

Extremist Protest or Patriotic Acts: The League of Blood Incidents

By Elizabeth Vanlier

On February ninth, 1932, a seemingly random act of violence shook the nation of Japan and many people in the global community. That night, Inoue Junnosuke, a former finance minister, was assassinated outside an elementary schoolhouse by Konuma Tadashi, on his way to a Minseito meeting. Minseito was one of many political parties in Japan created after the establishment of Meiji democracy in 1868. Inoue was shot in the chest four times with a revolver at close range, dying several minutes later.¹ Konuma, who was seized instantly, was described as a shabbily dressed figure that "emerged from the shadows of the schoolhouse gate and fired." As more information emerged about Konuma, he insisted that he acted alone to protest the conditions in the rural communities. He originated in a rural community north of Tokyo, a disgruntled citizen who had problems maintaining employment.² He insisted that Inoue's deflation policy was responsible for rural conditions. While Inoue held no direct power in the government, he arranged candidates for the Minseito party.³

On the fifth of March, a grotesque pattern began to appear. Baron Dan Takuma was assassinated in front of one of the Mitsui banks, part of the financial empire of which he was general manager. He was murdered with a revolver by a man named Hishinuma Goro, from the same Ibaraki district as Konuma.⁴ When Hishinuma committed his act he wore a pair of white underwear with a Nichiren Buddhist Sutra written on it.⁵ He bragged to officials that his actions were patriotic. He wanted to destroy the corrupt party system and those that supported it financially.⁶ Baron Dan, known as Japan's wealthiest employee, accumulated 291,000 dollars annually. Since he had graduated from MIT, he promoted relations with the United States.⁷ The police suspected a conspiracy when the motives for both the events were compared, and this led to the arrest of others.

On the eleventh of March, five members of the League of Blood, an ultra-nationalist group, were arrested. This arrest occurred after much hesitancy which the police attributed to a lack of funds.⁸ Included in this group was the ringleader, Nissho Inoue. In the days following the assassinations, he sought refuge in the home of nationalist activist and ultra-nationalist sympathizer, Toyama Mitsuru. He pledged with his surrender that he would help to capture the rest of those involved in the plot.⁹ According to Nissho, the purpose of the assassinations was the elimination of those "political

leaders with whom they disagreed."¹⁰ Nissho was unhappy with the current situation in government because of the relationship between the political parties and the zaibatsu (government related conglomerates).¹¹ More time passed and seven more were arrested. The trial for their crimes did not occur for some time following the arrest, ending with judgement in 1934.

Popular opinion in Japan at that time determined what happened after the incidents. In the 1920s and 1930s, Japan was following a course of intense industrialization and modernization. The effects of this, the cost of modernization, was the alienation of the lower classes. The difficult road that the poor were forced to take to survive the inequality in distribution of wealth initiated a change from nationalistic behavior to ultra-nationalism. The ultra-nationalist social climate in Japan, as indicated by the actions, ideology, and the trial of the League of Blood, shows that the Japanese did, in fact, accept radical acts of protest as acts of patriotism.

In addition to the plight of the downtrodden, across this decade, the influences of protestors criticizing the treatment of society impacted the shift of the nature of nationalism to ultra-nationalism, a more violent form of protest, and influenced the League of Blood. This shift helped society to sympathize with the League's violent acts. Gondo Seikei, a leading advocate of the rights of the rural community, influenced the Blood Brotherhood's ideology and helped to gather support for the group. Konuma said that he was directly influenced by the ideas of Gondo, who advocated a utopian sense of rural "self sufficiency" and "self rule."¹² While the Blood Brotherhood said as a whole that it was not influenced directly by Gondo's thought, all of those involved in the group had read his ideas. Gondo influenced the masses searching for relief from rural depression by creating an egalitarian base of ideas for the common person to ponder.

