying Stalin even a single positive attribute.

The *First Circle* takes us into the mind of the Man of Steel, allows us to follow his thought-process:

Distrust was Iosif Djusashvili's [Stalin] determining trait. Distrust was his world view...He did not trust his mother...He did not trust his party members...He did not trust the workers...He did not trust those close to him...And he always turned out to be right! And then he trusted just one man...That man was Adolf Hitler.⁶⁹

This quotation is damning on its face. Hitler was the least trust-worthy of any statesman in human memory; Stalin had watched him betray countless allies. He placed his complete faith in this man, who all along had professed to the world his will to forge a German Empire on the steppes of Russia.

Kern labels Stalin as the center of power, his will as the fuel that operates the machinery of state. He is “a man of unlimited power, a man whose squint can mean death and whose every word must be hailed as genius.”⁷⁰ To give some examples of the depths of madness to which the cult of personality sank, there were proposals to rename the Volga River and even the Moon after Stalin.⁷¹ A man who is so adulated has supreme difficulty remaining attached to reality; “such a mind inevitably has no foundation, dwells in megalomaniac fantasies, and begins to eat away at itself.”⁷² The great irony is, however, that “the hideous, senile tyrant, despite massive proof of his ineptitude, nevertheless keeps the country firmly in his grip.”⁷³ Kern would argue that Stalin is imbued with the one ability that allows him to remain in power, and even this is not so much a quality as a lack of one: ruthlessness.

Robert C. Tucker is an established historian and psychobiographer. He adds his voice to the chorus in a profoundly original way. Tucker believes that Stalin's inner world was one of epic battles between him, the leader of genius, and those who would destroy him. He constructed complex fantasies, “hero-scripts,” to borrow Tucker's term, and enacted them once he had attained power.⁷⁴ He identified with revolutionary figures from Russia's long and dark past, and was inspired by their deeds. The principal figures in his pantheon were Ivan Grozny (the Terrible) and Peter I (the Great).⁷⁵ Stalin resolved to cover himself with glory by achieving even grander accomplishments than these celebrated monarchs.

But he was not able to supersede them. Tucker mocks Stalin as a “colossal bungler of high policy.”⁷⁶ He failed in his historical mission. For instance, the first Five-Year Plan, while achieving some genuine results (such as the Dnieper River Dam, which incidentally utilized slave labor), had many blunders. There was poor oversight, and many projects “begun were not always completed. Expensive imported machinery was often mishandled or left to rust in unsheltered places.”⁷⁷ Industrialization and collectivization were attained, but “it did so at a cost that was incalculably great in lives, health, morale, and the well-being of a generation, and unnecessary for the bulk of the results achieved.”⁷⁸

The Incompetent Ruler division is the least compelling of the Stalin camps. These scholars write as if personally enraged with the Soviet Leader (two of them, in fact, were Soviet citizens and chafed under his yoke). Their arguments are logically consistent, to be sure, and Tucker's evaluation of Stalin's mental state is nothing short of brilliant, but the historians deny Stalin even the political acumen that the Tyrant and Great Leader companies concede him. This is at odds with reality, and leaves their work incomplete, like a painting left unfinished because the artist is inept at forming faces.

Joseph Stalin is a man who continues to be discussed and evaluated. His life and times have provided the pabulum for many a distinguished career in history. While the attempt to provide the definitive analysis degenerates into a gray blur of contradictory conclusions, one thing is presented in crystal clarity; Joseph Stalin, long dead, continues to dominate the world.

II. Argument

Many of the world-historic figures have had an ardent faith in their own destinies, a confidence bordering on arrogance that they would attain the lofty heights which beckoned, out of reach, to so many worthy individuals. And these figures, these titans of history, often develop their social designs long before they attain their ambitions; Napoleon no doubt coveted the crown long before that chilly December day; Hitler penned *Mein Kampf* while in prison, declaring his intention to stretch the German frontier to the Urals; and Joseph Stalin, one of those rare Communists who was actually from the working class, was the disciple of two sages: Karl Marx and Plato.

Republic is a blueprint for a state that existed only in the mind of a great thinker, and it was treated as a tool for the discussion of justice, not as an actual constitution. Plato himself probably doubted the likelihood of his plan's fruition, but he was no doubt sincere when he made a claim no less daring in our time than it was in ancient Greece:

Until philosophers rule as kings in cities or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, cities will have no rest from evils...nor will the human race.⁷⁹

Stalin was indubitably intrigued by this passage, as it is the foundation upon which Plato constructs his mighty *polis*, but it is unfortunately impossible to determine if Stalin's character naturally mirrored the Platonic guardian, or if he was influenced by the work to the extent that it formed his personality. The importance of this question is marginal. The fact of the matter is that nearly all of Stalin's actions, and those of his society, can be understood in terms of Plato's *Republic*.

Plato was munificent in describing his ideal ruler, and these attributes can be examined vis-à-vis Stalin's nature, confirming the somewhat bold labeling of him as a philosopher-king. The lifestyle of the guardian (this term and philosopher-king will be used interchangeably here as in *Republic*) is humble, free of any ostentation or luxury.⁸⁰ He is "moderate and not at all a money-lover."⁸¹ Stalin conforms to this image perfectly; the virtue of a modest home cannot be denied him. He was often

praised by visitors for his domicile, which was a "single story, two-room house in the former servants' quarters of the Kremlin, shabbily furnished."⁸² Stalin, like Plato's hero, cared little for the material world. He was more concerned with pure power and its exercise.⁸³ In this matter, ostensibly of minor importance but in sooth telling about the lifestyle, and henceforth attitude towards life of a leader, Stalin fits into the robes of the philosopher-king.

Plato takes great care in elucidating that his guardian does not exult in the diadem resting upon his head. In fact, the true philosopher, he exclaims, "despises political rule."⁸⁴ They instead look upon their ascendancy as a necessity, as something to be avoided if at all possible.⁸⁵ Stalin noted this characteristic of the philosopher-king no less than he did the previous point. Therefore, he made a maneuver to illustrate his aversion to political power; he declared to the Central Committee that he wished to abdicate as the Party's General Secretary.⁸⁶ The Party, naturally, refused to accept his resignation, and it would be absurd to contend that Stalin was sincere in his offer. However, this example does establish that Stalin recognized the expediency in feigning an antipathy to the exercise of power. It is an axiom that people are more likely to trust a person with great power if he is reluctant to possess it. Once again, Stalin looked to *Republic* for guidance, and emulated, albeit without sincerity, the guardian's approach to a situation.

Stalin reigned during one of the most cataclysmic epochs in human history: the ideological clash of fascism with all rival thought-systems. Especially bitter was fascism's battle with its polar opposite, communism. The triumph of the Soviet Union, with great assistance from the industrial democracies, over the monstrous German war machine is one of the most salient events in Stalin's story. The Red Tsar fancied himself a military genius, depicted in numerous books and films as the Force whose strategic formulations crushed the *Wehrmacht* when lesser plans would have yielded only perdition.⁸⁷ This was more than simple political prudence, more than crafting himself into the Architect of Victory. Stalin was an ardent admirer of the army, wearing his marshal's uniform with a healthy dose of pride.⁸⁸ He involved himself personally in inspecting the military equipment and outfits.⁸⁹ This sphere of Stalin's nature finds a partner in the guardian, who combines the professions of "both warrior and philosopher" in his person.⁹⁰

Plato, like the cold and calculating warrior that he praises, has naught but disdain for those who shirk their military responsibilities and embrace the coward's path of surrender. He icily declares, "anyone who is captured alive [should] be left to his captors as a gift to do with as they wish."⁹¹ Stalin had the opportunity to prove his loyalty to Plato in this regard. During the massive Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of the USSR), Stalin's own son, Yakov, was captured by the Nazis. The Germans extended feelers to Stalin with the purpose of exchanging Yakov for an important *Wehrmacht* officer. Stalin refused, leaving Yakov to the Nazis. He did not survive his confinement.⁹²

Stalin's way of life and personal beliefs have been compared to the philosopher-king, and it has been demonstrated that in many instances that their natures are identical. However, there remains the most essential characteristic of the Platonic guardian—the ability to philosophize. This is the integral component, without which the philosopher-king would cease to be such. If Stalin were discovered to lack this

feature, any earlier victories would be lost; our liberated cities would be re-conquered by the enemy, ignorance.

First, Plato's concept of the true philosopher must be established if we are to find an exemplar in Stalin. This question is one of the most complex in the entire *Republic*, but Plato is able to solve it with much aplomb. He laconically identifies the philosopher as an individual who possesses "the share of the knowledge that alone among knowledge is to be called wisdom."⁹³ He continues: the philosopher is he "who love[s] the sight of truth."⁹⁴

Now, armed with Plato's definition of the philosopher, we must probe into Stalin's psyche to find this quality. At this juncture, the debate reaches a crossroads; is it imperative that Stalin *actually* possess the rare ability to see Platonic truth, or is it sufficient that he *believe* himself to be endowed with it? This is an especially difficult conundrum because it is highly dubious that Stalin could fairly be called a philosopher. The previous examples of guardian behavior were all matters of will; one cannot will oneself a philosopher. It is a gift that cannot be seized. For the purposes of this inquiry, Stalin's belief in his philosophic acumen will be deemed adequate. After all, in order to emulate something it is not necessary to be such.

