Blaine Hoover and the Restructuring of the Japanese Civil Service During the Allied Occupation

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In a unique period of time after World War II, the Allied forces occupied the nation of Japan. Although referred to as the Allied occupation, a majority of the occupation was allied only in title. The United States forces led by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, controlled almost every aspect of the occupation. The occupation forces consisted of both civilian and military officials working together to form a democratic government in place of the previous fascist regime. This paper will attempt to describe the role of one man, Blaine Hoover, in the occupation and restructuring of Japan. It will also seek to examine legislation the was drafted by Hoover's commission and attempt to find any long term changes that may have taken place as a result of Hoover's time in Japan during the Allied occupation.

During the relatively short study of the Allied Occupation of Japan, many shifts in perspective have occurred; moving from the study of great men to the study of the defeated individuals role and reactions to the Allied activities. The earliest studies of Occupied Japan came from the Americans who lived through and played a role in the restructuring. Most of these accounts come from people like Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, one of MacArthur's top assistants during the occupation years, who wrote a biography of General MacArthur from his first hand experiences.[1] Many of these first hand accounts and recollections are now considered to be primary sources and not history. As time has progressed, historians have changed the ways in which they study World War II and the occupation.

One of the first defining historical works on the Occupation was written in 1960 by Kazuo Kawai. His book, *Japan's American Interlude*, is a political history of the Occupation. Kawai attempts to deal only with selected "controversial aspects of the Japanese reaction to the American influence during the Occupation period."[2] As a Japanese writer Kawai assesses the Occupation through a Japanese lens as well as a politically pro-American one. He opened a field of discussion that examines how the Japanese government responded to a foreign force attempting to restructure the country.

Kawai offers several explanations of why the Japanese were so cooperative during the Occupation period. Kawai provides the reader with the belief that the Japanese people saw that it was best to cooperate with the Allied forces.[3] This is an interesting perspective on the subject because many of the justifications of the Japanese cooperation that Kawai cites as unreliable, like the belief that the Japanese officials

cooperated because of an urging from the Emperor, are currently widely accepted theories on the post war attitude of Japanese by scholars like Justin Williams, a former occupation turned historian.

Kawai also examines the Constitution that the Allied forces designed, but the Japanese people were subject to, the role of the Emperor, who was still a major symbol in post-war Japan, and Economic and Labor reforms, which would typify the American battle against communism. This is an important work on the reconstruction because of the shift from personal accounts toward writing true history that is started by Kawai. He makes the first major move toward an objective look at the Occupation through the eyes of a historian, not a participant.

Although Kawai moved the study of the Occupation away from the personal accounts of the men who shaped post war Japan, like MacArthur and Whitney, in the late 1960's one of those men placed his name back into history. Justin Williams, the former chief of the Government Section's Legislative Division who turned his career toward international affairs, wrote on the relationship between the Japanese government and the Allied legislators[4]. Unlike Kawai, Williams looks at the effects of the Japanese submission and different levels of control that the Japanese Diet was given. This study on Japanese submission is important because it analyzes the process of passing legislation and how the Allied forces has the ability to make and essentially push legislation through with almost no contest. Unlike Kawai, Williams writes about the power of the Allied staff and how their views of the Japanese changed during the "Crucial Phase of the Occupation" from 1947 to 1952.

Williams states that the Japanese cooperated with the Allied proposals because of a request from the Emperor to do so and because of the unfamiliarity "with Western democratic principles and practices, all levels of the Japanese bureaucracy looked to their GHQ [General Headquarters] counterparts for guidance."[5] This appears to be William's version of Kawai's ideas on how the two sides came to cooperate so well. Williams places himself in the study of the Occupation in two ways: once as a participant and once as a historian. This work contains an important perspective on the two cultures; unfortunately the perspective is extremely one sided due to William's close association with the occupation and its policies.

In 1983, Japanese historian Takemae Eiji, a professor of political science at Tokyo Kenzai University, wrote a book entitled *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*. This book, after translation, is almost 700 pages of work on the GHQ (General Headquarters). This comprehensive study on the GHQ was originally publish in 1983, but translated into English in 2002 when the world began to look at the war on terror, and the Japanese role in the new world.[6] This book is an outstanding overall study of the function of MacArthur's Occupation headquarters. It is an in depth study of the parts of the GHQ and their specific functions and the people involved. Takemae is another Japanese author, like Kawai, who has made an extensive study of the American components of the occupation.

Another important historian in the study of the Allied Occupation of Japan is John Owen Haley, who is currently a professor at Washington University in St. Louis and one of the leading experts on Japanese Law. Haley has made his contribution to the field through the study of Japanese legal issues during the Occupation. In 1991, Haley wrote a book entitled *Authority Without Power*. In this book, Haley looks at the

historic Japanese struggle to maintain a government that had legitimacy among the people. In *Authority Without Power*, Haley examined a legal framework has led to a government where, in certain situations, "coercion is required."[7] Through legal history in the early 1990's, John Owen Haley has moved the field of Japanese legal history forward. In another more recent work, "Japan's Postwar Civil Service," Haley writes on the legal issues that surround the Civil Service in the post war years. By focusing on the legal construction, Haley analyzes a technical aspect of the Occupation and how it contributed to the economic prosperity that Japan would later experience.[8] One interesting item that Haley adds to the historical context of the Occupation is his crediting of the Japanese input to the legal aspect of the civil service. Haley states that the Japanese contributions should be emphasized because they significantly affected the Occupation reforms.[9] Although Kawai hints at how both the American and Japanese sides were surprised by how well they were able to interact and work together, he does not credit the Japanese as much as Haley does in the drafting of legislation.[10] Through his studies of the legal agenda, Haley's work on the Occupation years is an invaluable, analytical work on the legal developments of that period and how they affected Japan.