Similarly, Kita Ikki, the national socialist, inspired many frustrated patriots in this period with his "Plan for the Reorganization of Japan." This plan called upon the people of Japan to rise up and work together to reorganize their government. To begin this revolution, he asked the emperor to declare martial law and eliminate the capitalist constitution. He wanted to destroy the class barriers in society, advocating universal male suffrage. He wanted to establish government organizations that did not depend on politicians to pass beneficial policies. He did not want to create an undemocratic

institution; he wanted elections upon which the emperor could comment. He also wanted land reform for which even the emperor would have to sacrifice his wealth. He believed that the emperor could achieve true greatness if he could escape from the iron hand of the zaibatsu. He characterizes the zaibatsu as selfish and the politicians as corrupt.¹³ The ideas of Kita Ikki had a socialist ring, giving the majority of the public a larger voice in the affairs of their nation. While giving this larger voice, it did not create a socialist nation. These ideas are comparable to those of the Blood Brotherhood, opening the eyes of the public to the inequalities in the government system. These ideas influenced both the Brotherhood and the public.

Another great patriotic agricultural reformer, Tachibana, had the greatest influence on both society's and the Brotherhood's ideas. He was directly involved in the May fifteenth incident and was a leader in one of the Brotherhood's subgroups. He called for reform in the countryside, as did Gondo, but he was much less of an idealist calling for active reform protest. One of his objectives included establishing "a system of mutual self-rule in society."¹⁴ He wanted to construct "people's communities," created nationally and based on the values found in the countryside.¹⁵ He did not denounce urban society, for he knew that it would be impossible to make a total return to agrarian society. However, he called for society to rededicate "itself to these good values stemming from farming."¹⁶ He emphasized the importance of the farm and called for recognition of the farm as the foundation of the state.¹⁷ Direct-action protest and destruction of the ruling class would be needed to establish this type of recognition. After this destruction, he believed that if the country returned to the values of the farm, a government beneficial to society would fall into place.¹⁸ Tachibana's ideas were conducive to nationalistic thought. They opted for a return to the very essence of Japanese society, to the values of the land and the goodness—its Japaneseness. Society could sympathize with the active nationalism he called for, again shifting public sympathy to the ultra-nationalists.

The concerns of these intellectuals were rooted in the changes in the rural areas, which had been underway since the Meiji Restoration. Conscription, or the draft, brought young tenant farmers out from the countryside and revealed to them how Japanese urban society and other parts of the world lived. When they returned to the countryside after their tour of duty, they had much less tolerance of the ill treatment incurred by their landlords on the farms. Military service taught the men new skills and they were no longer content with their standard of living.¹⁹ Along with the higher literacy among the tenants, there was more communication among the people. This gave the people a view of events outside the realm of their village.²⁰ They gained a greater consciousness of how they fit into society. They no longer wanted to be pawns in the chess game of nations.

The feeling that the government ignored the conditions of common people created discontent in society, producing a need for change from the status quo. Nationalism often came from economic discontent, "inner discomforts," and a dislike

of government policies.²¹ Many in the agrarian society felt that the elite used them to gain wealth. In the mid-twenties, times were economically difficult for all people, especially for the poor. Before the world depression, new trade with foreigners and too many people on the farms helped to deflate the farm areas. However, actions were not taken to help the poor, either urban or rural; the government instituted a regressive tax and the landlord system drained the people of their resources.²² As a result, at the commencement of the Great Depression no "material or psychological reserves" were available to help people through tough times.²³ Unemployment in the cities provided no outlet for those farmers looking to improve their plight, because the policy of "industrial rationalization" had been introduced into the depressed Japanese economy, shutting down most companies that were not zaibatsu.²⁴ Government policy helped the elite and hurt the poor, creating resentment among the masses for un-Japanese behavior.

