

The Formation of Al Qaeda

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If hindsight is 20/20, then history must be where the answers lie. In the struggle to comprehend the ubiquitous question of logics behind the formation of complex terrorist organizations, and more specifically, why the formation of Al Qaeda occurred, it is necessary to examine the motivations behind one of its most conspicuous public actions, the attacks on America — 9/11. The overall logic of Osama bin Laden, founder and leader of Al Qaeda, as well as the network as a whole, can only be traced back through, and derived from, the many declarations and provocations stated and evident in the decades both immediately preceding and immediately following September 11th, 2001. Because, as Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky said, “While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.”¹

From approximately 1979 until today, those desiring to “understand the evildoer” are provided with 35 years of relevant evidence in the attempt to understand why Al Qaeda was created initially, as well as why it flourished in its movement to perpetrate one of the most memorable and staggering terrorist attacks ever carried out against the United States. Moreover, it is both useful and necessary to consider the “after” just as thoroughly as the “during” and the “before.”

Primarily, Middle Eastern regional conditions fostered an atmosphere prone to the development of terrorism, while expressed goals of Al Qaeda consistently reflected its founding ideology, and subsequent expressions serve as another round of even more explicit explanations. Through translating and deciphering declarations, recruitment tools, and handbooks, as well as understanding the overall context of Al Qaeda’s formation, there are various indications in support of two very important overarching factors that contributed to the formation of Al Qaeda. Differing religious beliefs, culminating in the form of Islamic extremism, as well as incongruences of political and social ideologies between “the West” and “the East,” ultimately led to the creation and

subsequent growth of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization. Thus, the question can be answered in one word: disparities.

Disparities most often result in one thing: conflict. A decade of conflict in the region east of the Persian Gulf — more specifically, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan — managed to accentuate the religiopolitical differences of the ideologies of the hemispheric West and East that created an ideal atmosphere in which to cultivate extremism. Moreover, it is partially due to previously unseen levels of anti-communist sentiment of the Cold War era that an Islamic extremist network such as Al Qaeda ever came to be. This ideological opposition served as the catalyst behind various political shifts and military actions that occurred in the decade from 1979–1989 that led to a never before seen (or perhaps never before recognized) increased loyalty to the ways of Islamic fundamentalism.

A principally stirring event in the shift away from the West was the 1979 revolution in Iran that “ousted the pro-American dictator, the last Shah.”² The ousting of the pro-American Shah effectively cut the ties of any U.S.–Iran alliance, and at the same time, conveniently paved the way for an immediate Iranian launch into a revolutionary society characterized by the theology of Islamism. A fundamentalist Islamic government had taken power in Iran, and it had inherited a vehement anti-American sentiment, even though Islamic fundamentalism did align (perhaps for the last time) with the desires of the West, in the form of Iranian anti-communist sentiment. As this new Iran pushed farther and farther from the U.S., it did just the same to communism. The newly revolutionized country began to ally with more similar neighboring countries — Pakistan and Afghanistan — in order to prevent the spread of yet another, seemingly imminently threatening, competing ideology of communism.³ This occurred around the same time that Saudi Arabian government officials and private donors began pouring money into both countries for the purpose of utilizing jihad against communism.⁴ These were only some

of the actions that led to the cementing of Afghanistan’s role as most valuable player among the many locales that played a part in allowing for Al Qaeda to be formed.

In 1979, when the threat of communism reared its head (quite explicitly) in the form of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were various countries and groups prepared to confront and oppose the enemy ideology and its accompanying military forces. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets is said to have led to “thousands of Islamic fundamentalists from different countries in the region” to mobilize and band together in order to “help fight the Soviet ‘infidels.’”⁵ Moreover, the Afghan forces received support (most often in the form of arms) from bordering Pakistan and a very recently post-revolution Iran. A full decade of training and fighting led to increased camaraderie among the ranks of those fighting on behalf of Islam, which included a young Osama bin Laden. This would be the same fighter who, in the early 1980s, returned home to fund, recruit, transport, and train a volunteer force of Arab nationals, called the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), to fight alongside the existing Afghan Mujahedeen — the name given to Afghan fighters confronting the Soviets.⁶ Although the ISF was later disbanded, these formidable years undoubtedly served as priceless experience for Bin Laden’s later activities to initiate the Al Qaeda organization, which acted as a home base and financier for a global network of participating Islamic groups.⁷ The ISF can be considered a virtual prototype for the not coincidentally similar organizational description of Al Qaeda.