Recently, the Japanese Occupation has appeared frequently in popular culture discussion. Historian and Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor John W. Dower's 1999 Pulitzer Prize winning work entitled *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* has become invaluable in the survey of writings on the Japanese Occupation. In *Embracing Defeat*, Dower adopts the perspective of Kawai, and digs into it. Dower leaves the governmental focus that Kawai had and, instead, tries to "capture what it meant to start over in a ruined world by recovering the voices of people at all levels of society."[11]

Dower moved away from the traditional studies of diplomatic history and took the field into social history. *Embracing Defeat* is an attempt not only to understand how the Japanese citizen was affected by the Occupation, but also how they, in turn, affected the Occupation. Dower's work here provides a voice for those who have been referenced in the study of the Occupation, but rarely, if ever, focused on.

With the addition of Dower's social history on the Occupation years, the study of the "American Interlude" in Japanese has taken another step. In studying the Occupation, one can find numerous works on the government structure, the relationships between the Japanese and Allied/American leaders and many other great men, great moment types of histories. Dower takes the field of study and brings out the important role of the unmentioned people in history.

Although there has been a large number of works written on great men of the Occupation, some men have not been studied. This work on Blaine Hoover will seek to fill in one small area of that study and respond to Dower's work on the occupation by looking briefly at the life of Hoover, and then at his role and impact during the Occupation, this paper will link one man, who played a smaller role, to the greater context of the Occupation and Japanese history. It will seek an American perspective from a member of the occupation force who served for only a brief period of time and took over his job with only a minimal knowledge of Japan, its people and civil service structure that he was intended to evaluate and restructure.

The prewar Japanese Civil Service system has roots in the latter half of the nineteenth century. During the Tokugawa period of Japanese history, which lasted from 1600 until 1868, the country was run and controlled under a feudal system. This system relied on a military rule to control smaller domains of the country.[12] These individual domains were staffed by samurai who were loyal to the Shogun. This system of governance was a successful one for Japan, evidenced by the fact that it lasted for over 250 years.

Since the country was run by a military based government, there was a bureaucracy in place; however it did not resemble the large bureaucracies that are found in modern day democracies. However, after the fall of the Tokugawa regime in 1868, the country faced a different set of governmental needs. The changing of the Japanese government from a feudal military government to a branched system created many problems for the Japanese.[13] Since the overthrow of the government took away the legitimacy of power by those controlling the new government, there has to be a way to place leaders into new roles. Bernard S. Silberman, of the University of Chicago, refers to this as bureaucratic rationalization; or more directly "the consequence of political acts by those seeking to secure their incumbency to positions of power and status."[14] This bureaucratic rationalization brought about the placement of samurai into governmental positions by using strategic planning. This allowed the leaders during the early parts of the Meiji period to avoid moving toward voting; an alternative that might not guarantee the controlling samurai a position of power.[15]

One key factor in choosing the early civil service leaders was loyalty. An essential piece of the Meiji Constitution (1889) was loyalty to the Emperor. Even though the ending of the Tokugawa period took away the need to own property to hold office there were other items of status that came with the job in the new era. By holding a government office, a person was a member of a higher social class. In emphasizing loyalty to the Emperor, there were three different methods used for the appointments; 1) direct appointment by the Emperor; 2) appointment by imperial decree; or 3) appointment stemming from a recommendation by the Prime Minister[16].

In the years after the Meiji Constitution was written, the makeup of the Japanese government would change greatly. The 1880's would become the birthplace of the modern Japanese bureaucracy. The country no longer had new members to recruit from the old power sections of the Tokugawa system; instead there was a movement toward politics and political parties that would bring about many changes. One significant move that changed how party politics were used in the selection of officials was made by Prime Minister Aritomo Yamagata in 1899. Yamagata passed a revision to the earlier Civil Service Appointment Ordinance in 1899, so that the higher level civil service employees would retain the power of appointment over the lower level employees directly underneath them. This allowed members of political parties to be candidates for imperial appointment.[17] The stipulation added by Yamagata forced imperial appointees to have already passed the Upper-Level Civil Service Examination and gained job experience to be eligible for appointment.[18] This was a narrowing of the pool of possible candidates by Yamagata that prevented the political parties from taking control of the government and placing anyone that they chose into a position of authority.