As a result, people had begun to attack institutions such as Mitsui during the gold embargo for dollar speculation.²⁵ These speculations were allowed by the government, for such zaibatsu as Mitsui, as favors in return for campaign fund gifts. In the eyes of the people, this was an act of "treachery."²⁶ While people starved in the country, some in the city prospered. Tachibana said at his trial that, "Inouye threw to the winds 120,000,000 yen in defending the gold standard. Two thirds of the country teachers went unpaid as a result of Inouye's policy. I examined the lunch boxes of one hundred school children. Nine of them had a few salted plums buried in rice, and that was their whole lunch."²⁷ A widening gap was appearing between the rich and the poor. The farmer headed down a road to economic ruin, while those in business benefited from the elitist party government got rich by riding the farmer's backs. The conditions had to change because the nation was going to ruin in the name of the greed of a few men. The result was the use of a few patriotic societies that decided to save Japan in the name of the Emperor, something with which many in the masses could identify. According to historian Richard Storry, "Desperate times seemed to call for desperate remedies."²⁸

Another stimulus to nationalism encompasses a new focus on the emperor that the government had been using as a legitimizing force since the late 1880s. After the Meiji Restoration, the emperor was elevated to divine status in order to create a united front for modernization among society. With this modernization attempt, Japan forged into the imperialist fray with the other powers in the world. The history of the West's unequal treatment of the East magnified the need to reassert the superiority of Japanese traditional values and beliefs. These traditions are at the very core of what it is to be Japanese and the events in the late nineteenth, early-twentieth century shaped what nationalism meant to them at the time of the Blood Brotherhood incidents.

To be more specific, several events in the 1920s and 1930s intensified nationalistic feelings in Japan creating a setting for ultra-nationalism. One incident that influenced the path of ultra-nationalism was the attempted assassination of the

Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi who was shot in November 1930 while he prepared to travel to watch the military perform with the Emperor.²⁹ The London Naval Treaty had been accepted by his cabinet, again giving in to the West.³⁰ The Japanese submission to the West was a point of contention with the people. The masses did not believe that they constituted a weak country. Their pride rose dramatically, because of the unequal treatment. The attempted assassination brought into the forefront of national consciousness the tradition of assassination as a means of political protest.

Another influential event occurred in Manchuria, where tensions between the Chinese and Japanese caused by the murder of a civilian named Nakamura erupted. Nakamura had been arrested and shot earlier that summer in Manchuria by Chinese soldiers, while supposedly carrying a Chinese government permit to travel in Mongolia and Manchuria.³¹ Support for a forceful retribution skyrocketed in Japan for the unfair murder of its citizen. On September eighteenth, 1931, there was an explosion of railway tracks at Mukden in the coveted Liaodong peninsula. The explosion occurred that night around 10:30, and by the following morning at 6:30 the Japanese had gained control of the city of Mukden. Seventy to eighty Chinese soldiers were killed in an attack that they claimed to have not resisted.³² It was later discovered that some Japanese officers perpetrated this offense and fabricated a story about Chinese saboteurs to create an excuse for immediate and justifiable military action in Manchuria.³³ The majority of Japanese society, not the governmental elite, supported the force used in Manchuria as a reassurance of Japanese power. They wanted to show the world that no one could treat them unfairly any longer. According to Joseph Grew, the ambassador from the United States at this time, the capitalists wanted to rule Japan solely, with the distinctively western economic system.³⁴ The army planned the incident in order to stop this monopoly.³⁵ As a result of the Manchurian incident, according to Wilfred Fleisher, membership in radical groups like the Blood Brotherhood rose dramatically.³⁶ Nissho stated at his trial that, "The Manchurian issue also had an effect on me. . . I planned a wholesale killing on February 11, 1932, by shooting."³⁷