Nonetheless, in 1989 the Mujahedeen succeeded in driving Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. With the help of military and monetary U.S. aid to the anti-communist opposition, as well as a globalized network of support from several surrounding Middle Eastern countries, Islamic groups and followers, the Soviet invasion and mission failed. However, too busy basking in what was considered an enormous victory over the Soviet Union and communism as a whole, the United States promptly stopped paying any attention to the enormous numbers of Islamic fundamentalists that it had directly nurtured in the region.⁸ The United States failed to take notice of this rapidly expanding “global village,” which had been, and was still, uniting in a shared and prodigious religious commitment to fundamentalist Islam. This is the cause to which the United States had somewhat unknowingly or unrecognizably directly provided money and weaponry to during the invasion.

Despite previous wartime attentiveness and support, the flow of U.S. dollars to the efforts in Afghanistan was staunch, and the fanatical Taliban regime took advantage of the nation’s vulnerability, quickly coming to power in the nation. Promoting — or perhaps more accurately, instating and enforcing — an Islamic fundamentalist way of life was their first priority. Along with this came the allowance of Al Qaeda’s occupation of land in Afghanistan. The new government was providing a haven for the various gestating pockets of Al Qaeda.⁹ With ambitious extremists being sheltered in various regions of their newfound jurisdiction, the Taliban’s role in the growth of the Al Qaeda organization was essentially indispensable.

Finally, another domino fell: Pakistan. Clearly not wanting to be left off the Islamic bandwagon, after Soviet forces were removed from Afghanistan in 1989, religious zeal in Pakistan increased. Fundamentalism, as an ideology and a system of government, in Pakistan strengthened. Its overall amount of “training grounds on which to prepare ‘Islamic freedom fighters’ to fight against communism and secularism” vastly increased.¹⁰ Yet another fundamentalist Islamic government had sprouted up and flourished healthily in the region of the Middle East. Thus, Afghanistan was surrounded on both sides — Iran on the west and Pakistan on the east — by countries with aligning commitments to Islamic fundamentalism. Afghanistan became the springboard nation with an ideal location in which to cultivate the grassroots of the network that would quickly develop into the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.

The stage was set. Revolutionaries, fighters, and politicians had (some, intentionally and others, haphazardly) opened the door to a unification movement — one that moved swiftly as far away from both communism and Westernization as possible, and one that did not hesitate to jump into the open and welcoming arms of Islam (in the form of Islamism). An emerging trend of commitment to the creation of a wholly fundamentalist Middle East laid much groundwork; and opposition to democracy and secularism, or more pointedly, continuation of advocacy for “purist” Islam, sustained an early wave of the Islamic fundamentalist movement being nurtured in the region — most essentially, in Afghanistan.

It is absolutely essential to examine the brand of Islam to which Osama bin Laden and his subsequent followers subscribed in order to truly understand the logic behind a group like Al Qaeda, as well as the reasons behind their many original intentions and later actions. As it has, more often than not, been concluded that terrorist groups similar to Al

Qaeda are founded upon one, overarching aim, this singular goal for Al Qaeda was (and likely still is) the achievement of an ideal Islamic society. Over an indeterminable number of years, this ideal Islamic society has been interpreted and strategized by Bin Laden and various groups of fundamentalists, including Salafists (“purists”).¹¹ This term for devoted Islamic purists, Salafists, is derived from *salafiyya*, meaning the imitation of the precursors. Therefore, it is said that “the faithful should model their actions on the Prophet and his Companions who founded the ideal Islamic community” of an age long since passed.¹² According to Fathali M. Moghaddam’s book *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, these fundamentalist individuals “have evolved identities that find fulfillment and meaning through a morality that depicts only one goal as worth living for, and justifies killing civilians to get to that one goal.”¹³ Most frankly, this means that Al Qaeda was founded upon a kind of “we will stop at nothing” approach.