The Civil Service Appointment Ordinance and the Upper-Level Civil Service exam would undergo many changes throughout the early part of the twentieth century. What government positions these items covered, what form the examination would take and the subjects covered by the exam were all addressed during this time and the Japanese bureaucracy grew into a complex and impressive force. All of the changes that took place during this time were a result of the ongoing power struggle between party politics and the political elite.[19] However, this struggle would be minimized during World War II out of a direct need to fill positions as the numbers of potential candidates fell as the war progressed. The examination became less strict and more of a formality as the need to fill positions grew. The system moved into a period of taking "resumes, and on the basis of those resumes asking those it [the Selection Committee for Civilian Officials] thought suitable to write theses at home."[20] This demonstrates the regression in civil service standards during World War II. With lowered standards the civil service positions were open to be filled by less qualified candidates than ever before, a far cry from the controlled system of selection that Aritomo Yamagata attempted to structure before the turn of the twentieth century.

Around the same time in Red Cliff, Colorado a boy was born to Simeon Hoover and Carrie Lowry. James Blaine Hoover was born on January 23, 1893.[21] Although his legal first name was James, he went by Blaine for the duration of his life. After moving around during his childhood years, Hoover would eventually begin his college career at Beloit College in Wisconsin. During a football practice at Beloit, Hoover took a hit to the face and tore his lip. After consulting his pre-law advisor, Hoover was convinced by his advisor that his mouth was going to be an essential part of his law career; he quit football shortly thereafter.[22] Hoover also transferred from Beloit after three years to the University of Chicago, where he would eventually earn his degree. After graduation, Hoover held various jobs including: Midwest Sales Manager for Yale University Press, Head of Personnel for the Illinois Employment Relief Commission and the Head of Employment for the Works Progress Administration in the State of Illinois all before the start of World War II.[23] All of the work experience gained by Hoover built an impressive resume that would gain him an important role in the Occupation Forces after the war.

The reconstruction forces had begun to outline ideas for restructuring before the formal surrender of the Japanese military to the Allied powers aboard the USS Missouri ending the World War II on September 2, 1945. A necessary step in a successful occupation by the Allied forces was going to involve breaking up the current bureaucratic officeholders.[24] MacArthur believed that the key to this move away from the incumbent bureaucrats involved a complete restructuring. In the words of Takemae Eiji: "Only a complete reconstruction of the bureaucratic edifice itself, SCAP [Supreme Commander of Allied Powers] believed, could transform the arrogant minions of Imperial authority into humble servants of the people."[25] By late January 1946, there were cries from the occupation authorities for a swift change in the old guard of the bureaucracy. According to the American authorities, the bureaucratic system was inefficient and incapable of handling the control of a country moving towards a modern democracy.[26] The voice behind these early comments on the bureaucratic shortcomings, Lieutenant Milton J. Esman (PhD from Princeton), a leading political scientist who was added on as an advisor to the Government Section's (GS) Public

Administration Division, called for the "visit of a high-profile US civil service mission to Japan."[27]

These calls for change by Esman and the Public Administration Division coincided with another struggle between the GS and an enemy that the United States government would become familiar with: communism. In his biography of General MacArthur, Major General Courtney Whitney (a Brigadier General at the time of the occupation) writes about the struggle against communism as the justification for needing a civil service mission to the East Asian nation.[28] According to Whitney, communist groups had gained great control of both the transportation and communication industries by massively infiltrating the unions that were associated with each respective sector. According to MacArthur's men, this gave the communist organizers the opportunity to cripple the Japanese way of life at will. At this point MacArthur countered the communist action by "encouraging the enactment of a law bringing all government workers within the framework of a modernized civil-service system."[29]

This encouragement by MacArthur prompted Whitney to create a new division within the GS in order to handle the civil service issues at hand. Whitney chose Blaine Hoover to lead this newly formed mission[30] because of his expertise in the areas of personnel and management. Hoover's previous experience with civil service came through the heading of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada and through being a consultant to the US Civil Service Commission.[31] This made him an obvious choice for the American dominated Allied occupation forces. Hoover would be placed in charge of a mission whose goals were to modernize the Japanese civil service.

After arriving in Japan on November 30, 1946, Hoover and the rest of the United States Personnel Advisory Mission (USPAM) to Japan, sometimes referred to as the Hoover Mission, took Sunday December 1st to rest before beginning their mission on the 2nd of December. The three other men who would comprise the Personnel Advisory Mission were Manlio F. DeAngelis, Robert S. Hare and W. Pierce MacCoy.[32] The Mission had been constituted by the War Department of the United States and was there to assess "the entire personnel system of the Japanese government."[33]

The first official meetings of the commission were briefings with Brigadier General Courtney Whitney and other GHQ staff (Figure 1). Whitney was the Chief of the Government Section of the GHQ under the supervision of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP). At this meeting, Whitney alerted the group to "occupation problems, policies and accomplishments."[34] These meetings consisted of lectures as well as questions and answer sessions to help orient the group of American civil service advisors in their new setting. Although experts in their field, prior to their arrival the members of the commission "possessed little knowledge of Japan."[35] The briefings covered many different subjects on the country of Japan and its people. The mission was informed about Japanese history, occupation policies, the organization of the local governments, political parties, the judicial system, labor issues and the "Japanese character and psychology."[36] This multifaceted crash course on Japan was provided for these men to allow them a small chance to become familiar with attempting to restructure parts of the government. Although this orientation process appears to be insufficient when considering the role that the mission was about to take

on, Hoover speaks very highly of the meetings and the men who "gave fully their time and knowledge as a contribution to the work of the mission."[37] Hoover specifically credits Dr. E.H. Norman who was the head of the Canadian Liaison Mission for his contributions and knowledge about the Japanese people. Dr. Norman's "seminal scholarship on Japan's emergence from feudalism influenced Allied thinking on the country during and immediately after the war."[38]