From these acts, the increasingly violent climate of society can be seen. Anti-western feeling pervaded the masses, providing not only a target for anger against Japan's unfair situation globally, but a reason to advocate the cultural correctness of Japan. It pressed some to advocate violence as a means of protest, while others simply sympathized with the cause. This is a turning point in the move toward ultranationalism and its acceptance in mainstream society. These people saw capitalism as responsible for the deviation of urban society from the Japanese path. Inoue Junnosuke urged the cooperation between the Americans and the Japanese.³⁸ The assassination of Dan was due to his position as head of Mitsui, which was seen as the "pinnacle of Japanese capitalism," having divisions in foreign countries that "out-number the embassies and consulates of the Japanese empire."³⁹ Dan was also known for his hospitable treatment of foreigners.⁴⁰ The so-called "habit of greed" sent to Japan

from the west was destroying the "essence" of the country.⁴¹ One purpose of the movement was to change the moral standards in Japan back to pre-western times.⁴² As a part of the radical protestors' ideology, they wanted to exorcize the selfishness and corruption they attributed to the west. The magazine, *Asia*, said that the mission of the Brotherhood was to bring about a return to "the ancient and pure spirit of Japan" by the elimination of capitalism.⁴³ Konuma, the assassin of Inouye, said that he killed because he thought his unemployment was "due to the corruption of society."⁴⁴ With western exorcism, the countryside's conditions would improve, and the urbanites would be saved from moral deprivation and commercialism.

The League of Blood was, therefore, an example of a ultranationalist protest group with a following of both radicals and moderates and an ideology shaped by society in the 1930s. It was conceived in 1930, with Nissho as leader, from a consolidation of several other "blood oath" groups such as the Nippon Kokuminto, Tachibana Kosuburo's group the Jichi Nomin Kyogikai, Kesshitai, Seisanto, and the Ketsumeji Gonin Otoko.⁴⁵ Although each group's ideologies were different, together, these groups depict the prevalence of patriotic societies.

The people who followed the Brotherhood originated from less than privileged families. They held occupations, if they had employment at all, as " . . . politicians, soldiers, and sailors."⁴⁶ *Asia* stated that, "The typical patriotic society is a group or gang of intensely nationalistic temper with a preference for direct action."⁴⁷ The movement was made by those forced to follow, without a chance to give their opinion, the rules and policies dictated to them by the elite. The leaders of these groups came from the same background as their followers. Nissho was an excellent example of a typical member of a patriotic society. The head of the Blood Brotherhood was described as a failure at everything he did before he joined the Nichiren priesthood.⁴⁸ The members wanted to fight the same issues and gathered strength in that alliance. Their plight was similar to that of others in the countryside and they gained sympathy for their acts by association with the masses. Military sympathy created another support base for the Blood Brotherhood. Many of the enlisted men of the Navy were from the countryside. While the Navy did not publicly advocate the acts, a Navy man named Fuji, supplied weapons to the cause. According to Fleisher, General Araki in Prime Minister Inukai's cabinet also sympathized with the cause.⁴⁹ The composition of the Blood Brotherhood provided a massive sympathetic support base for the assassination committed in 1932.

The ideology of the Brotherhood was derived from principles of nationalism, but it was magnified by its social and economic situation. The ideology was formed partly from past national experience and partly from the treatment of the poor by the so-called democratic government.

One specific ideology that the masses could sympathize with was the doctrine of Nichiren. Inoue Nissho was a Nichiren priest who openly advocated "violent patriotism" as described by the dogma of his sect of Buddhism.⁵⁰ The Lotus Sutra

basically states that The Lotus is the morally correct sutra and the disciple of this sect must "propagate" its value to others. If he does this he will eventually reincarnate into "Buddhahood."⁵¹ This religious philosophy translates into the moral correctness of Japanese society and traditional beliefs. Konuma, the assassin of Inouye, wrote, "Revolution is the morning dew; what matter if we perish? Buddhism is sensitive to nature. The privileged classes have no sensitivity to nature and caused me to wish for revolution."⁵² The follower must do anything possible to reach the rest of society with its cause and indoctrinate them to their values. With this indoctrination would come a powerful, moral, Japan. This appealed to both Buddhist and nationalist tendencies.