However, it is not solely the responsibility of the Salafists to conscribe Islamic extremists to a commitment to fundamentalism, or subsequently to the ranks of Al Qaeda. Throughout Islamic history, *ulema* (elite Islamic scholars and religious leaders) have unanimously agreed that the *jihad* (religious “struggle”) is “an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries”; or perhaps, taken more literally, if an enemy body threatens to destroy the Muslim/Islamic purist ideological contagion, it is the expectation that that individual will fight in favor of the one and only cause.¹⁴ The goal is one of conversion of person and/or transformation of society. Supporting this same idea, within the Holy Quran, Surah Nine, Surat at-Tawbah, is the most frequently cited:

Then when have passed the sacred months, the sacred months, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and seize them and besiege them and sit (in wait) for them (at) every place of ambush. But if they repent and establish the prayer and give the *zakah* then leave their way. Indeed, All (is) Off-Forgiving, Most Merciful. And if anyone of the polytheists seek your protection then grant him protection until he hears the words of Allah, the word of Allah.

Calls such as this are the impetus driving the Al Qaeda network — and, more broadly, Islamic extremists as a whole.

In addition to learning from Salafists, Al Qaeda very clearly drew on the Wahhabi strain of Islam, which interprets

shari’a (Islamic holy law) strictly.¹⁵ Because Al Qaeda’s driving system of beliefs is so strict, the extremist nature of Islamism is perpetuated by the wide opposition to it. A common saying suggests that if one is prevented from doing or having something, it only makes one want to do it, or have it, more. In this way, fundamentalist ideology blossomed into the formation of Al Qaeda — a group that would unite in conviction to combat secularist opposition. This opposition to the ideology was the kindling. Calls for political change and reversal of beliefs were the gasoline and the spark; and, years and years of attempts to suppress a “pure” version of Islam has only fueled the fire that much more.

Another important purpose behind the founding of Al Qaeda was the intention to overthrow regimes with large Muslim populations that do not install *shari’a* as the official law. In much of the Western world, the past several decades have pointed toward democracy as the only possible and logical progression on the way to societal progress; however, for Islam, “democracy itself is forbidden because only divine power can decree law.”¹⁶ Therefore, the so-called “democratic solution” intended to stop the spread of Islam, and especially Islamism, is exactly the movement that most perpetuates it. Fundamentalist Islam has been given reason to take on a more offensive stance in order to defend against their system of beliefs, as well as the “unbelief” of the Western, democratic world. In the *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*, translated into English and subtitled *The Al Qaeda Manual*, the following supporting excerpt is found,

It is the same unbelief that drove Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, Hafez Assad, Saleh, Fahed — Allah’s curse be upon the non-believing leaders — and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison, and torment Moslems. These young men realized that an Islamic government would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make a truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun. The young came to prepare themselves for *Jihad*, commanded by the majestic Allah’s order in the holy Koran. [Koranic verse:] “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the

hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.”¹⁷

They could hardly be more explicit in their reasoning. Islamism had refused to even consider compromise in a democratic way, and so many orthodox extremists felt compelled by direct calls from both Allah and their founding superiors to physically combat those that will in the future work to oppose their ideals in order to implement their own, westernized ones.

Islamic fundamentalism rejects legislation, diplomacy, and civil debate in favor of intimidation, violence, and aggression. While Al Qaeda derives its objectives and purpose from the Sunni, Wahhabi branch of Islam, as well as lifestyle suggestions of Salafists, it is also structured according to many ideas of Sayyid Qutb, the principle ideologue of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Those that chose to work within the Al Qaeda network were likely educated about the teachings of this similar organization, by which many fundamentalist Sunni movements are inspired.¹⁸