Although the initial briefings were an essential reference for the mission, there was one other extremely important piece of information that came out of the first meetings. The mission found out that they would work independently from the rest of the Government Section to draft their own suggestions and legislation. This would prove to have a major affect in the mission's later policy making. Though the mission had been provided with an overview of Japan, there were still other issues that needed to be addressed. Before the arrival of the USPAM, the GHQ had been preparing for their arrival as well as learning as much as possible about the Japanese structure of government. The GHQ spent many months, before the arrival of the mission, preparing studies of the Japanese personnel practices.[39] From these studies, the GHQ pieced together reports on the status of the system. These reports were not comprehensive, but they did prove to be useful to the mission. The GHQ reports pointed to, what the mission would later declare, the major problems of the practices of the personnel divisions of the Japanese government. The Hoover mission had these reports as the foundation of their understandings of Japanese personnel practices and used them to formulate the strategy for approaching these problems.[40]

At this point in time, the mission had a basic understanding of Japan and how personnel administration of the country worked without ever interacting with a member of the actual Japanese government. They did begin to meet with the government soon after their preliminary research was completed. In October of 1946, the Japanese government had created an Administrative Research Bureau to "conduct investigations, do research and formulate plans for the reformation of the organization, the personnel system and the administrative procedures of the Japanese Government."[41] This Japanese Administrative Research Bureau had the same responsibilities as the USPAM; therefore it was not difficult to arrange conferences between the two groups. On December 24, 1946 the United States Personnel Advisory Mission and the Japanese Administrative Research Bureau had their first in a series of meetings.[42]

The decision to meet as one body would be pivotal in the restructuring of the Japanese Civil Service. Before this first meeting, the Hoover mission had focused and refined their thoughts and beliefs on how to approach the task at hand. The mission had also developed a time table in which they planned to carry out their planned operations. However, in a subsequent meeting, the two groups decided on a new plan of action that involved merging the two groups and reassigning responsibilities.[43] The original two units identified specific areas of the Japanese personnel administration that were to be studied and formed new subcommittees under the supervision of individual members of USPAM and the Japanese Administrative Research Bureau. To oversee the operations of the subcommittees and receive the reports, a General Committee was formed. This was done in order to reduce overlap in the two groups and to make the process of reorganization more efficient. More specifically, the committee was

formed to: "(1) promote progress of the work of the special committees (2) coordinate work of the special committees and (3) consider major problems developed by the special committees."[44] This committee consisted of ten men; including Hoover, the three aforementioned USPAM members (DeAngelis, Hare and MacCoy), as well as six members of the Administrative Research Bureau; Kiyoshi Asai, Toshio Irie, Katsumi Maeda, Toshigosha Miyazawa and Akiiye Yamashita.[45] Hoover and the presiding Minister of the State and President of the Administrative Research Bureau, Takao Saito, served as the chairman and co-chairman of the new committee.[46] Through their roles in the General Committee, Hoover and Saito developed a close friendship based on a mutual respect that would last through the duration of the occupation.

In the first month of their time in Japan, the Hoover mission had experienced many things. From the brief, intense study of Japan and its people, the government and the personnel system to the union with the Administrative Research Bureau and formation of the General Committee, Hoover and USPAM were about to transition into the next phase of their mission. The knowledge and structure were in place and the mission "entered the New Year having (1) informed itself as well as possible, within the limitations of time, concerning the broad aspects of the Japanese governmental system, (2) reviewed the studies reviewed the studies previously made of personnel administration in the Japanese Government, (3) established relations with the Japanese officials as a basis for work and (4) launched a series of special studies."[47] The mission had put itself into position to formulate a plan for a new strategy on personnel affairs in Japan that would fix the problems that came about through a feudalistic tradition as well as during the Second World War.

Hoover explained the situation in Japan during the first month of the mission's time there in the first section of his interim report issued to General MacArthur on April 24, 1947.[48] This report was issued just five months after the mission had entered Japan and was not a complete commentary on the mission, simply because USPAM had not completed its duty in Japan. This interim report contained a proposed piece of legislation that would greatly change the composition of the Japanese civil service and, according to Hoover, needed to be submitted immediately for a variety of reasons. Hoover saw the need to submit the report at this time because of the aforementioned fight against communism, but the main reason for the a submission at the end of April lay in its proximity to the May 3, 1947 of the new Constitution of Japan taking effect.[49] This would allow the new National Public Servants Law to have momentum and possibly legitimacy with the Japanese population.