Another symbol of the movement was the emperor. Loyalty to the emperor was something with which all Japanese could associate. Regardless of class, the people had a common bond with the emperor, built into their education with the Imperial Rescript on Education. According to Fleisher, conscription also added to the loyalty felt toward the emperor.⁵³ The magazine, *The Christian Century*, stated, "Assassination was defended as a patriotic necessity above all law, and the claim made without reservation that the glorious destiny of Japan could never be achieved until the clouds surrounding the throne had been dissipated."⁵⁴ If the act was done in the name of tenno, if the citizen was acting in the best interests of the emperor, the act could be seen as patriotic. Nissho, in answering a question at his trial, stated "... the emperor should give the final word."⁵⁵ Since the act was done for the greater good of the country, many people could accept it as patriotic. The date of the assassination of Inoue was originally planned for the eleventh of February, the 2592d anniversary of the ascension of the first emperor.⁵⁶ The act did not have to be morally correct to be accepted by the people, only justifiably patriotic.

The Brotherhood also identified with the feeling that the government was an elitist institution. This appealed to the idea in society that the public stood outside the scope of a supposedly democratic government. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the process of upward mobility for classes changed from a hereditary, hierarchical society to a merit based society—or did it? Was the government a democracy or a system in which the privileged classes were able to gather and dominate? According to the Blood Brotherhood, it was a place to gather and become a part of or more firmly entrenched in the elite. Nissho said in his trial that "... party politics in Japan are politics of the privileged classes."⁵⁷ The corruption that the League saw in the government created a generalization among the members that the politicians were only interested in pleasing those leaders of the zaibatsu from which they received money.⁵⁸ The policy of the party government led to the establishment of a foreign trade association with the west and this enabled business leaders to make great amounts of money. The relationship between the Brotherhood and the country people helped to form ideas sympathetic to the plight of the countryside. Nissho claimed that the party leaders were "deceiving the public for their private

convenience."⁵⁹ The purpose of the brotherhood was to get rid of capitalists, corrupt political leaders, and the privileged statesmen in order to recreate society.⁶⁰ The list was not created to destroy specific people, but to destroy the institution in general.⁶¹ To do this they believed in using violent means, the only way to remove the elite from society. The resentment by society of elitist activity provided another connection between the Brotherhood and the nationalist views of society.⁶²

The trial itself sheds special light on how the public and judicial system viewed political murders. For the duration, there were many differences between this trial and other murder trials. These murderers were allowed to orate for any amount of time they wanted, creating a public pulpit for ideological sermons. Konuma, Inoue's assassin, spoke in court for three days.⁶³ Since the courtroom was packed with spectators and media, the platform from which the defendants spoke could be broadcast throughout the nation.⁶⁴ This was a legitimate trial because the government had to try these men or lose control of the nation.⁶⁵ However, "the boundary between relevancy and irrelevancy was tacitly thrown open"; the courtroom was turned into a media circus.⁶⁶ It seemed that the victim was forgotten in the oratories of the defendants. In a strange turn of events, Nissho was allowed to yell at the first judge of the trial for being disrespectful to him and his cause; the judge resigned soon after, claiming illness to the press.⁶⁷

At the conclusion of the trial, Nissho, Konuma, and Hishinuma received sentences of life imprisonment. All others tried received less time, fifteen years hard labor for their involvement in the sect. The sentence was lenient in light of their actions, and they were treated as "prisoners of honor."⁶⁸ As historian Robert Butow concluded, "Murder when committed out of sincere motives, was apparently not murder at all, just as the taking of Manchuria had not been aggression because the motives of the Kwantung army had been pure."⁶⁹ In 1940, after the judgement of those indicated in the plot to assassinate Saito Makoto, the defendants walked out of the trial because they did not attain the verdict they wanted to hear; no one followed them. A week later the assassins from the Blood Incident were released in a general amnesty.⁷⁰