Stalin understood truth, perhaps predictably, in Marxist terms. In one of his letters to his principal lackey (and friend, or so the tone of the letters connote) Molotov, Stalin complains that the Chinese Communist Party is bereft of competent leadership: "There is not a *single* Marxist mind in the [Chinese] Central Committee capable of understanding the underpinning (the social underpinning) of the events now occurring [that is, the brewing civil war in China between the Reds and the forces of Kuomintang]."⁹⁵ Without a leader who is able to analyze the situation in Marxist terms, that is, truth, Stalin clearly believes any revolutionary activity to be fruitless. Philosophy, then, is a prerequisite for true leadership.

Naturally, Stalin himself was generously endowed with this crucial faculty, at least according to works produced by his propaganda machine (which disseminated the view Stalin had of himself, ergo being germane to the discussion). His genius for philosophy was manifest; his

whole career is an example of profound theoretical powers combined with an unusual breadth and versatility of practical experience in the revolutionary struggle...His advice is taken as a guide to action in all fields of Socialist construction...Everybody is familiar with the cogent and invincible force of Stalin's logic, the crystal clarity of his mind, his iron will...Stalin is wise and deliberate in solving complex political questions where a thorough weighing of pros and cons is required. At the same time, he is a supreme master of bold revolutionary decisions and sharp turns of policy.⁹⁶

Through this indulgent and over-adulatory language, Stalin's intellectual puissance is confirmed. His mind is a powerful instrument capable of fertilizing the barren fields of ignorance. He can see the dawn of glory where others see only the blankets of night, because he is the "farsighted statesman and wise strategist who is cognizant of the laws of historical development and who molds [the Communist] Party's policy, strategy and tactics strictly on the basis of the objective laws of history and of a sober estimation of the actual forces."⁹⁷ Or so Stalin believed, and hoped others would as well.

Clearly, Stalin viewed himself as a leader of the Platonic type, who was able to view the truth, which were the immutable laws of historical materialism. These laws were the key to action; only policies formulated according to the truth were satisfactory. In this most important respect of all, Stalin is a Doppelgänger of Plato's ideal ruler.

In official Soviet history, the General Secretary is lauded as the solitary "Architect of Communist Society."⁹⁸ Under his auspices, the USSR blossomed into a flower of mirth, a marvel of science and order.⁹⁹ This accolade could have been taken verbatim from Plato's immortal work: "Surely one individual would be sufficient to bring to completion all the things that now seem so incredible, provided that his city obeys him."¹⁰⁰ And so, all of Stalin's ambitions find a corollary in *Republic*. His destiny to be the Builder of Socialism is found in the pages of this blueprint, and the only condition of his victory was the acquiescence of the people and his fellow politicians.

Let us travel backwards through time, to before Stalin's supremacy of Party and Country was established. Stalin was confident of his abilities to triumph in his endeavor to construct a socialist state; in fact, he felt that he alone possessed the vision and will-power to bring the revolution to its Fructador. However, he was burdened by the lead cloak of his brethren party members, who lacked Stalin's philosophic gift for beholding the truth (recall, this is his personal belief, not necessarily objectively factual). It was therefore imperative to remove this onus and rule alone.¹⁰¹

The means of accomplishing this *coup* was the secret police, which was known by many different acronyms: GPU, OGPU, and finally the NKVD. The transitory status of the names did not mirror the perpetual state of fear the organization inspired. The institution had its claws in all Party organs, and there were sections that watched over this first level, and still another stratum spying on these watchers. Furthermore, and perhaps even more effective, every important Party official (and therefore opponent of the philosopher-king) was protected by a troupe of NKVD agents, whose true purpose was to act as Stalin's spies.¹⁰² Their duty, of course, was to promote Stalin's viewpoint through intimidation or outright terror. In Plato's terms, the secret police are the "auxiliaries[, who are the] supporters of the guardians' convictions."¹⁰³ Stalin personally cultivated this organization, which provided the keystone of his power. He bloated its authority to mammoth proportions, which ultimately included placing criminals in jail or concentration camps, jurisdiction over these camps, and the ability to commit capital punishment without any formal judicial procedure.¹⁰⁴

The auxiliaries have no will of their own; they must defer in all instances to the volition of the philosopher-king. This is precisely the relationship Stalin shared with this organization. As its powers grew, he decided that it had become expedient to replace its head, Yagoda, because he had

become too intimate with Stalin's purge methods, and too close to the reins of power...The man chosen as Yagoda's successor was Nikolai Yezhov, whom Stalin had 'planted' several years before as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and head of the bureau of appointments, chief dispenser of patronage. In these positions Yezhov had been silently building a parallel OGPU, responsible only to Stalin personally.¹⁰⁵

The secret police, then, became an extension of Stalin's own self, a dagger in his inclement hand. The GPU/OGPU/NKVD were "like dogs obedient to the rulers, who are themselves like shepherds of the city."¹⁰⁶ Stalin expected that his pets enforce his enlightened will with "unrelenting firmness and ruthlessness,"¹⁰⁷ as one of his letters to his crony Molotov puts it. The successful creation of the auxiliaries mark one of Stalin's greatest triumphs; it represents his imposition of the ideals of *Republic* not on himself, but on entities independent of his personal perspective.

The madness of the secret police's terror is well known and could fairly be said to form the general population's perception of the Stalinist regime. The violence is random, the victims unrelated. The arm of the law becomes the lightning of electrical storms, awesome and capricious. The secret police would arrest someone, as innocent and clean as freshly-fallen snow, and force them to put their signatures to wild confessions, admitting to involvement in vast and elaborate, almost Goldbergian conspiracies.¹⁰⁸ A representative example is the case of the "Toiling Peasant Party." A huge portion of the bureaucracy was exposed to be members of this cabal, whose program was to destroy the farm implements of the kolkhoz (the collective farms), which would result in a poor harvest and ergo a famine. This famine would undermine the popularity of Stalin and the Soviet government, leading to a counter-revolutionary mood among the populace. The "Toiling Peasant Party" would then use its position in the bureaucracy to overthrow the Soviets and abolish all vestiges of communism from society, thus ordaining a bourgeois democracy.¹⁰⁹ If the accused were to refuse signing the confession, he would be subjected to physical and psychological torture until he agreed to admit guilt to a crime that never transpired.¹¹⁰

The facts of the case invariably consisted entirely of self-incriminations, with the contrite conspirator expounding upon his twisted deeds, which often did include a kernel of truth (for instance, when Yagoda was arrested, he was charged with attempting to poison the Politburo members, and he was in fact responsible for observing their food's preparation).¹¹¹ One of Stalin's secret policeman, a certain Krivitsky, went so far as to call it a "gigantic madhouse...[where] the very concept of guilt was lost sight of."¹¹²

Such practices seem to weaken, indeed, to destroy the view of Stalin as a philosopher-king. The practice of arresting a sea of officials and executing them on trumped-up charges is *a priori* contrary to the nature of a Platonic guardian, who loves truth above all else. However, even in this instance, where our daring comparison ostensibly is toppled like the statue of a deposed tyrant, Stalin proves himself more forcefully than ever to be a philosopher. Plato reminds us that such a being "must be without falsehood—[he] must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth."¹¹³ This can be observed in his behavior, if the husk of appearance is shed.

Stalin was compelled by his belief in his unique wisdom to destroy those who would interdict him from ruling unfettered (see above). He had them removed from the power structure by the secret police, who accomplished this end by arresting them for conspiratorial activity that never happened. This falsehood was anathema to Stalin, who could not countenance this glaring challenge to his philosophic nature. The secret police were ergo instructed to force the prisoners *themselves* to sign their confessions, and then later incriminate themselves in open court.¹¹⁴ Such behavior

served to hide the falsehood with a cloak of truth that made these underhanded methods palatable to Stalin the philosopher-king.