The National Public Servants Law (NPSL) was designed and proposed by Hoover and the mission in their interim report of April 1947. The NPSL was a response to the Hoover Mission's stated purpose, which was to "plan an efficient system of personnel administration for the Japanese Government."[50] The law reflected the experiences Hoover had gathered during his years working the field of civil service administration. Hoover compared the old, feudalistic personnel system of Japan to the feudalistic systems that controlled Western Europe in the past. He used two examples within the Hoover Report to show examples of bureaucratic movements in the past. The first example is that of England, where the civil servants went from "servants of the monarch, then of the dominant political party, and finally of the people as a whole."[51] According to Hoover, the development of the English civil service had helped Britain

become a flourishing democracy that served the people, much like that of the United States, his other example. Hoover briefly mentions the frustrating inefficiency of the spoils system, which involved rewarding loyal supporters, friends and political party members with appointed positions after winning a political office, which ran American politics during most of the 1800's and how that moved the civil service to the form it took in the late 1940's; where the civil servants were servants of the dominant political party of the day, but through law and administration, the civil service had become servants to the people of the United States.[52] Hoover envisioned a similar transition occurring in Japan.

A transition from a bureaucracy that served political interests to one that operated in the best interests of the people would require an ideological change in making personnel decisions. The nation of Japan would need to move toward a "Merit System Administration," similar to the one that sprouted in the United States to fight the spoils system. Hoover addressed the negative connotations that were associated with a merit based ideology by stating that "government has come to recognize as an employer who must do certain things if men and women of superior ability are to be brought into and retained in the government."[53] This demonstrates Hoover's belief that the methods that businesses used, and still do use, to recruit and retain talented employees can and must be applied in modern democracies where large bureaucracies are vital.

To have an opportunity to reach the goal of planning an "efficient system of personnel administration for the Japanese Government,"[54] the mission believed that the civil service must start with a clean slate of leaders. In his letter to MacArthur, Hoover is writing about the main points of the National Public Servants Law when he states that "The positions in the service of Vice-Ministers, Heads and Assistant-Heads of Agencies of government, Heads and Assistant-Heads of Bureaus, Heads and Assistant-Heads of Divisions and other positions of similar organization leveling in the (civil) service as determined and identified by the (National Personnel) Authority, are hereby declared to be vacant and without incumbents."[55] Hoover finishes the note by stating that anyone occupying one of the stated positions after May 3, 1947, the day that the new constitution took effect, will stay in their position as a temporary appointee until they are replaced by the Authority.

One of the mission's main concerns about the bureaucracy, and the main reason that they chose to eradicate the aforementioned leadership positions, was a concern with the previous systems focus on Tokyo Imperial University graduates. The NPSL sought to provide "uniform regulation of the national civil service,"[56] which was seen as impossible with the current composition of the bureaucracy being dominated by Tokyo Imperial University graduates. The reasons that this disparity between graduates of the TIU and other institutions occurred because of what Hoover sarcastically refers to as the previous "so-called Higher Civil Service examination."[57] This reflects the changes after the conception of the Meiji Constitution that allowed for changing Civil Service Examinations that favored political parties and friends, much like that of the old American spoils system. The Civil Service Examinations that Hoover refers to with such distain covered topics that revolved around administrative law and "operated to favor graduates of the law department of Tokyo Imperial University."[58] This is a piece of Japanese tradition that the mission found to

be intolerable. Favoritism of TIU graduates goes back to the beginnings of the Meiji period. In fact, "until 1893, Todai (TIU) graduates were not even required to take the higher civil service examination."[59] This form of favoritism moved itself from exclusion of the exam for graduates to favoring the graduates through the exam and the mission designed the NPSL to change this. The men that had reached the higher level positions were deep-rooted in the system. Hoover described these men as having "money, influence, legal training and little understanding of and a distaste for the democratic process."[60] The mission believed that the only way to cope with the problem at hand was to clean the bureaucratic slate.

Expelling the higher level bureaucrats might have been an important first step in fulfilling the mission's goal, but it was not the only hurdle that needed clearing. There was another main idea of the National Public Servants Law that the mission believed was central to creating a civil service that would serve the interests of the people and be efficient. The National Personnel Authority was a large portion of the interim report submitted by Hoover to the Government Section for legislation. Section III of the Hoover Report establishes the National Personnel Authority (simply referred to as the Authority in the report).[61] The report lists the framework for the Authority as having three main officers; a President and two Commissioners. According to the report, the President is to be appointed by the Cabinet and serve for a term of fifteen years, the commissioners shall also be appointed by the cabinet and serve terms of fifteen years.[62] The three serve as the overseers of the Authority, with the President serving as the interpreter, enforcer and administrator of the rules of the Authority. The eligibility requirements of the officers of the Authority mirror that of a United States President. The officer must be a citizen of Japan, at least thirty-five years of age, of "highest moral character and integrity, of demonstrated executive ability, experienced and qualified in the field of personnel administration, in known sympathy with the democratic form of government and efficient administration therein based on merit principles."[63] The American democratic ideals of Hoover and the other commissioners are apparent here in the requirements of "sympathy through the democratic government."

Also evident in the first few requirements of for the officers of the Authority is the determination of the mission to break the stronghold on Tokyo Imperial University graduates and fight against political motives that might impede the officers from serving the people inside the three designated offices. This trend continues into the latter part of Article 1, Part 4 of the report. The mission lists that none of the three officers may be a member of a political committee, officer of a political party, officer in the Japanese military organization, or a candidate in the last ten years for an elected public office.[64] These restrictions all follow the mission's beliefs that the bureaucracy should not be a breeding ground for political activity. The mission then goes one step further to ensure that there is no preference given on the basis of education background. The NPSL requires that of the three appointed officers, "no two members of the Authority, at any one time, shall be graduates of the same school, college or department of the same university or institution of higher learning."[65] By ensuring that the officers of the Authority are not of identical educational backgrounds, the mission believed that there would be no favoritism in the application of the NPSL.