Moreover, Qutb had been strongly influenced by the writings of Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, who was educated in an ultraconservative *deobandi* school, which led him to the development of five key Islamic principles that Qutb would later claim as his own.¹⁹ Perhaps most notably, falling under his second principle, anti-Westernism, Sayyid Qutb adamantly rejects democracy because he believes in adherence to “Islamism’s first principle — *hakimiyyat* Allah, God-Government.”²⁰ Commitment to this principle meant embracing the belief that religion and politics are, and always should be, organized together, as a singular body. Because democracy stems from a basis of individuality, free speech, and self-determination, it is not in accordance with fundamentalist Islam, a religion under which individual liberty, frankly, does not exist. For fundamentalist Islam, sovereignty belongs to God alone. This anti-Westernism is all encompassing due to its humanism. For example, the aforementioned democratic ideals suggest “worship of Man,” which for Mawdudi and Qutb is the same as *shirk* or “attributing partners to God” — always considered a supreme sin.²¹ As universalism is the last of these five important principles, this closing rule means that everything in Islam is valid for all human beings. Secularism, and any activity not in direct accordance to this sense of Islam, is most literally blasphemy. Therefore, Al Qaeda’s formation is a direct response to the conquest of democratic nations to religiously “colonize” Muslim nations, as well as any and all attempts to

quell Islam, in ways similar to those which communism was subjected to just a few years prior.

While much blame can be directed toward ideological reasoning and opposition to Islam as a whole, in somewhat more weighted and specific ways, the United States has played an integral role in prompting the formation of Al Qaeda. Many actions taken by our nation in the pursuit of cultivating democracy and protecting alliances has enraged extremists and brought cause for both defensive and offensive activity in the form of horrendous terror. It is due to these devout feelings of hatred and defensiveness that Islamic extremism was “forced” or “called” to resort to unification as one very unfortunate root of the terrorist network, Al Qaeda.

The concept of territory was, and is, yet another important point of contention between the Western and Eastern world. In Islam, it is said that once Islam takes control of lands, they should retain sovereignty over them until the end of time. The conspicuous global actions of the United States posed what Al Qaeda viewed as a very explicit threat to their Muslim way of life and to the lands of which they occupied. Within the *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*, mentioned above, and discovered in a known member of Al Qaeda’s home, it is expressed that those devoted to jihad for the sake of a pure Islam firmly believed that, just prior to the turn of the century, all Westerners aimed at a generation of progress. However, this progress was to come by way of producing a neo-generation of ambitious, individualistic, and secular citizens. The document translation recalls that, “They aimed at producing a wasted generation that pursued everything that is western and produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, and information specialists. [Koranic verse:] “And Allah’s enemies plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is Allah.”²² Thus, the responsibility to reverse this way of thinking fell into the willing hands of those aligning with the words of Allah and the objectives of Al Qaeda.

By the same token, years and years — which at that time, was said to have been about seven — of U.S. occupation of the Islamic holy lands in the Arabian Peninsula was offensive to Muslims, especially as many worried about the potentially detrimental effects of the U.S. role behind the spread of a type of “Western contagion” of individual ambition. This is a key component of the first facet listed by Osama bin Laden in his 1998 fatwa. He reasons, “the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and

turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.”²³ (Iraq — a Soviet ally, ironically enough — was later occupied in efforts to combat ideology that directly opposed democracy.) Moghaddam argues that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups were determined to gain control of territory and other material resources, as reflected for example by their efforts to expel Westerners from Islamic lands (such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq). The purpose behind their formation was, perhaps most importantly, to “drive both overt and covert U.S. forces out of Muslim lands in the Near and Middle East (covert American forces have not left Saudi Arabia, the country that houses the most important Islamic holy places, including Mecca, the prime destination for millions of Muslim pilgrims from around the world each year).”²⁴ Just two years prior, in *Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad Against Americans*, he had declared the condemnation of the U.S. occupation of Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi Arabian arms trade with the United States. Looking here, and tracing the logic backward just a few more years, Osama bin Laden makes it clear that Al Qaeda originally banded together as a response to the assumed and anticipated threat that a U.S. presence in these lands meant to an Islamic way of life, and to believers themselves.