Stalin was able to extend his will not only to his auxiliaries, but also to society itself. Not content with being a philosopher-king, he resolved to construct Plato's *polis* as he found it in the pages of his beloved book. Of course, the populace in *Republic* lacks that most lofty of attributes, the ability to see truth and beauty, and is therefore incapable of philosophy.¹¹⁵ Stalin shared Plato's negative assessment of the masses. He felt nothing but scorn for popular opinion (he mocked certain officials who "love[d] to *swim along* 'with the tide' of the sentiment of the 'masses.'").¹¹⁶ The lot of the populace is to abstain from philosophy and to devote themselves to executing the will of the *vozhda*.¹¹⁷

Plato was remarkable in many respects, but he has earned special distinction as one of history's first feminists (or at least as a soldier for women's liberation). He argues that philosophic nature has prejudice for neither sex.¹¹⁸ Since the guardian is the greatest of all people (combining the qualities of the thinker and the warrior), it can be inferred that men and women are both qualified for all kinds of lesser work. Stalin embraced this lesson, and labored to engrave it into his society. At his report to the Seventeenth Party Congress, the GenSec gives several figures showing the presence of women in the highest echelon of party and society.¹¹⁹ He goes on to applaud this phenomenon, declaring

This fact, comrades, is of tremendous significance. It is of tremendous significance because women form half the population of our country; they constitute a huge army of workers; and they are called upon to bring up our children, our future generation, that is to say, our future. That is why we must not permit this huge army of working people to remain in darkness and ignorance! That is why we must welcome the growing social activity of the working women and their promotion to leading posts as an indubitable sign of the growth of our culture.¹²⁰

The respective natures of Stalin and of Plato's philosopher-king continues to be indistinguishable, and the Red regime and the *polis* are proving to be of like constitution as well.

Plato's hierarchy of society is justified by the different make-ups of the citizenry, who rise so far as their merit allows. This has been coined the "Myth of the Metals," and is expounded by the sage in an oft-repeated passage:

All of you in the city are brothers...but the god who made you mixed some gold into those who are adequately equipped to rule, because they are the most valuable. He put silver in those who are auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and other craftsmen. For the most part you will produce children like yourselves, but, because you are all related, a silver child will occasionally be born from a golden parent, and vice versa, and all the others from each other...If an offspring of theirs is found to have a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in any way, but give him the rank appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen and farmers. But if an offspring of these people is found to have a mixture of gold or silver, they will honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries...¹²¹

The purges of the party that Stalin undertook with increasing regularity were the means of implementing the Myth of the Metals, of ascertaining that party members were those with gold or silver in their souls. These purges, according to a decree, had manifold objectives but were primarily executed to "rais[e] the ideological level of the

members of the party...[and] to [rid] the party of persons not worthy of the lofty title of party member."¹²²

It is manifest that the removal of unworthy elements finds a parallel in the demotion of iron and bronze guardians/auxiliaries. But Stalinist society also rewarded those who it regarded as golden. During the heroic period of the First Five-Year Plan, there were massive opportunities for those who were imbued with industry and ambition. Especially favored were people from underprivileged backgrounds, such as manual workers and peasants. These individuals benefited from affirmative action programs that allowed them to ascend to dizzying heights, unimaginable in the days before the Revolution.¹²³ It is not require a Herculean exertion to see that the designation of workers and peasants as golden citizens is a result of Stalin's Marxist coloring of *Republic*.

Plato contends that the guardians of his city must have the power to "receive a clean slate or are allowed to clean it themselves."¹²⁴ He goes further: "They'll send everyone in the city who is over ten years old into the country."¹²⁵ This ambiguous language could easily be interpreted as a call for the decimation of the population, especially by a man consumed with a desire for historical immortality as Stalin. The Man of Steel did not shrink from the actions Plato advocated. His slogan for the Great Purge was "A whole generation must be sacrificed."¹²⁶ Those who opposed the philosopher-king were forfeit; those who had lived prior to his ascendancy were dangerous reactionaries. As one victim of the purge, Sloutski, lamented to his compatriot: "They will take me. They will take you, as they took the others. We belong to the generation which must perish. Stalin has said that the entire pre-revolutionary and war generation must be destroyed as a millstone around the neck of the Revolution."¹²⁷ Of those who were fortunate enough to survive the Purge, many experienced earth-shattering events that changed them fundamentally. Those technocrats and peasants who opposed Stalin often found themselves in a labor camp under the grim rule of the GPU/OGPU/NKVD, bombarded with propaganda extolling the Stalinist system and broken physically and mentally by onerous work. One day they were released from the prison, but their minds remained shackled in chains.¹²⁸ They had been arrested as independent spirits and had been reduced to clean slates, to be marked as the Best Friend of Counterintelligence Operatives desired.

Plato also conceded that the philosopher-king, when serving the Great Cause, is above any considerations of morality. In a dialogue with his friend Glaucon, Socrates (Plato's mouthpiece in *Republic*) admonishes those who aspire to superhumanity:

Socrates: And will a thinker high-minded enough to study all time and all being consider human life to be something important?

Glaucon: He couldn't possibly.

Socrates: Will he consider death to be a terrible thing?

Glaucon: He least of all.¹²⁹

Stalin did labor for his vision of a perfect society, the utopian paradise of communism. Pondering the truth of historical materialism and class struggle, of a mighty Soviet state capable of surviving capitalist encirclement, he become apathetic to his people's present suffering and hardship.¹³⁰ He toiled in the fields of politics, "capable of destroying nine-tenths of the human race to make happy the one tenth."¹³¹

Furthermore, Plato explains that the ultimate goal of the *polis* is not to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion.¹³²

This passage found a willing vassal in Stalin. It was not his wish to make a particular class in his society content, but to endeavor to make the whole happy and affluent. If this could only be accomplished through the destruction of a particular stratum, so be it. This was the true purpose of the class struggle. This can be illustrated in the liquidation of the kulak class (relatively wealthy peasants). A Central Committee document notes the "number of complaints concerning violence and threats directed by kulak elements at kolkhoz members who do not wish to leave the kolkhozy and who are working honestly and selflessly for the consolidation of these kolkhozy..."¹³³ The document then proposed:

To apply as a measure of judicial punishment for the plundering (theft) of property belonging to kolkhozy and cooperative societies the highest measure of social protection, namely, execution with confiscation of all property, with commutation of execution under extenuating circumstances to deprivation of freedom for a term of not less than 10 years with confiscation of all property.¹³⁴

Despite the draconian measures employed, it can be gleaned from the directive that Stalin had the happiness of the collective farmers in mind. The kulaks, he believed, were the wreckers who blighted the farms, ruining the felicity of the good people who wanted only to work. By liquidating the kulaks, he made one group miserable, but aimed to make society as a whole prosperous in matters of joy.¹³⁵ This is the duty of the philosopher-king.

This bloody regime was defended by those who believed it represented the sole chance for the victory of the proletariat. Out of transient evil would be born the ultimate stage of human development, where freedom and jubilation would be ubiquitous.¹³⁶ Plato reminds us that the guardian is concerned with the infinite march of time rather than the infinitesimal period of repression.¹³⁷ Stalin found a balm in these words; he may be remembered by posterity as an iron-willed despot, but he would be celebrated as the Builder of Socialism. Only the superhuman volition of a Platonic guardian could construct a lasting human happiness.

The domination of society by the tenets found in *Republic* was not limited to structure. Plato's tract includes provisions for the censorship and control of culture, that expression of a people's soul. He affords culture a prominent role in the life of the *polis*, and judges it "appropriate for the founders to know the patterns on which poets must base their stories and from which they mustn't deviate."¹³⁸ As might be expected, the Soviet totalitarianism realized this principle. The standard to which all culture must adhere is "Socialist Realism," which remained an ambiguous term. Essentially, it represented Stalin's tastes, which were conservative. He also had a penchant for the monumental. Any deviation from Socialist Realism was heaped with ridicule and censored.¹³⁹

A further prohibition imposed upon the cultural agents is that their works must demonstrate that "a god isn't the cause of all things but only of good ones."¹⁴⁰ While this applies only to the actions of the gods (something a Marxist would not concern himself with), Stalin doubtlessly was convinced of the wisdom of this policy. What

applies to the gods could be extended to include the guardians. Therefore, the epithet "wreckers" was created in order to absorb the blame for all shortcomings of Stalinist society. During the famine following complete collectivization, for instance, saboteurs and conspirators were labeled as the causes of the poor harvest.¹⁴¹ Stalin called for the publication of all the wreckers' testimonies, disseminating the true cause of society's ails.¹⁴²

Eventually all the achievements of Stalin's reign were amalgamated into a single tome, *The Short Course*. This work extolled the Man of Steel as a leader of genius whose policies resulted in the might of the USSR and the joy of its people. Stalin was directly involved with the creation of the textbook, although the extent of his role is subject to debate.¹⁴³ Called the "Bible of the Stalin Cult,"¹⁴⁴ *The Short Course* became more than a mere textbook; it ascended to a Gospel truth, a "catechism of revolutionary ideology and...a handbook of revolutionary action."¹⁴⁵ This book marked Stalin's victory in his effort to present himself as the bringer of glory, of all happy things. It also successfully castigated those who sought to demolish his work, the double-dealers and wreckers.