One more position was created by the NPSL that would work closely with the three previously listed officers of the Authority. This other position was that of

Director-General of Personnel. However, unlike the President and Commissioners, the Director-General was no to be appointed by the Cabinet.[66] The Director-General of Personnel was to be chosen "from amongst the three persons having the highest scores in the examination."[67] Also, the records of the Director that involve the selection process (i.e. test scores, applications and other evaluations) were to be filed in the Authority archives and the Director must meet the same criteria as the other three appointed officers as far as age and citizenship, the Director was also given the role of temporarily replacing the President in his duties, however he was not given the right to vote as a member of the three person authority.[68]

The Authority was in place to apply the rules and guidelines set forth in the NPSL. There were other powers conferred upon the Authority. These powers mainly dealt with administrative and record keeping type tasks that the Authority needed to keep track of. Such items included investigations within the personnel system,[69] regulate appointments and layoffs, keep documentation of personnel staff, to run and analyze statistics pertinent to the authority[70], after five years the authority had the right to determine the "time and sequence of applying the standards prescribed by this law,"[71] and finally to make an annual report to the Cabinet that describes the Authorities activities and progress.[72]

The remainder of the report outlines seven standards that the civil service should be based on. These seven standards follow the typical lines of belief held by the mission. The standards covered the merit based system that involves compensation on the basis of duties and responsibilities, increasing productivity from each servant, equal treatment, working in the interests of the public, having no other job than that in the service and the right to receive retirement payments after a proper time of faithful service.[73] According to the Hoover report, the NPSL establishes a "beach head for a modern and efficient civil service in Japan."[74] Understanding how difficult it might be to place a new Authority in charge, the mission reestablishes their role in the restructuring of the civil service and identifies the need to advise the temporary Authority and to help with logistical training and setup.[75] This entire concept provided by the report essentially breaks down the old, "feudalistic" civil service by reconstituting and reducing the prestige of the bureaucracy through providing a law that would setup a new administrative form of personnel service including a National Personnel Authority.[76] The report did not officially put the law into place, but the writing and submitting of the law to MacArthur moved the law towards its next hurdle.

The National Public Servants Law would have to be approved by the Diet to complete its course from proposed to instituted law. This was, in some respects, not as difficult of a task as it may seem. The adoption of the new Constitution had been a surprisingly unproblematic process. The Emperor had requested that the Japanese officials cooperate with the members of the GHQ. Hoover's documented experience with this came through a letter from acting Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama, which, referring to the NPSL, stated that "upon it becoming law, I [Katayama] am firmly determined to administer it strictly according to the letter and spirit of your recommendations."[77] As Justin Williams writes: "the Japanese officials obediently, if not always cheerfully, accepted both the new constitution and major responsibility for its implementation."[78] In fact, the Japanese officials, in their unfamiliarity with the

Westernized system being placed into effect in their country, often sought the advice of their equals in the GHQ section. The atmosphere of the interactions between the two parties reflected an eagerness to learn and an almost academic atmosphere. In fact, many Japanese officials showed such an eagerness for knowledge and mastery of the institutions that were going to govern their country that they traveled to the United States to study these institutions.[79] Although cooperation by Imperial ordinance is one reason for the collaboration, it is also true that since prior to August 1948, all laws, bills and ordinances required the approval of the GHQ, however after that time, it was still necessary to seek the advice of the GHQ in the decision making process.[80] This mandatory submission of legislation prior to voting by the Diet, explains Kawai's belief that since there was no other alternative, the Japanese officials at the time saw it in their best interest to cooperate with the American forces.[81] With all of this taken into account, the National Public Servants law received a strong backing from the GHQ and the law was passed on October 21, 1947.

After the first NPSL was passed, there was talk of a revision. One way that the Japanese officials attempted to understand, and potentially influence, the drafting of legislation during the post war occupation was through outside meetings with the American officials. Outside meetings with Japanese officials was something that Hoover experienced during his time in Tokyo and the rest of the country (Figure 2). One meeting in particular was with a Supreme Court Justice of Japan. In a letter from the Supreme Court Justice, who name is illegible, on August 31, 1948 to Hoover, the Justice expresses his interested in meeting to "exchange views on the National Public Servants Law."[82] Although this letter is clearly a formal type invitation, it does document how the interaction between Hoover, a drafter of legislation, and the Supreme Court Justice, who had a role in the countries future, sometimes took place outside of formal meetings.