Moving forward through the Middle East’s historical chronology, it is important to recognize the United States’ role in the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a pivotal moment on the timeline of Al Qaeda’s formation. Prompted by the accusation that Kuwait was stealing petroleum from Iraq, leader Saddam Hussein’s extremist forces moved to invade Kuwait. However, when Bin Laden offered up his band of jihadists (not quite yet a fully structured Al Qaeda) to protect the nation and turn back the Iraqi forces who threatened Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government turned instead to the U.S. military forces, who then formed their own coalition of hundreds of thousands that defeated the invading Iraqi forces in about a month.²⁵ Seth Jones, author of *In the Graveyard of Empires*, refers to this as a “clarion call for [Bin Laden’s] movement.” For the Americans to lead the Saudi military efforts in an assault against Iraq as a result of its occupation of Kuwait was considered a “grievous transgression.”²⁶ Thus, this event was one of the final catalysts propelling the unification of Al Qaeda.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, another one of the most important men thrust to a position of leadership in Al Qaeda during this time, prepared the jihadists for the struggle to pursue a three-pronged plan. Aligning almost exactly with the outline of the reasons listed herein that allowed for and motivated

the formation of Al Qaeda, Zawahiri spells out his invoking objectives. The first was to overthrow “corrupt regimes” in the Muslim world. These would include the likes of Iran, as mentioned earlier. The second, was the establishment of *shari’a* in these lands — the goal to implement pure Islam as a universal rule. Finally, he looked to put an “end to U.S. support for, and manipulation of, corrupt puppet regimes in Saudi Arabia and other dictatorships of the Near East, Middle East, and North Africa.” The goal was to inflict significant casualties on those working for the causes of the west and to “get crusaders out of the lands of Islam especially from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine.”²⁷ And while there had to have been some disagreement or variation of intended focuses and goals within the ranks of potential Al Qaeda jihadists, these were the things most commonly presented as motivators and desires for the movement upon which Al Qaeda was based.

Recalling above the mention of American occupation of Palestine, this presence and topic of debate is perhaps one of the most often noted areas of discontent for Al Qaeda fighters, and especially Osama bin Laden himself. The longstanding U.S. alliance with Israel currently stands as a source of contention, and also acted as a clear motivating factor for members of Al Qaeda. The jihadist movement did not approve of the unqualified U.S. military and political support for Israel.²⁸ In fact, in his declaration of jihad, Osama bin Laden directly called for expanded jihad against the United States because of the occupation of Palestine (in support of Israel and Judeo-Christianity) and alleged murders of Muslims there.²⁹ Perhaps a reiteration of previous ideological testimonies, the U.S. presence in what (according to many who considered themselves a part of the fundamentalist movement) should be a region safe for Muslims and conducive to the practice and support of Islam, again prompted actions of terror in the pursuit of their eradication. According to Jonathan Schnazer, author of the book *Al-Qaeda’s Armies*, the group from which Al Qaeda’s ranks would have been chosen rejected Israel’s existence. He states that, for them, “the very concept of peace with Israel is an anathema.” To be sure, the absence of peace and the *intifada* (with its images of Palestinian youngsters taking on Israeli tanks) soured the climate for moderation in the area and created a more fertile breeding ground for anger and resentment — the stock in trade of Osama bin Laden and the terrorist networks.³⁰ Al Qaeda jihadists shared the perspective that Israel, and Israel’s perpetual alliance with the United States, explained the unrest in the region and the persecution of Palestinians in the ongoing territorial, religious, and political conflict. For Al Qaeda, these

unresolved tensions, and U.S. contributions to it, stood as one large and legitimate cause for the formation of a terrorist organization. Eventually, Al Qaeda would be essentially fighting fire with fire, performing acts of terror and violence as retribution for Israeli/Palestinian violence and tension in the Middle Eastern region, and American contributions toward it.