Plato further advocates a repression of certain aspects of culture and history. He makes the bold claim that it is desirable to "delete the lamentations and pitiful speeches of famous men."¹⁴⁶ Again, Stalin was capable of aggrandizing this policy into one far more expansive than Plato intended. The Worker-Tsar interpreted it as a signal to alter history, forging it into the shape he wishes. Armed with Plato's suggestion, Stalin manufactured documents, invented interviews, doctored photographs, and even erased personalities from the historical record.¹⁴⁷ Stalin was able to apply Plato's proposal, making himself a titan of history in his own lifetime.

These examples illustrate a general policy that constitutes a significant feature of both Plato's *Republic* and Stalin's USSR, namely, the widespread use of falsehood and propaganda.¹⁴⁸ What is more, the use of this propaganda was quite effective. The conspiracies of the wreckers and class enemies were accepted as truth by ordinary people, who became ever more vigilant and suspicious.¹⁴⁹ The future of the Soviet Union was clouded in darkness, and only the beacon of Comrade Stalin's enlightened mind kept the blankets of night at bay.¹⁵⁰ Or so the incessant barrage of newspaper articles, poetry, songs, and posters proclaimed.

III. Conclusion

Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, envisioned himself as the hero of Plato's epic philosophical tract, *Republic*. In his actions and in his policy, the nature of the Platonic guardian is manifest. *Republic* was the guiding light of the Stalinist system no less than the voluminous works of Marx and Engels.

But despite the myriad of parallels between Stalin and the philosopher-king, there remains one quality that Stalin was not able to emulate. Despite the philosopher-king's inclement nature, he worked strenuously for a justice that would genuinely permeate society. The rewards for his *polis* would come to pass; the sacrifices would result in a world of plenty and mirth.

Stalin, however, even if he were sincerely working for the happiness of his people, never did attain this goal. His people were broken on the grindstones of tyranny, sacrificed on the altar of Stalin's own vanity. He believed himself to be a philosopher-king, but that did not make it so. His rule did not usher in the next phase of human society; it destroyed an entire generation, a whole nation. The sacrifices his people endured did not bring victory to the Great Cause; it maimed and ruined it.

If Plato were able to journey to our world from the cave of history, he would lament the work his *Republic* has wrought. The achievements of Stalin's regime were not the ones he envisaged. He would return to his cave, his eyes glazed with defeat, his form bent by the force of history's rebuke. Plato had penned his *Republic* intending to show that the rule of the philosopher-king would bring to being the perfect society; Joseph Stalin has proven him wrong.

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- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 33-34.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 38.
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- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 39-40.
- ¹⁰ Lesley Brown, "How Totalitarian Is Plato's *Republic*?", in *Essays on Plato's "Republic"*, ed. Erik Nis Ostenfeld (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1998), 13-14.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 14.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
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- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 77.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 62.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 63.
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The Centrality of Neutrality: The Significance of Austria's Geostrategic Location in the Heart of Europe

Mandy Oleson

On 15 May 1955 at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna, the Austrian government and the four occupying powers of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States signed the Austrian State Treaty, ending ten years of foreign occupation. This act came at the height of the Cold War and procured the first withdrawal of troops by the Soviet Union from territory it had conquered in World War II. At the conclusion of war in 1945, the Allied forces marched into Austria with the Soviet Red Army occupying the eastern portion of the country and British, French, and American troops taking control of the western areas. An Allied Commission for Austria was established to administer the country, in conjunction with a democratically elected Austrian government. As early as 1946 discussions concerning the future of Austria had begun among the Allies, when the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) created a committee of deputies to work on drafting a treaty.¹ In the course of the ten-year occupation, there were several moments when the signing of a treaty appeared imminent but failed prior to 1955. Between 1953 and 1955, political changes in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Austria produced various shifts in foreign policy that in turn cultivated fertile ground for the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. During this period, the confluence of internal politics and external events also influenced policy decisions, particularly in the Soviet Union. Thus the Austrian State Treaty was signed in 1955 because the Kremlin leaders decided to drive a wedge between NATO's northern and southern flanks. By stipulating that a Soviet signature would require a post-treaty Austrian declaration of neutrality, Moscow was able to create a geographical division of NATO countries in the heart of Europe.

In examining the various reasons why the Austrian State Treaty was signed and who the key figures were historians have posited an array of arguments. The historiography on the Austrian State Treaty breaks down into three main categories: an American, a Soviet, and an Austrian angle. This does not mean that the historians necessarily fall into these categories based upon nationality or that the boundaries between these categories are solid. The historians instead argue the importance of the actors and events based on the role of the Americans, Soviets, or Austrians in creating the Austrian State Treaty. There is also a gray area for some historians, who do not restrict themselves to emphasizing only one political aspect, but recognize that the Austrian treaty required a concerted effort on behalf of the countries involved.

One school of historiography focuses on the role of the Americans in the negotiations. Stephen E. Ambrose, one of the leading biographers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, significantly emphasizes the President's role in the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Ambrose lauds Eisenhower as "the western leader most

responsible for the restoration of Austrian freedom.² He bases this assessment on the power of the President in the negotiation process. In Ambrose's analysis, "when Eisenhower stepped forward and offered a deal - a summit³ for Austria's freedom - the troika [Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Zhukov] overcame their reluctance and on May 15, 1955, signed the Austrian treaty."⁴ While Eisenhower, as leader of the United States, undoubtedly played a role in the signing of the Austrian treaty, Ambrose takes a very narrow view of the treaty negotiations. He focuses on the top level of American power, thus excluding key figures and events from the Soviet and Austrian sides, as well as other American negotiators.

Frederick W. Marks III shares Ambrose's view that a successful solution to the treaty depended on the policy decisions of great American men. Marks, however, emphasizes a different Washington policymaker from the 1950s. As a biographer of John Foster Dulles, he credits the Secretary of State with pushing the treaty toward a positive conclusion for both the Americans and the Austrians. Where Ambrose writes, "Eisenhower's most enduring foreign policy contributions were a free Austria,"⁵ Marks counters with "even to this day, the most astute observers of the Eisenhower presidency still find it difficult to say who was at the helm of American foreign policy from 1953 to 1959."⁶ Marks contends that "Dulles has never received as much as half the recognition he deserves for his role in obtaining the Austrian State Treaty."⁷ He credits Dulles' hard bargaining and delay tactics with the Soviets for producing the treaty.⁸ Marks even uses the anecdote that Dulles "ordered his plane readied for the trip home"⁹ should the Soviets not reduce their demands on the day the treaty was scheduled to be signed. While Marks certainly brings the contributions of Secretary of State Dulles to the forefront, he, too, neglects the work of the Soviets and Austrians in negotiating the treaty. In referring to Dulles' "eleventh-hour triumph . . . [as] the evacuation of the Red Armies from Austria,"¹⁰ Marks ignores the fact that when the Viennese crowds came to cheer the signing of the treaty, they were also celebrating the newly achieved independence of their country, which included the withdrawal of American troops.¹¹ Marks' and Ambroses' analyses of Dulles and Eisenhower give a one-sided, American-centered account of the factors influencing the formation of the Austrian State Treaty. Their interpretations have most likely been influenced by their bias toward their subjects and the role that they feel these men played in shaping the world.

The second major category in the historiography debate on the treaty looks at the role of the Soviet leaders and their motives for ending the occupation of Austria. The Czech historian Vojtech Mastny is one of the strongest proponents in support of the Soviet contribution to the treaty. In his article, in which he refers to the Soviets as the "Godfathers of Austrian Neutrality", Mastny argues that "Austrian neutrality originated in Moscow. The 1955 State Treaty, which made neutrality possible, could only come about because the key Soviet leaders had changed their mind, and finally approved of a neutral status for Austria."¹² He remarks that the Soviets blocked progress on the treaty negotiations because they refused to separate the German and Austrian question. As Mastny notes, however, "making the Austrian settlement contingent upon the prior solution of the German question, and thus postponing both solutions indefinitely, was integral to that Stalinist tactic, whose obsolescence became clear by late 1954."¹³ By 1954 the stage was set for West Germany's integration into

NATO,¹⁴ and Mastny argues that Soviet concerns about the expansion of NATO led them to seek the Austrian State Treaty. By signing a treaty in return for Austrian neutrality, the Soviets initiated "political developments calculated to diminish the cold war's military dimensions."¹⁵ He also credits Khrushchev with developing this plan to counteract Western military expansion.¹⁶ Finally, Mastny recognizes the Austrians and the surprising negotiating power they displayed at the bilateral talks in Moscow.¹⁷ The majority of his article, however, centers on Soviet motives for signing the treaty. His emphasis on the Soviet Union comes perhaps from his Czech background and the experience of living in a Soviet satellite state, where nothing seemed to happen without prior Kremlin approval.