After months of conversation, the law came up for revision in 1948. This process proved to be highly controversial. Hoover and the mission believed that the new government trade unions had gained enough power to form significant political opposition.[83] Because of this, the Hoover and the mission believed that it was necessary "to restrict the rights of civil servants to bargain collectively."[84] This created much conflict within the GHQ. James S. Killen, chief of the British mission in Tokyo and chief of the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, believed and argued with MacArthur that "a liberal attitude towards British government workers and civil servants has hardly reduced the nation to anarchy."[85] This conflict between the two men eventually required the intervention of MacArthur, who would eventually side with Hoover. This conflict between the two sides would lead directly to the resignation of Killen.[86] Hoover later referred to Killen's philosophies in a *NY Times* article as "complete nonsense."[87] This unfortunate conflict brought out the worst in the two men. Hoover, showing the reasons that he is often criticized by historians, was supremely confident in his standing with MacArthur, but not for specific policy reasons. Hoover is quoted as saying that he would have MacArthur's vote because of his proximity to American philosophy, but even if Killen and him were on an equal political field, Hoover's "dignified bearing and impeccable attire contrasted with his cloddish manner and tawdry appearance will prejudice MacArthur against him

[Killen]."[88] This shows the superior American attitude that Hoover carried was not only a part of his policy making, but his personal beliefs as well.

Hoover issued a public statement in August 1948 that described and defended the Authority from criticism that he believed stemmed from a lack of understanding of the NPSL. In this statement Hoover fought back against the negative image that has been built of him through the ordeal with Killen. In addressing the need for the National Personnel Authority, Hoover comments on the relationship between the government and its employees, stating that it is a concern that "must be answered before the people of Japan can fully affect the national recovery and establish a Government which will be both efficient and democratic."[89] Hoover believed that through this Authority, the damage that had been accomplished by the old system of strikes and move the country into a system that is controlled by men who are only concerned by the welfare of the Japanese state and its people. This piece of writing by Hoover could fall into a modern political campaign. The statement's concluding paragraph opens with that statement: "Citizens who believe in justice and law and order will welcome this new civil service system."[90] This is another piece of Hoover's work that shows his "inimitable rhetoric"[91] and strong belief in the American way.

Through the remainder of his time in Japan, Hoover dealt with the implementation of the NPSL and the continued battle against communist influence in the restructured government. Hoover understood that the ideas set forth by the mission would be unpopular among the Japanese people when the revised law was passed early in December 1948, over a year after the initial version received approval from the Diet. Hoover "expected battles over the reduction in the number of public servants, over increases in their salaries and over the transfer of major control from individual agencies to new regional bureaus under the National Personnel Authority."[92] Hoover held to his belief that the people of Japan, after time for the system to integrate itself into the functions of government, would allow the people government services that were uninterrupted and featured well trained, well paid, quality civil servants, free from the influence of politics and communism.

Hoover's close ideological relationship also made him a virtual spokesperson for MacArthur on certain personnel issues. In June 1949, just over a year before his death, Hoover was in contact with the Japanese personnel who had taken over the operations of the country. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanashichi Masuda consulted with Hoover before the Japanese government terminated 172,000 employees. This was significant enough that *The New York Times* declared that MacArthur would favor the move if Hoover favored the move.[93] This emphasizes Hoover's strong belief in the American system of doing things. MacArthur was known for his strong American and anti-communist beliefs; Hoover's proximity to MacArthur and the implied approval of MacArthur that approval by Hoover provided articulates the strong pro-American attitudes that Hoover held.

Hoover left Japan in early 1950 to return home due to illness. He spent the remainder of his days hospitalized fighting prostate cancer that developed during the latter portion of his time in Japan. Hoover refused to inform any medical authorities about his illness while in Japan and eventually died on September 3, 1950 in the hospital at Great Lakes Naval Training Center north of Chicago.[94]

Hoover's return to the United States was the end of his participation in the occupation of Japan, which continued on for another few years. Hoover's role as the head of the United States Personnel Advisory Mission served an important function to MacArthur's occupation forces by following through on MacArthur and Whitney's desire to break up the Japanese bureaucracy and form it into a system that would be more efficient and able to serve the people of Japan. Hoover's goal through the National Public Servants Law was to break up the tightly woven system of favoritism in the civil service examination in favor of Tokyo Imperial University graduates. This was the reason for the creation of the National Personnel Authority. This control of the higher civil service seems to be exaggerated by Hoover when one considers the data that between 1941-43 46.7% of the Higher Civil Service employees were Tokyo Imperial University graduates (Figure 3). Whether or not this claim was an exaggeration, Hoover achieved his goal of breaking up the system and by 1966 the percentage of TIU graduates was down to 21.1% of the system, however this number continues to fluctuate and has, at times, returned to levels close to that of the WWII years (figure 3). As B.C. Koh, professor at the University of Illinois-Chicago writes, "it is reasonable to expect that the apparent erosion of the predominance of Tokyo [Imperial University] graduates in the Japanese bureaucracy will continue in the years ahead."[95] During his time in Japan, Blaine Hoover, with his firm belief in an American system of government and strong anti-communist sentiments, led the crafting of legislation that, with some success, was crafted to break up the monopoly and communist influence that was present in the Japanese Civil Service system.



Figure 1. Hoover (the third man from the right) meeting with the GHQ staff.



2 Sept 48

SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN
TOKYO

August 31st, 1948.

Dear Mr. Hoover,

I am very glad to have had the opportunity to see you last time, and exchange views on the National Public Service Law.

I would like to confirm the invitation of our last meeting, where I invited you and Mrs. Hoover, on behalf of my colleagues to dinner.