The answer to the question of why extremist Muslims, Islamic jihadists, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the thousands of others worldwide originally came together, structured Al Qaeda as an organization, and took up arms to perform acts terror is not entirely conclusive, confusingly tangled up in the events of the last several decades, and contains seemingly innumerable reasons. But, from many large pools of information, it can be gathered and studied, many logical conclusions can be drawn, and many in search of answers can be provided with some degree of explanation, or even closure. The creation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization was due to various events and conditions, culminating in three collective causes.

First, the decade of 1979-1989 and its major events, as well as their results, led down the road to Al Qaeda. Most importantly, events such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan fostered a kind of heightened Islamic unity, in the face of opposing outside ideologies. Revolutionary changes in power and culture, as well as recruitment and unification for the purpose of military action, increased external funding and weaponry, and legitimate reason for training masses, led to never-before-seen levels of Islamic, Muslim, and Middle Eastern camaraderie on the Persian Gulf.

After the development of this coincidentally ideal climate in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan came the heightened popularity and devotion to the religion and culture of Islamism. Advocacy for an extreme sect of Islam, one whose perfect society is a most pure Islamic one, became perhaps the most logical catalyst propelling the Islamist movement and resulting in the formation of an Al Qaeda, clearly intending to perform its bidding. With renewed devotion to such an extreme ideology, jihadists (with the help of experienced leaders like Osama bin Laden) began to connect the dots and listen attentively to their grievances with the West, as well as to the calls of Allah to address these discrepancies.

Together with this, the modern, progressive, democratic and westernization movement, as well as actions of the United States such as occupation of Islamic lands and continuation of an alliance with Israel, were also important

components of the initiating logic of Al Qaeda. All of these activities were viewed as an interconnected, giant affront to Islam as a whole. So, those interested in standing up for what they believed in — Islamism — as what was best for their people ended up being the ones first in line to contribute to the foundation and ultimately decide to form such an organization as Al Qaeda in the first place.

It was not one person’s fault. It was not one nation’s fault. The “fault” was, most simply, in any and all opposition and continuation of violations of the extremist Islamic ideology. The fault was in our differences and in their discrimination. Al Qaeda is not the effect of one event. The Al Qaeda organization is the effect of thousands of actions and events in our fairly recent history that culminated in the form of extremist terror. Ultimately, it can be concluded that differing religious beliefs and incongruences of political and social ideologies between “the West” and “the East,” both prompted, and have allowed for, the progress and growth of Al Qaeda in the past three decades. Without any one of the events or developments listed herein, the timeline of formation and subsequent acts of terror might well have been completely altered. Nonetheless, this is the history that our world has created, and the formation of Al Qaeda as an Islamic terrorist organization was the unfortunate result we’ve been forced to reason, and to live with.

Endnotes

¹ Rex A. Hudson, *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists* (Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 1999).

² Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and What They Come to Destroy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing, 2006), 3.

³ Ibid., 3.

⁴ Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 69

⁵ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 5.

⁶ Hudson, *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why*, 171.

⁷ Ibid., 171.

⁸ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 34.

⁹ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰ Ibid., 34.

¹¹ Ibid., 79.

¹² Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 161.

¹³ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 97.

¹⁴ Osama bin Laden, “Osama bin Laden’s 1998 Fatwa,” 1998, accessed March 13, 2015, <http://www.911memorial.org/sites/all/files/Osama%20bin%20Laden%27s%201998%20Fatwa%20declaring%20war%20against%20the%20West%20and%20Israel.pdf>.

¹⁵ Aaron Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terror Organizations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 17.

¹⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷ Al Qaeda. *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*, 1993, accessed March 13, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf.

¹⁸ Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism*, 100.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 101.

²² Al Qaeda, *Encyclopedia*.

²³ Bin Laden, *1998 Fatwa*.

²⁴ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 58.

²⁵ Hudson, *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why*, 8.

²⁶ Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, 70.

²⁷ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 24.

²⁸ Ibid., 4.

²⁹ Osama bin Laden, “Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad Against Americans,” 1996, accessed March 13, 2015, <http://www.911memorial.org/sites/all/files/Osama%20bin%20Laden%27s%201996%20Fatwa%20against%20United%20States.pdf>.

³⁰ Jonathan Schnazer, *Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror* (New York: Specialist Press International, 2005), 6.

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