Gerald Stourzh, an Austrian historian, responds to Mastny's analysis with the argument: "If the Soviets were the godfathers, there was also a godmother, in the unlikely person of John Foster Dulles."¹⁸ Stourzh credits the American Secretary of State for his proposal at the Berlin CFM in 1954, where he suggested that the Western powers would support a neutral Austria on the Swiss model. He then notes that "this became the Soviets' most persuasive argument in their bilateral talks with the Austrians in Moscow in April 1955."¹⁹ In emphasizing Dulles' suggestion, Stourzh refutes Mastny's claim that the Soviets were responsible for Austrian neutrality. The Soviets instead used the Dulles proposal to negotiate with the Austrians during their bilateral talks in Moscow. While Stourzh credits Dulles with playing an important role in the formation of Austrian neutrality, unlike Marks he also recognizes the Austrian initiative in turning to the Kremlin leaders for bilateral talks "with a purpose of de-blocking the State Treaty issue."²⁰ Stourzh is quick to point out, however, that "the non-solution of the Austrian question in 1953 or 1954, and its solution in 1955 depended less on the lesser or greater weight of Austrian 'leverage,'²¹ and more on different power constellations and policy determinations in the Kremlin."²² Stourzh's ultimate analysis coincides with Mastny's interpretation of the political motive behind the Soviet signature on the treaty: "What was most essential . . . was the world wide attempt to push back American influence with political rather than military means . . ."²³ While Stourzh provides a more balanced view of the contributors to the Austrian treaty, he leaves no doubt that without Soviet consent there would not have been a treaty in 1955.

Another Austrian historian, Michael Gehler, provides a different perspective on the motives of the Soviet Union in signing the Austrian State Treaty. Gehler remarks that "for Kremlin decision makers the withdrawal of occupation forces from the Soviet zone of Austria was designed to send a strong signal for initiating East-West detente in general and solve the German question in particular."²⁴ He, too, emphasizes West Germany's impending membership into NATO as a key factor in the decision by Soviet leaders to withdraw from Austria. Gehler argues that the Kremlin wanted to use Austria to create an alternative example for the Germans. "Even though the Paris Agreements of October 1954 had been signed, they still were up for ratification in the national parliaments in the spring of 1955. With the Austrian model for the German question, Kremlin diplomacy hoped to derail the ratification process."²⁵ The Soviets hoped to lure the Germans away from Western integration and toward unification and neutrality on the Austrian model. Gehler notes, however, that Austria succeeded because "unlike the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria did

not put its faith in the hands of other powers but negotiated with Moscow on its own."²⁶ The Austrian government took a chance in going to Moscow for bilateral talks, but "the courage to take risks paid off: Austria became independent and free."²⁷ Gehler recognizes that while the Soviets intended to use the Austrian treaty in a wider diplomatic context, the Austrians were the ultimate beneficiaries of Soviet policy. Since Gehler looks at multiple factors influencing the formation of the treaty, he provides a fairly balanced analysis.

Even though he is an American historian writing in the mid-1960s, William Bader also looks at the impact of Soviet policy on the Austrian State Treaty. Bader notes that "after the death of Stalin in 1953, the style of the Soviet Union's holding action in Austria changed noticeably" but the changes "did not mean that in 1953 Russia was willing to withdraw."²⁸ While Stalin's death altered Soviet actions with regard to Austria, Bader also recognizes that the Berlin CFM in 1954 indicated that the Soviet leaders were not yet ready to negotiate solely over Austria but that they intended to link the Austrian question together with that of Germany.²⁹ "Not a year later, however, came the volte-face of February 8, 1955,³⁰ and the door was opened to an Austrian settlement . . ."³¹ Bader acknowledges the significance of this event in the broader context of Soviet strategy and considers the Austrian treaty to be part of Khrushchev's larger plan to initiate East-West détente.³² In a further analysis of Soviet policy, Bader also looks at the Soviet signature on the treaty as attempting to create a model for other European countries. He remarks that "the most compelling justifications for Khrushchev's action, however, . . . [was] a long-term calculation that the Austrian settlement would serve as a model - an inducement for some to accept demilitarization, for others to point up the advantages of staying out of military alliances."³³ Bader's analysis also critiques Dulles and the American role in the treaty, noting that "in the Austrian case the United States only grudgingly came to accept the idea of neutrality."³⁴ Bader, however, does not give the Austrians any credit for their involvement in seeking a treaty. Writing against the background of the Cold War perhaps biased Bader's interpretation of the conflict as primarily influenced by the two superpowers.

Writing twenty years after Bader, Audrey Kurth Cronin is unique as an American historian because she addresses the role of the Austrians in her study. She reaches the same conclusion as Bader, however, on the importance of Stalin's death. In her assessment, the death of the Soviet leader not only brought power changes in the Kremlin but also foreign policy changes, particularly concerning the occupation of Austria.³⁵ Cronin notes, however, that even in the wake of the power changes, "the disagreement over Austria's future often had little to do with Austria itself and much more to do with the course of the Cold War."³⁶ Cronin emphasizes, as other historians also have, that Austria is part of the broader issue of the Western integration of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Soviets refused to separate the two questions. Her hypothesis is that "had Soviet threats concerning the future of Austria succeeded in putting off German rearmament, the Austrian State Treaty would probably not have been signed in May 1955."³⁷ Cronin thus minimizes the role of the Western powers in favor of the importance of Soviet decisions. "Internal Soviet considerations and events outside Austria" played a larger part in the signing of the treaty than any of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western

Allies.³⁸ In her analysis, the key figure in the Soviet decision-making process was Nikita Khrushchev, who intended "to use the treaty to initiate an East-West détente in Europe."³⁹ Cronin also addresses the role of the Austrian government in the negotiations. "Although Austria never controlled its own fate, in the early 1950s the Austrians occasionally exercised a leverage with respect to the Western powers which was out of proportion to the small country's strength."⁴⁰

The Austrian historian Günter Bischof's assessment of the role the Austrians played in procuring their own freedom forms the final category of historiography. Bischof's argument for the importance of the Austrians in negotiating their own independence begins with the death of Stalin and "his successors [who] signalled a departure of post-Stalinist foreign policy towards 'peaceful coexistence'."⁴¹ This change prompted Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab to test "the Soviets in bilateral contacts to explore the meaning of 'peaceful coexistence' for Austria."⁴² Bischof then credits Raab with proposing "neutrality as a means of getting rid of the occupation powers."⁴³ In Bischof's analysis, Khrushchev's willingness to negotiate with the Austrians in Moscow was merely "the culmination of Raab's bilateral diplomacy."⁴⁴ Thus, Bischof's conclusion is that "Austria's risky diplomacy and hard-won independence in 1955 demonstrated to the world that the weak had leverage in the Cold War."⁴⁵ Bischof regards as necessary Austria's initiative on the matter of bilateral negotiations to achieve a treaty because the Western powers were slow in reacting to the Soviets. He criticizes American foreign policy, noting that "Eisenhower refused to negotiate with the Kremlin leadership, let alone meet them on the summit level to test the sincerity of their peace offensive."⁴⁶ Without the Austrians, Bischof's argument indicates that there may not have been a treaty in 1955.

In the introduction to his book, Günter Bischof discusses the recent changes in Cold War scholarship. He notes that new historiography largely looks at new sources, including German language scholarship and the mostly untapped archival sources in Moscow.⁴⁷ This shift in historiography occurs in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the fall of Communism across Europe. Bishop also criticizes "traditional American Cold War scholarship [that] has largely ignored Austria as an important case study contributing to the origins of the Cold War and aggravating East-West conflict."⁴⁸ Stephen Ambrose and Frederick Marks fall into this classification. They barely touch on the role of Austria in the Cold War, and when they do, it is only to praise their subjects (Eisenhower and Dulles) for solving the Austrian question. They are looking at the bigger picture of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and the role of great men in shaping it, which ignores the role and impact of the smaller state. The American historian Bader, writing in the mid-1960s, also falls into the same trap by leaving the Austrian leaders out of his analysis of Soviet and American actions in treaty negotiations. At the height of Cold War tensions, it might have been easy to overlook those states that were not members of a military security pact.

The other historians, who have tried to touch upon multiple factors in their assessment of the formation of the treaty, generally have a European background and are writing near or after the end of the Cold War. The fall of Communism, in which the satellite states in Eastern Europe broke away from the Soviet Union, undoubtedly contributed to a new type of historiography on the Austrian State Treaty as well.

Those newly liberated countries demonstrated that smaller states can have an impact on their future. The Austrian historian Bischof writes from this perspective but probably takes his assessment the farthest by crediting the Austrians with attaining their treaty. While he currently lives in the United States, his Austrian background has perhaps led him to overemphasize the importance of the Austrians. Stourzh and Cronin, who is the lone American to examine the Austrian role, provide a more balanced view, recognizing that without the Austrian initiative, the lull in treaty negotiations may very well have continued. Their assessment that the power to make a decision on Austria was always with the Soviets is perhaps most legitimate.