After the sentence was handed down, the opinion of the media reflected the mind set of the people: "Political murders are nothing new in Japan and are regarded with astonishing calmness: in the public mind statesmanship is scheduled[sic] as a dangerous occupation."⁷¹ The reaction to the assassination of Inoue by Foreign Minister Yoshizawa was "like the French counselor might have told him it was a fine day."⁷² The press attention given to the trial, as a result of free speech, created more of a focus on the defendant than on the victim. The unsatisfied needs of society resulted in less and less sympathy for the victims, associated with the "bad" government, and increased sympathy for the need for change for which the group seemed to be fighting. The general consensus was that while the act of murder itself was wrong, the patriotic motive for the murder cleansed the person of guilt. The people are likely to praise the act of patriotism but

sympathize with the dead politician at the same time.⁷³ The judge could not let the murderer go free because murder is morally wrong, but he could make the sentence more lenient in the face of patriotism. According to *The Japan Times*, the press opinion was that justice was served by the trial, but again there must be more rational forms of patriotic protest available.⁷⁴ Professors fearing more murders, not more patriotism, said "... it is believed that the fundamental basis of the patriotism of the accomplices is sound, but that the means adopted to attain this end was unwarranted and anti-social."⁷⁵

The 1920s and 1930s in Japan were exciting, yet brutal times. As industrialization took its course, the cost of modernization, the alienation of classes, took effect. The gap between the rich and the poor, the plight of the poor to be more specific, caused the evolution of nationalism into ultra-nationalism. This evolution was based on the principles of nationalism, such as loyalty to the Emperor, culturalism, and an anti-hierarchical tradition among the masses, built up with the creation of the state. These traditions, with the addition of outside ideologies and religious influences, created a large base of support among the poor based on ideas with which they could identify.

The need for social change has been an impetus for protest throughout time. In Japan, the effect on society and its reactionary ideology was similar to that in other nations. The policies of the Meiji democracy (and their treatment of the people provided this type of need.) The need for relief from the elitist government and its debilitating economic policies provided a catalyst for an acceptance of radical ultra-nationalist protest as patriotism.

The unusual circumstances of the trial of the Brotherhood depict how the public thought about the political murders. The trial and the subsequent sentence reflect that the majority of society stood behind the motives of the assassins. Society accepted the argument that the actions were done for a higher purpose. The government ran through the motions of a trial not only to retain control of the nation, but to show that responsibility for murder must be taken. In the case of this unusual trial, the outcome did not simply portray who was responsible for the murders, but where society stood in relation to the murders, acceptance as patriotism or censure as random violence.

Endnotes

- 1 "Tokyo Leader Slain by Young Assassin," *The New York Times*, 10 February 1932, 1:7; *Ibid.*, 14:2.
- 2 "AKonuma Insists He Acted Alone," *The New York Times*, 11 February 1932, 3:7.
- 3 "Tokyo Leader Slain," *The New York Times*, 1:7.
- 4 "Baron Dan Is Slain by Youth in Tokyo," *The New York Times*, 5 March 1932, 9:3.
- 5 "Leaders pay High Tribute to Dead Mitsui Executive," *The Japan Times*, 7 March 1932, 1:1.
- 6 "Political Murders are Linked in Japan," *The New York Times*, 6 March 1932, 3:6.
- 7 "Baron Dan Is Slain," *The New York Times*, 9:3.
- 8 "Japanese Police Show Hesitancy in Murders," *The New*