The place of the dinner will be the Imperial duck hunting Lodge, at Ichikawa, and a car will be at the Dai-Ichi Building to lead the way at 4:30 P.M., Thursday, September

Thanking you for your acceptance of the invitation

Yours truly,

Judge,

Supreme Court of Japan.

Figure 2. Letter sent to Hoover by a Judge of the Supreme Court of Japan

Year	University Background: Tokyo		Kyoto		Other*		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1941-43	547	46.7	112	9.6	512	43.7	1171	100.0
1966**	318	21.1	142	9.4	1047	69.5	1507	100.0
1967†	350	25.7	174	12.7	840	61.6	1364	100.0
1970	335	24.8	129	9.5	889	65.7	1353	100.0
1971	453	32.3	174	12.4	774	55.3	1401	100.0
1972††	266	17.9	146	9.8	1078	72.3	1490	100.0
1973	499	43.8	204	17.9	437	38.3	1140	100.0
1974‡	435	29.1	191	12.8	870	58.1	1496	100.0
1975	459	35.2	172	13.2	674	51.6	1305	100.0
1976	461	37.3	193	15.6	582	47.1	1236	100.0

* Includes those who did not attend four-year colleges. In 1967, 28 or 2 percent of the total belonged to this category.

** Success ratios (= $\frac{\text{Number of Successful Candidates}}{\text{Number of All Candidates}}$) were as follows: Tokyo, .357; Kyoto, .295; total, .066.

† Success ratios: Tokyo, .333; Kyoto, .257; total, .063.

†† Due to disruptions caused by student protests, no students were admitted to Tokyo University in 1968; hence only a small number of *rōnin* graduated from it in 1972, thus accounting for a sharp decline in the number of successful candidates in the higher civil service examination.

‡ The figures for 1974-76 represent the combined totals of higher civil service examinations (A) and (B), whereas those for 1966-67 encompass higher civil service examination (A) only.

Sources: The 1941-43 figures were calculated from Robert M. Spaulding, Jr., *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations* (Princeton, 1967), p. 269 and p. 277; the 1966-67 figures are from *Jinji In geppō* (Tokyo, June 1967 and July 1968); the 1970-71 figures are from Satō Tomoyuki et al., *Todaibatsu* (Tokyo, 1972), p. 176; remaining data are from *Asahi shimbun* (Tokyo) 22 August 1972, 9 September 1974 (evening edition), 1 November 1975 (evening edition), 26 October 1976, and *Mainichi shimbun* (Tokyo), 11 September 1973. Success ratios could not be claculated for 1970-76 because a breakdown of the applicants by university background was not available.

Figure 3. Successful Candidates in Higher Civil Service Examinations by University Background and Year.

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[14] Ibid., 150.

[15] Ibid., 151

[16] Murumatsu and Pempel, 175.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., 176.

[20] Ibid., 177.

[21] Elaine Severin, interview by author, 13 October 2004, phone interview. [Elaine Severin is the daughter of Blaine Hoover]

[22] Jim Hoover, interview by author, 10 October 2004, phone interview. [Jim Hoover is the grandson of Blaine Hoover]

[23] Severin.

[24] Takemae, 305.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Whitney, 271.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Takemae, 306.

[32] Blaine Hoover, "Hoover Report" (1947), at the Macarthur Memorial, Bureau of Archives, Norfolk, VA, 2.

[33] Ibid., 1.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Takemae, 306.

[36] Hoover, *Hoover Report*, 1.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Takemae, 152. [Takemae also describes Norman's unfortunate life after his role in the occupation. Norman's political beliefs are described as leftward leaning by Takemae and his interactions and lobbying for communist political prisoners and criticism of the occupation after 1950 resulted in him being a target of McCarthyism. Norman was accused by the United States Congress of assisting the Japanese Communist Party because

of his involvement in the Communist Party during his childhood in Japan. The pressure and continued hounding from the Senate would eventually lead Norman to commit suicide in Cairo in 1957.]

[39] Hoover, *Hoover Report*, 1.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 2.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. [Kiyoshi Asai was the Japanese Director of the Civil Service Division, Professor of Law, Keio University and a member of the House of Peers. Toshio Irie was the Secretary-General of the Administrative Research Bureau and the Director of the Bureau of Legislation. Katsumi Maeda was the Director of the General Affairs Division of the Administrative Research Bureau and the Secretary of the Cabinet. Okiiye Yamashita was the Director of the Management Division of the Administrative Research Bureau and a consultant to the Hadachi Manufacturing Company.]

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

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[49] Hoover, *Hoover Report*, 9.

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[52] Ibid.

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[54] Ibid., 3.

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[80] Ibid.

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[88] Ibid., n 36.

[89] Blaine Hoover, "Statement Issued By Mr. Braine Hoover, Chief of the Civil Services Division, Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, Concerning the National Personnel Authority, August 24, 1948," *Contemporary Japan* 17 (July/Dec 1948): 180. [The name "Braine" that appears in the title of the article is a typographical error. The name should read "Blaine."]

[90] Ibid., 414.

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[92] "Civil Service Plan Arouses Japanese," *The New York Times*, 7 December 1948, 23.

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