The varying arguments of these historians indicate that one event can produce a myriad of interpretations. The range of scholarship also demonstrates, as Bischof noted, that the study of history changes with time. Traditionally, the Cold War meant the superpower struggle between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The conflict brought the superpowers to confrontation and led them to the brink of nuclear destruction. The two sides engaged in an ideological fight intended to win, or when necessary force, converts into their camp. There was no supposed gray area in this fight: It was East versus West. What, however, did this superpower confrontation of the Cold War mean for the smaller states? What sort of impact did it have on those countries not strong enough to join the fray as superpowers? For Korea, it divided the country in 1953 along the 38th Parallel. In 1954, it meant the existence of two Germanys. For Europe, it partitioned a continent from the Baltic to the Black Seas. Yet on this line, or "iron curtain"⁴⁹ as Winston Churchill first called it, there was a country that somehow remained unified without officially joining either side. Austria, decimated by two world wars and constituting the rump state of the once mighty Habsburg Empire, found a gray area between East and West and maintained the territorial sovereignty of its land. The foundation for this Austrian achievement was military neutrality and the act that paved the way for it was the Austrian State Treaty of 1955.

The treaty was signed in 1955 because the Kremlin leaders decided to drive a wedge between NATO's northern and southern flanks. By stipulating that a Soviet signature would require a post-treaty Austrian declaration of neutrality, Moscow was able to create a geographical division of NATO countries in the heart of Europe. Between 1953 and 1955, treaty negotiations followed an unstable course of peaks and valleys leading to the final signature. During this time, there were four critical moments: the power changes of 1953 in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Austria; John Foster Dulles' statement on a suitable neutrality at the Berlin CFM in 1954; the growing influence of Nikita S. Khrushchev in early 1955; and the Austrian acceptance of the Soviet invitation to Moscow for bilateral talks in the spring of 1955. Two events external to the Austrian issue were also important. These included the expansion of NATO to incorporate the Federal Republic of Germany and the creation of the Warsaw Pact, both of which occurred in early May 1955. In this atmosphere, which sharpened the lines between East and West, Austria found a third option.

While the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 was still more than two years away, the first quarter of 1953 had a tremendous impact on the future of Austria. In January, Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Harry S. Truman and became the thirty-fourth President of the United States. The new Republican President had been

in the White House little more than a month when Austria also elected a new government on 22 February 1953.⁵⁰ While this election did not alter the coalition between the People's Party and the Socialists, it did bring about the appointment of a new chancellor. Julius Raab from the People's Party replaced fellow party member Leopold Figl at the head of the Austrian government. Llewelyn Thompson, the United States High Commissioner for Austria, commented on Raab's selection: "There is no doubt that Raab will give stronger leadership and his designation will satisfy the strong PP [People's Party] feeling of need for a change."⁵¹ In 1955, Raab would assert his leadership and prove Thompson correct.

The most important political change, however, came out of Moscow. On 5 March 1953, the death of Joseph Stalin ushered in a new era for the Soviet Union. An American diplomatic official in Moscow sent a telegram to Washington, relaying the new distribution of power in the Kremlin. Georgii Malenkov would be the government and party leader, Lavrentii Beria would run security, Vyacheslav Molotov would oversee foreign policy, and Nikolai Bulganin would handle army affairs.⁵² The name of Nikita Khrushchev was, in hindsight, conspicuously absent from this list. As President Eisenhower noted in his memoirs, U.S. intelligence believed that the new Soviet leadership would be a "government by committee."⁵³ The era of dominance by a single person was over in the Kremlin.

On 15 March 1953, Malenkov gave a speech designed to reflect the new look in the Kremlin through an innovative approach to foreign policy. In addressing the Supreme Soviet, "Malenkov spoke briefly on foreign policy matters and included the following statement: 'At present there is no disputed or unsolved question which could not be settled by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of the countries concerned. This concerns our relations with all states, including the United States of America.'"⁵⁴ Malenkov's speech presented a change in Soviet foreign policy commonly referred to as "peaceful coexistence." Instead of confrontation, the Soviets were looking to lessen the tensions of the Cold War. This speech seemed to indicate that where conflict existed the leaders in the Kremlin were willing to compromise to reach a solution to the problem. Malenkov's offer was clear: this included the United States.

The American reaction to the Soviet initiative was less than enthusiastic, however. On 16 April 1953, President Eisenhower responded to Malenkov and the Soviets with a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors entitled "The Chance for Peace." Eisenhower invoked the unified spirit of April 1945, but remarked that "this common purpose lasted an instant and perished. The nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads."⁵⁵ Instead of offering to meet the Soviets at the negotiating table to bridge this gap, the President chose instead to challenge the Kremlin leadership. Among his comments, he acknowledged Malenkov's proposal with this reply: "We welcome every honest act of peace. We care nothing for mere rhetoric. We are only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds."⁵⁶ Eisenhower spelled out one of those deeds as "the Soviet Union's signature upon an Austrian treaty."⁵⁷ The indication from the United States was that the Soviet proposal for peace would have to take a more concrete form; words would not suffice.⁵⁸

In spite of Eisenhower's remarks, however, the United States did initiate contact with the Soviets over the possibility of treaty negotiations. In May of 1953, "the

Secretary General of the treaty deputies . . . called for a meeting to be held at London on May 27.⁵⁹ The Soviet Union turned down this offer for a meeting on the grounds that only the Council of Foreign Ministers and not the deputies had the power to call a meeting. They also noted that the deputies had been meeting since 1947 with no conclusive result and thus another round of meetings would also prove unproductive.⁶⁰ In the course of the summer and early autumn of 1953 the Soviets offered many excuses for attending neither a deputies conference nor a foreign ministers conference.⁶¹ This stance directly contradicted Malenkov's speech and the supposed peace initiative of the new Soviet foreign policy. The Kremlin leaders weakened their argument in favor of mutual conflict resolution when they would not even come to the bargaining table.

One reason for Moscow's refusal to meet with Western leaders hinged on an issue known as the "short treaty." In March 1952 and without consulting the Soviets, the Americans, British, and French submitted an abbreviated version of the state treaty to the Kremlin. This treaty was to replace the long draft of 1949, upon which the four occupying powers had agreed outside of a few points.⁶² After reviewing this treaty, the Kremlin made it clear that future progress on Austria required the "withdrawal of the proposal re[garding] the so-called 'abbreviated treaty.'"⁶³ At the time of American willingness to meet in 1953 to work on the Austrian State Treaty, the "short treaty" remained the official submission of the Western powers. The Soviets reiterated their concern over the "short treaty" and again emphasized the withdrawal of this treaty as the grounds for resuming negotiations.⁶⁴ The United States indicated "that they were prepared to accept any treaty which would insure Austria's political and economic independence."⁶⁵ Yet the "short treaty" was not officially withdrawn until November 1953.⁶⁶ Neither side of this confrontation was without reproach in their tactics for creating an atmosphere ill-suited for negotiations. Once various obstacles were overcome, however, the four occupying powers and Austria met in Berlin in the winter of 1954 for discussions pertaining to the signing of an Austrian State Treaty.

From 25 January until 18 February 1954, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Berlin for their first conference in five years. The secretaries and ministers of foreign affairs from Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States were in attendance. On the first day that the CFM convened to discuss the issue of Austria, the Austrians also submitted a request to participate, which was subsequently granted. The significant figures at the Berlin Conference were the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, and the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Figl.⁶⁷ In honoring Molotov's request, the Austrian State Treaty was the third item on the agenda, with the issue of a five-power CFM and the German question taking first and second priority respectively.⁶⁸ As a result of this agenda, the discussions concerning Austria first occurred on 12 February. Despite the lack of productivity in the earlier portion of the conference, Dulles expressed optimism regarding the Austrian issue: "We are here today in a meeting which may have historic consequences. From it may come the kind of accomplishment which the whole world has been expecting of this conference; but which after nearly three weeks has not yet been forthcoming."⁶⁹

On the first day of meetings dealing with Austria, however, Molotov presented the committee with a set of new Soviet proposals that essentially blocked any further

progress in Berlin for concluding an Austrian State Treaty. Two components from these proposals brought about strong opposition from the Western powers and Austria. These included a provision "in the text of the State Treaty with Austria [of] the following additional article: 'Austria undertakes not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Germany and in the liberation of Austria. Austria undertakes further not to permit the establishment on its territory of foreign military bases and not to permit the use of foreign military instructors and specialists in Austria.'⁷⁰ The other noteworthy Soviet suggestion linked the withdrawal of troops from Austria to a peace treaty between Germany and the former Allied Powers. In defense of these changes to the previous draft of the state treaty, the Soviet Union argued that they were protecting Austria from "a new Anschluss."⁷¹ The Russians' concern was that "in the absence of a German peace treaty no satisfactory guarantees are possible against resurgence of West German militarism."⁷² Molotov manipulated the Soviet concern regarding the status of Germany to overshadow the discussions on Austria.