- York Times*, 11 March 1932, 14:1.
- 9 "Tokyo Police Seize Five in Death Band," *The New York Times*, 12 March 1932, 1:7.
- 10 "Twelve of 'Death Band' Seized," *The New York Times*, 21 March 1932, 3:3.
- 11 "Late Naval Officer Reported Involved in Assassinations," *The Japan Times*, 10 March 1932, 1:1.
- 12 Thomas R.H. Havens, *Farm and Nation in Modern Japan: Agrarian Nationalism, 1870-1940* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 302; *Ibid.*, 164.
- 13 Kita Ikki, "Plan for the Reorganization of Japan," in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Comps. Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene (New York: Columbia UP, 1958), 777-84.
- 14 Thomas R.H. Havens, *Farm and Nation*, 242.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 305.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 250.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 252.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 301.
- 19 "The Transformation of Rural Society, 1900-1950," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 6, ed. Peter Duus (England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 562.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 560-61.
- 21 Hugh Byas, "Will Japan Don the Fascist Black Shirt?" *Asia*, 33 (March 1933) 146.
- 22 "The Transformation of Rural Society," 567.
- 23 A.E. Tiedeman, "Taisho and Early Showa Japan," in *An Introduction to Japanese Civilization*, ed. A.E. Tiedeman (New York, 1974), 245.
- 24 Robert Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization: The Japanese Case," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 114.
- 25 "Baron Dan Slain," *The New York Times*, 9:3.
- 26 B. Omura, "Dagger and Pistol in the Hand of the Japanese Supremacist," *Asia*, 32 (December 1932) 634.
- 27 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York: Knopf, 1942), 71.
- 28 Richard Storry, "The Road to War: 1931-1945," in *An Introduction to Japanese Civilization*, ed. A.E. Tiedeman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 252.
- 29 "Premier is Shot by Tokyo Fanatic; Feared to be Dying," *The New York Times*, 14 November 1930, 1:6.
- 30 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1941), 64.
- 31 "Japanese Seize Murkden in Battle with Chinese: Rush More Troops to City," *The New York Times*, 19 September 1931, 8:4.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 1:1.
- 33 Richard Storry, "The Road to War: 1931-1945," 248.
- 34 Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 44-48.
- 35 B. Omura, "Dagger and Pistol," 630.
- 36 Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan*, 48.
- 37 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 60.
- 38 "Inouye Long Guided Japanese Finances," *The New York Times*, 10 February 1932, 14:1.
- 39 "Foreign News: Japan," *Time*, 14 March 1932, 25.
- 40 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle*, 68; "Baron Dan Killed by a Youthful Assassin in the Heart of Tokyo," *The Japan Times*, 6 March 1932 1:1.
- 41 Thomas R.H. Havens, *Farm and Nation*, 257.
- 42 H. Murakami, *Japan: The Years of Trial: 1919-1952* (Tokyo, 1983), 47.
- 43 Hugh Byas, "Will Japan Don," 145.
- 44 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 61.
- 45 Richard Storry, *The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1957), 100.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 63.
- 47 Hugh Byas, "Will Japan Don the Fascist Black Shirt?" *Asia*, 33 (March 1933) 144.
- 48 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 57.
- 49 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle*, 66.
- 50 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 57.

- 51 Murata Kiyooki, *Japan's New Buddhism* (Tokyo: Wetherhill Books, 1969), 26.
- 52 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 61.
- 53 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle*, 65.
- 54 "Japan's Crisis," *Christian Century*, 11 March 1936, 393.
- 55 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 60.
- 56 Robert Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of War* (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1961), 54.
- 57 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 60.
- 58 A.E. Tiedeman, "Taisho and Early Showa Japan," in *An Introduction to Japanese Civilization*, ed. A.E. Tiedeman (New York, 1974), 245.
- 59 Thomas R.H. Havens, *Farm and Nation*, 301.
- 60 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle*, 64.
- 61 Hugh Byas, "Will Japan Don," 145.
- 62 R.P. Dore, "Tenancy and Aggression," in *Imperial Japan: 1800-1945*, eds. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 435.
- 63 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 60.
- 64 Ibid., 43.
- 65 O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1934), 266.
- 66 Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, 74.
- 67 Ibid., 50.
- 68 O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism*, 227.
- 69 Robert Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of War*, 57.
- 70 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle*, 105.
- 71 Hugh Byas, "Will Japan Don," 145.
- 72 Wilfred Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle*, 67.
- 73 B. Omura, "Dagger and Pistol," 659.
- 74 "Japanese Opinion as Mirrored in the Press: Social Unrest and the Diet," *The Japan Times*, 20 March 1932, 1:4.
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