These proposals were not well received by the Western powers and Austria. In a top-secret memo from Dulles to Eisenhower, the Secretary of State communicated to the President that "Molotov's presentation last night regarding Austria seemed to destroy [the] last lingering hope of any substantial agreement here. It turned the clock back on Austria and cut [the] heart out of proposed treaty by providing for indefinite Soviet occupation so that treaty would not be treaty of liberation but of servitude."⁷³ In arguing Austria's opposition to the Soviet proposals, Foreign Minister Figl noted that the "principal problem is to end occupation [of] Austria."⁷⁴ The French Minister of Foreign Affairs also articulated several concerns on behalf of the Western powers. These included linking the Austrian solution to a German peace treaty, which would only further damage Austria through continued financial support of the occupation forces and which would inhibit the independence of the country. He noted as well that article 4 of the treaty already prohibited a future Anschluss.⁷⁵

The most important and perhaps most eloquent argument against the Soviet suggestions came from Secretary of State Dulles. In addressing the Soviet desire for including in the treaty a statement that would prohibit the Austrians from joining any military alliances or allowing foreign military bases on their soil, Dulles countered with a plan for the neutrality of Austria that would be acceptable to the Western powers. He criticized the Soviets for insisting that these clauses for the neutralization of Austria be included in the wording of the treaty itself, and instead offered this interpretation:

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she had achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian state treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss nation.

However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral and it is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.⁷⁶

While the remainder of the conference produced little or no progress on an Austrian State Treaty, Dulles' rebuttal of the Soviet method for neutralizing Austria laid the foundation for an eventual treaty and subsequent declaration of neutrality by the Austrians. Molotov's proposals, however, stalled treaty talks for the remainder of 1954.

As evidenced by his demands at the Berlin Conference, Molotov's foreign policy did not follow the more compromising approach presented by Malenkov in the spring of 1953. In his memoirs, Molotov acknowledged that in his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs after Stalin's death he operated very independently, but "within the limits of . . . [his] instructions."⁷⁷ This last statement seems to indicate that the other leaders in the Kremlin had sanctioned Molotov's hard-line policies, yet his self-styled independence when dealing with matters of foreign policy brought him into conflict with the rising Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Molotov did not support the Soviet slogan of "peaceful coexistence," believing that it undermined the teachings of Marx and Lenin. He argued rather that Communism meant the "overthrow of imperialism"⁷⁸ and this could not be achieved through a policy of "peaceful coexistence." Molotov believed that "war is inevitable as long as imperialism exists."⁷⁹ Thus for him, "peaceful coexistence" was an empty phrase because its meaning was the antithesis to war, and only war could bring peace.⁸⁰

At the beginning of 1955, however, Khrushchev had begun to consolidate his power as first secretary of the Central Committee and leader of the Presidium of the Central Committee.⁸¹ Khrushchev's control over Kremlin politics marked the transformation of "peaceful coexistence" from theory to policy. Khrushchev and the implementation of "peaceful coexistence" were the spark for a solution to the Austrian question.⁸² In his memoirs, Khrushchev remarked on the hypocrisy of pursuing "peaceful coexistence" while keeping Soviet troops in Austria: "We were increasing our efforts on behalf of peaceful coexistence, and we were seeking the withdrawal of troops by other countries that occupied foreign territories. Yet our troops were in Austria."⁸³ He also acknowledged that this policy of continued occupation came from Stalin and Molotov and was continued after Stalin's death by Molotov.⁸⁴ Khrushchev "felt that . . . [the Soviet Union] needed to be done with the matter of Austria. As minister of foreign affairs, Molotov was not taking any initiative on it."⁸⁵ Thus Khrushchev approached Molotov with the argument that if the Soviets were not preparing for war, then there was no purpose in keeping troops in Austria.⁸⁶ Based on this assessment, which was founded on "peaceful coexistence," the Soviets began preparations to renew negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty.

At the beginning of 1955 the Soviets made public their new intentions regarding Austria. The historian Audrey Kurth Cronin noted that "the surprising Soviet about-face on Austria was announced by Molotov himself on 8 February 1955, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet. . . . Molotov announced that the Soviet Union would consider signing an Austrian treaty even without a German peace treaty, provided that there was a firm guarantee against Anschluss and that a conference on both Germany and Austria be convened without delay."⁸⁷ While the Soviets were finally willing to separate the German and Austrian questions, the American government viewed Molotov's speech with a great deal of suspicion. They were wary of the hidden undertones regarding Germany and believed that the Kremlin was actually

looking for a reason to bring the Western powers to the negotiating table in order to address the issue of Germany. The American fear in the immediate aftermath of Molotov's speech was that the Soviets wanted to use Austria as a pretext to block the rearmament and military integration of West Germany into NATO.⁸⁸

Throughout the course of nearly ten years of negotiations over Austria, the German issue persistently overshadowed and delayed a solution to the Austrian problem. The Soviets made Germany a catch-22 for solving the Austrian question. In October 1954, however, the Kremlin was suddenly faced with the very real prospect that West Germany would join NATO, which would bring the country definitively into the Western fold and facilitate rearmament. The Paris agreements, signed on 23 October, laid the foundation for German integration into NATO.⁸⁹ All that was needed was the ratification of the accords for them to take effect. Once ratification occurred, the Soviet Union would be faced with NATO directly at the border of its communist satellites. Thus the United States distrusted the Soviet initiative on Austria for fear that the ulterior motive of the Kremlin was to delay ratification through a four-power conference.⁹⁰

While the United States could refuse to meet with the Soviet Union until after ratification of the Paris agreements, they could not stop the Austrians from accepting the Soviet invitation for bilateral talks in Moscow. On 24 March Molotov replied to an Austrian memorandum, which had been written in response to his speech, and "mentioned . . . that the Soviet Government would welcome a visit of the Austrian Chancellor and other officials in the near future."⁹¹ Prior to Austrian acceptance of Molotov's invitation, Secretary of State Dulles indicated that the United States would not stop an Austrian delegation from engaging in bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. He noted, however, "that he assumes Chancellor Raab would not go to Moscow under the impression that he could speak for the U.S."⁹² The Austrians could go to the Kremlin with American approval but without authorization to conclude a treaty.

The stance of the American government had changed drastically since 1953 when the Austrians had previously attempted to enter into bilateral negotiations with the Soviets. In his memoirs, Bruno Kreisky, who was the state secretary under Raab, related the Austrian attempt in the summer of 1953 to broach the subject of neutrality with the Soviets. As Kreisky recollected, "Karl Gruber, our foreign minister at the time, met with Pandit Nehru. Raab had expressly authorized Gruber to ask the Indian Prime Minister for mediation in Moscow. The Indian diplomat Menon reported a little later that Molotov declared it was not enough."⁹³ Not only did Molotov reject the Austrian proposal, but the Austrians also had to face American displeasure at Austro-Soviet contacts. Llewelyn Thompson met with Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Gruber to express the dissatisfaction of the United States, stating "that whatever intention Gruber approach to Nehru, . . . fact it was made without informing US very disturbing, particularly reference by Indian Ambassador to neutrality which might make Soviets think they had only to press for this in order [to] obtain it."⁹⁴ Thompson also indicated in his report that he made the Austrians aware of their "duty to consult with US before making any move concerning her future."⁹⁵ By 1955, however, the stringency of the American position had slightly abated, and the United States was willing to approve bilateral talks between the Austrians and Soviets.

Thus from 12 to 15 April, delegations from both Austria and the Soviet Union met in Moscow in order to facilitate agreement between the two countries on certain issues pertaining to an Austrian State Treaty. On 15 April, they issued a joint memorandum outlining the results of their discussions.⁹⁶ From the Austrian side, the delegation of Chancellor Raab, Vice Chancellor Schärff, Foreign Minister Figl, and State Secretary Kreisky, clarified their intentions regarding neutrality. In the memorandum, the Austrians referred back to the Berlin Conference of 1954 and noted that Austria would not join any military alliances or allow foreign military bases on their territory and that they would "practice . . . a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland."⁹⁷ The Austrians went on to stipulate that the declaration of neutrality would come from an act of parliament following the signing of the treaty.⁹⁸ At the Berlin CFM, talks broke down partly because the Soviets had insisted that this declaration of neutrality should be included in the treaty itself. Thus, the Soviets appeared to have backed down on at least one of their previous demands.

A second significant change to the Soviet stance came in their portion of the memorandum. The Soviet delegation of Molotov and Mikhoyan reversed their insistence, made at the Berlin CFM, that occupation troops should remain in Austria until a peace treaty with Germany was signed. Instead, they now proffered an "agreement that all occupation troops of the four powers be withdrawn from Austria after the entry into force of the State Treaty, no later than on the 31st of December 1955."⁹⁹ In the span of just four days, the Kremlin reversed its policy on two key points of contention and stated that "the Soviet Government is prepared to sign the Austrian State Treaty without delay."¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union then issued a call for a new CFM to be held between the four occupying powers and Austria to reach a solution "for the restoration of an independent, democratic Austria."¹⁰¹

The Soviet proposal for a meeting to sign the Austrian State Treaty met with a positive reaction in the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France. While noting that agreement on certain issues was still needed, the Western powers suggested "that the Ambassadors together with Austrian representatives should meet in Vienna on 2 May. As soon as the necessary preparations have been completed, the earliest practicable date should then be set for the Foreign Ministers to meet and sign the treaty."¹⁰² As a result of the Soviet-Austrian talks in April and the subsequent correspondence between the occupying powers, the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference was held from 2 May to 15 May, on which date the Austrian State Treaty was finally signed.

In a report to the President, Secretary of State Dulles viewed the treaty as a success because Austria would be "a sovereign, independent, and democratic State."¹⁰³ In addition to the previous Soviets concessions regarding an Austrian declaration of neutrality rather than an inclusion of neutrality in the treaty and the withdrawal of occupation troops by the end of 1955 at the latest, the Soviets also compromised on several other political and economic issues. The Soviets had agreed to delete from the treaty stipulations that would have restricted the size of an Austrian army. They also acquiesced on important economic issues, including the return of "extensive oil and shipping properties, other business and industrial enterprises and agricultural lands." In addition, "the Austrian Government . . . agreed to compensate the Soviet Government for the properties thus relinquished" in exchange for "\$150 million in

goods.¹⁰⁴ As described here, the treaty satisfied practically all of the Western demands. Why, therefore, did the Soviet Union sign the Austrian State Treaty? What practical advantage did they see in their compromise with the Western powers?

When the Soviets invited the Austrians to Moscow for bilateral talks, American diplomatic officials asked the same type of questions. Why were the Soviets doing this? What did they hope to achieve? Charles Bohlen, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union offered a possible reason for the Soviet initiative. He believed "that [the] chief immediate motivation of [the] Soviets in reopening [the] Austrian question is to endeavor to insure neutralization of Austria in order to prevent military integration [of] three Western zones of Austria into NATO . . ." ¹⁰⁵ In early May 1955, two events external to the Austrian issue demonstrated that Bohlen's assessment in April was the most plausible explanation behind the Soviet motivation for signing the Austrian State Treaty.

The two events were the integration of Germany into NATO on 5 May 1955 and the formation of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955. The first event directly precipitated the second as elaborated in the preamble to the Warsaw Pact, which stated that "the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, . . . increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of the peaceloving states, . . ." ¹⁰⁶ By signing the Austrian State Treaty with the stipulation that Austria would then declare neutrality, the Soviet Union could protect against Western Austria also following the West German example and militarily integrating with Western Europe. ¹⁰⁷ Not only would this prevent Austria from military joining the West, but through Austrian neutrality the Soviets could also drive a wedge between NATO's northern and southern flanks because Austria would divide Germany from Italy. In the event of armed hostilities between the countries in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the geographical position of Austria in the heart of Europe would force a strategic break in the NATO defense line. Thus in giving up Austria, the Soviets were hoping to gain a geostrategic advantage should the Cold War ever turn hot.

Throughout treaty negotiations, the Soviet refusal to resolve the Austrian question without a prior solution for Germany continually delayed progress on Austria. Ironically, however, the remilitarization of West Germany suddenly forced the Soviets to act on Austria. The Soviet signature on the treaty was only possible, however, in light of earlier events, particularly from 1953 to 1955. Stalin's death in 1953 shuffled power in the Soviet Union and produced a collective style of leadership among his successors. As a result, Soviet policy did not always follow the purported Soviet theory. This was most evident at the Berlin CFM in 1954, when Molotov's demands blocked any further progress in the negotiations. Khrushchev's consolidation of power, however, forced Molotov to support the new Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," which entailed making certain concessions in order to reduce the tension between East and West. As a result, the Soviets renewed contacts, first with the Austrians and then with the other occupying powers, that ultimately led to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Moreover, had the Austrians, and particularly Chancellor Raab, not been willing to take the risk of going to Moscow alone to discuss the treaty with the Kremlin leaders, the subsequent meeting of the four powers and Austria may well have been further postponed.¹⁰⁸ Finally, John

Foster Dulles has to be given credit for defining a form of Austrian neutrality that would be acceptable to the Western powers. In the end it was this suggestion of neutrality that the Soviets used to take advantage of Austria's geostrategic location to drive a wedge between the NATO countries in Central Europe.

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- ² Stephen E. Ambrose, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1950s," in *Contemporary Austrian Studies*, ed. Erich Thöni, et al., vol. 3, *Austria in the Nineteen Fifties*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 21.
- ³ Ambrose is referring to the Geneva Summit, which took place in July 1955.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.
- ⁶ Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 19.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, xi.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 52-54.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 54.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, x.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 55.
- ¹² Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Godfathers of Austrian Neutrality," in *Contemporary Austrian Studies*, ed. Günter Bischof, et al., vol. 9, *Neutrality in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 240.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 241.

- ¹⁴ The Paris Agreements of 1954 paved the way for German rearmament and Western integration through membership in NATO.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 243.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 245.
- ¹⁸ Gerald Stourzh, "Reply to the Commentators," in *Contemporary Austrian Studies*, ed. Günter Bischof, et al., vol. 9, *Neutrality in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 278.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 279.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 284.
- ²¹ With this comment, Stourzh is critiquing the thesis of Günter Bischof, which will be addressed later in the paper.
- ²² Ibid., 285.
- ²³ Ibid., 282.
- ²⁴ Michael Gehler, "State Treaty and Neutrality: The Austrian Solution in 1955 as a 'Model' for Germany?," in *Contemporary Austrian Studies*, ed. Erich Thöni, et al., vol. 3, *Austria in the Nineteen Fifties*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 39.
- ²⁵ Gehler, "State Treaty," 39.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 65.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ William B. Bader, *Austria Between East and West 1945-1955* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), 199.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 199-200.
- ³⁰ Molotov made a speech announcing that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate solely over Austria.
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- ³² Ibid., 202.
- ³³ Ibid., 205.
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- ³⁶ Ibid., 21.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 160-61.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 161.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 166.
- ⁴¹ Bischof, *Austria*, 130.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 131.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 135.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁹ Modern History Sourcebook, "Winston S. Churchill: 'Iron Curtain Speech', March 5, 1946"; available from <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.html>; Internet; accessed 18 November 2002.

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⁵³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1956* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 148.

⁵⁴ *FRUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. VIII, 1181.

⁵⁵ U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958-1961), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, 180.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 184.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ For a similar interpretation see Bischof, *Austria*, 137.

⁵⁹ U.S. Department of State, "New Meeting of Austrian Treaty Deputies," in *The Department of State Bulletin XXVIII*, no. 726 (May 25, 1953): 751.

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⁶⁶ *FRUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. VII, Part 2, 1939.

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⁶⁹ Ibid., 1066.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 1194.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 1064.

⁷³ Ibid., 1076.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 1084.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 1083.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 1088-89.

⁷⁷ Albert Resis, ed., *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 67.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 388.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 332.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyachslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 76.

⁸² For historiography on the role of Khrushchev, see above p. 4-5 and 8-10.

⁸³ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, 74.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 75.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 78.

⁸⁷ Cronin, *Great Power*, 145. "At the same session of the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov tendered his resignation from the premiership." (Ibid.) Khrushchev had made a major move toward consolidation of his power through Malenkov's resignation.

⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. V, Austria State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministries Meetings, 1955*, ed. William Z. Slany and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1.

⁸⁹ Harold Callender, "Protocols to Arm Bonn Signed," *New York Times*, 24 October 1954, sec. 1, p. 1.

⁹⁰ *FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. V*, 6.

⁹¹ Ibid., 15.

⁹² Ibid., 17.

⁹³ Bruno Kreisky, *Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten* (Berlin: Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag GmbH, 1986), 459.

⁹⁴ *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VII, Part 2*, 1871.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State, "Soviet-Austrian Agreement of April 15," in *The Department of State Bulletin XXXII*, no. 834 (June 20, 1955): 1011.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 1012.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, "Soviet Note of April 19," in *The Department of State Bulletin XXXII*, no. 827 (May 2, 1955): 734.

¹⁰² U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Note to U.S.S.R. April 22," in *The Department of State Bulletin XXXII*, no. 827 (May 2, 1955): 733.

¹⁰³ U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Dulles' Report," in *The Department of State Bulletin XXXII*, no. 834 (June 20, 1955): 1010.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. V, 26.

¹⁰⁶ *Modern History Sourcebook*, "The Warsaw Pact, 1955"; available from <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2002.

¹⁰⁷ For historiography on Soviets and NATO expansion, see above pp. 4-7 and 9-10.

¹⁰⁸ For historiography supporting the role of the Austrians, see above pp. 5-7 and 9-11.